How to Economize
MR. CHURCHILL'S way of meeting an enormous deficit, though it surprised and pleased us all by its amazing cleverness, has rightly drawn more attention than ever -to the need for national economy. His expedients Cannot be repeated. His method of bringing taxation under Schedule A of the Income Tax from next year into this year will not serve again ; nor will he he able to raid the Road Fund again while he is Chancellor of the Exchequer. The sobering truth is that, though the deficit will be made good this time by legerdemain, no new sources of revenue have been laid bare. Mr. Churchill counts, of course, on a trade revival, but we refuse to believe that any Unionist Government has become financially so demoralized as
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On the present plan we are spending much more han we can see our way to raise from regular or egitimate revenue. What do the Government propose o do in this crisis ? They propose to abolish three partments and considerably reduce the entries into the Civil Service. This is something, but if the staffs f the three Departments are simply transferred to other epartments, the immediate saving will be very small !steed. Moreover, we have a strong suspicion that if he exporters of this country were consulted, they would lecide by a majority that the Department of Overseas Trade has been more useful to them than any existing epartment. By comparison with that Department the ass of the Ministry of Transport and the Mines Depart- neat would 'cause no mourning at all. No doubt the ismissal of staffs who believed that they were secure i their employment is a very unpleasant and invidious .t, but thiS consideration does not apply to persons .ho have not yet entered the Civil Service. If the dries are cut down by the thousand, it will be found ither that the work will be done just the same, or that .ork which cannot be done by a Civil Service as large the nation can afford is not worth doing.
There is no method of economy so salutary or so simple s that of deciding that there is only a certain amount to Pend, and spreading that amount over the various items. 'overnments always begin at the wrong end by going lirough the items first and deciding what can or cannot he lispensed with. So few things can be dispensed with in heory that the sum arrived at in this way is bound to xeeed the amount available.
„It is not, however, in the Civil Service, but in the. ighting Services, that we can look hopefully for great eonomies. Here is the real field for saving. We are old that it is extremely " risky " to cut down the Navy. e agree in a sense that it is a risk, but, on the principle at beggars cannot be choosers, we say that our problem really to choose between risks and to prefer the mailer. Can any nation possibly accept a greater risk han that of insolvency ? That is the risk which we accepting at present lightheartedly—as though it id not matter. The First Lord of the Admiralty tells s that, whereas we had a two-Power standard before e War, we now have only a 'one-Power standard. e tints hopes to acquire merit. Yet the one-Power standard costs more than the two-Power standard. No one argued more constantly or more anxiously in support of a large Navy than we did when we were conscious of the positive German menace. But against whom are we building now ? The nations are all so exhausted that war on the grand scale is out of the question for several years. Even if the world's finances would run to a great war, the nations are in such a frame of mind that they would not tolerate it.
Under the League of Nations a sense of the convenience. of arbitral settlements is taking the place of reliance upon the old-fashioned ultimatum. Every civilized nation knows now that if it attempted a mad dog policy and became a public danger, it would be sent to Coventry by all the other civilized nations. Its communications would be cut off ; its trade would take a generation to recover from the wholesale boycott dictated by dis- approval and indignation. It seems, therefore, that we are maintaining a great Navy without any definite risks to insure against. We are told that, after all, we have got to police the Empire. That, too, is true, but what kind of new ship is needed for this police work ? Is it the type of large cruiser, very expensive, which is being built now ? We cannot believe that it is.
Finally, we are told that as the work of the Pre- paratory Commission of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva has reached something like a deadlock, the chief argument of those who would save on the Fighting Services has been taken away from them. For our part, we have never believed that there was much prospect of success in a plan for au all-round limitation of armaments, as the scheme compares like with unlike and no common denominator can be found. We hope against hope, of course, but even if the present Geneva scheme should conic to nothing, there is always the possibility of acting on the proposal of President Coolidge. Great Britain, the United States and Japan might agree among themselves to further Naval limitation. Such an agreement would in itself amount to an understanding that because we three accepted risks with our eyes open, none of the parties could look on unmoved if the others suffered from a disturber of the public peace. Incidentally, we could call off the Singapore scheme. Whatever happens, then, to the plan of the Preparatory Commission, we are not, and shall not be, justified in refusing to economize on the Navy.
We would also economize on the Army. The Govern- ment, by a masterpiece of ironic action, have so far economized on the one military force which is economically managed and is capable of definite expansion—the Territorials.
With a smaller Navy during the next few years, a smaller Army, and a much greater reliance upon the Air Force for Imperial police work by land, we could put an entirely new complexion upon these terrifying Budgets. And, in our judgment, our security would be not less but greater. For not only should we set an example which might be followed, but we should be building up a financial reserve, which is the best defence in the long run that any nation can possibly have.
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