Etendard embarrassment
Sam White
Paris From the start France's involvement in I: the Iran-Iraq war was such as to make it in effect a co-belligerent on Iraq's side. This was already dangerous enough but it was a danger limited largely to France itself. Now, however, with the prospect of the Iraqis acquiring and actually using the five Super-Etendards and their Exocet missiles, the danger takes on a global character — with the US and Western Europe and ultimately the Soviet Union becoming directly involved.
It is this prospect which has made even the French shudder and hesitate and has brought bitter division on the issue within the French government. As for the aeroplanes themselves, although they left their Brittany base some time ago their pre- sent whereabouts remain a mystery and it is not certain even now that they have actually reached Iraq. Clearly, however, the delay in delivery has been due to last-minute French efforts to extract concessions from the Ira- qis as to their use, giving France some kind of veto power on the targeting of the Exocets. One concession that the French have cer- tainly pressed for is that the Etendards with their missiles would not be used before a projected resolution declaring the Gulf region a non-combat zone goes before the United Nations. If the Iranians rejected such a resolution, as they almost certainly Will, then at least France and with it Iraq Will have gone through the motions of trying to prevent an enlargement of the conflict.
The question of targeting is all-important
because the most obvious target for the Etendard-Exocet combination — indeed virtually the only plausible one — is the Ira- nian oil terminal of Kharg. If that is attack- ed or even threatened with attack then this Would effectively shut off the bulk of Ira- nian oil exports by frightening off shipping, and reduce Iranian oil revenues, as Iraq's have been by the war, to a fraction of their present level.
It is here that panic sets in in the West, for Ayatollah Khomeini has threatened that if that happens he will block the Straits of Hormuz through which most of the oil from the Gulf passes. In that case Western navies, including those of Britain and France and headed by elements of the US fleet already in the region, will have no op- tion but to force a clearance of the straits. Meanwhile Iraq having lost the bulk of its Oh l revenues in the course of the three-year- old war — the Syrians have obligingly cut the Pipeline to the Mediterranean and Ira- nian guns overlook the sea route — finds itself on the point of financial collapse. Its ast hope is to end the war which it star- ted by forcing ban to negotiate a settle- ment. Otherwise the regime will go down the drain and with it some four billion dollars, at the most modest estimate, that the French have lent it.
The whole idea behind the Etendard deal — thought up by the Iraqis and agreed by the French — was that the mere threat of the use of a weapon combination that had achieved such fame in the Falklands would bring the Ayatollah to the conference table. It was a dubious idea at the time (some six months ago), and it looks even more dubious now. The deal as agreed to then included not only the five Etendards and the Exocets but also 29 Mirage fighter- bombers. The deal on the Mirages was an- nounced immediately but the Etendard one was not announced until several weeks later and then in a curious form. The Etendards were not to be sold to Iraq but only 'lent'. Nor was the government 'lending' them — it was the plane manufacturer Dassault who was doing it, and he in turn was borrowing them on lease for two years from the French Navy. This was a way of `moralis-
ing' the operation by making it appear as a private deal between Dassault and the Iraqis in which the French government was not directly involved. However, it was soon realised that this did not look so good either, so the idea of a 'loan' was quietly dropped. Instead a new formula was in- vented according to which the planes were 'leased' to Iraq for a three-year period after which, if they were not used, they would be returned to France. It is only in the last few weeks that all pretence and evasion in the matter has been dropped and the planes declared well and truly sold.
All these euphemisms reflected not only the French government's diplomatic embar- rassment over the deal but also the internal dissension within it on the subject. The chief objector was not himself a minister but the Secretary-General of the Socialist Party, Lionel Jospin. He found it hard to swallow that a Socialist government should be promoting arms sales to a near-bankrupt regime in what seemed like an attempt to keep it afloat so as to enable it to pay off its debts. Another objector was, oddly enough, the Minister of Finance, M Jac- ques Delors. He took the view that, apart from the diplomatic difficulties, such a deal would provoke a further large increase in the Iraqi debt and would weigh heavily on France's public finances.
Meanwhile M. Cheysson dispatched an emissary to Baghdad to plead that France should be allowed to have at least partial control over the use to which the planes might be put. It is not known what answer he received or whether it was even prin- table. Wherever the planes may be now the debate over their sale will continue within the cabinet, and President Mitterrand himself is becoming heavily involved in it. The leading defender of the deal, M Cheysson, claims that it is now more necessary than ever for France to honour its commitment or risk losing all credibility as an arms supplier.
Others argue that, though the risks in- volved in the deal should have been taken into consideration much earlier, to go back on it now or delay delivery would be disastrous. It would make it appear that the French government was not only yielding to international pressure but, worse still, to the Ayatollah's threats. This loss of face would not even be compensated by an im- provement in relations between Paris and Teheran. On the contrary it would prove to Teheran that France can be intimidated and the Ayatollah would be made more deter- mined than ever to bring about the downfall of his enemy Saddam Hussein. In any case, they further argue, the Iranians do not have the means for carrying out their threat to close the Straits of Hormuz. Meanwhile M Cheysson, who sows confu- sion with every statment he makes, has still further added to it by publicly claiming that he does not believe the Etendards will change the military balance in favour of Iraq. In that case, what is the point of the deal?
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