GLOOM OVER GENEVA
THE physical preparations for the Geneva Conference are coming along. But, in the West, diplomatic prepara- tions have, astonishingly, only just begun. The reason, which is a bad reason for being unprepared, is that the West finds it almost impossible to see what it can gain from S'etteva, while it is only too easy to see what the Communists "', ay gain from it The issues, now being discussed by British, btalerican and French officials in Paris, are three: a peace 6.ettlet11ent for Korea; the composition of the conference when It comes to. discuss Indo-China; and the terms of an armistice Or peace settlement for Indo-China. 1, It is a long time since President Syngman Rhee was in the "eadlines. And it seems unlikely that the Geneva Conference /:,ill Pit him back there for long. The issue is comparatively ' 111Ple. Will Russia and China and North Korea agree to the 11,13ification of the country and the free election of an all-Korean evernment in circumstances that will allow the majority of the 1,sc ‘°rean people to be properly represented ? The population '.' North Korea has shrunk in the course of the war from elght to three millions. If only for this reason, it seems tplikely that the Communists will agree to elections that will eallY be free. The continued division of Korea along the armistice line is, therefore, the most probable outcome. „ The state of Western opinion on Indo-China is far more .confused. What are the allied peace terms ? If there is no rs)e,ace, what then ? These questions remain undecided, in ,P'te of the attempt by some politicians with an axe to grind 1°. make out that they were prejudged during the visit of Galr. Dulles to London and Paris. The American and British ,, elvernments believe that it would only be safe to accept a l'eace in Indo-China on terms that left Ho Chi-minh militarily :11d politically impotent. The sort of terms they have in mind i',tie much like those announced to the French Assembly by rek Lailiel at the beginning of March: the withdrawal of the els from Laos and Cambodia and, in Vietnam, their con- f.‘7..nlration in definite zones. At the same time, the loyal ,a,ste,toamese would be given their independence . from France, . alloWed every opportunity lo turn themselves.into a genuine Political alternative to Ho. Chi-minh. - • Whether the French still regard these terms as their minimum is another matter. M. Laniel and some of his Cabinet do, which implies that they are also prepared to go on fighting if (as they are almost bound to) the Communists turn them down. But others in M. Laniel's Cabinet, who have the support of hundreds in the French Assembly and millions in the country, feel that France cannot go on fighting and that she should therefore accept the most favourable settlement she can get.
In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the United States has not yet decided .precisely how, or where or even whether it will intervene in the war. What it has decided is that it " cannot.afforcl to let Indo-China go." lithe West gets a peace settlement on its own terms, American interven- tion will not be necessary. If, it does not, the form that inter- vention must take will depend on a number of questions which may not have to be answered until the end of the monsoon in the Autumn—whether France will hold on and whether, with American supplies, she can manage another campaigning season alone. If it is necessary to take a decision before that, America's allies can be sure that it will be taken.
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