THE JOINT CANDIDATE SCHEME.

[TO THE EDITOR OF THE " SPECTATOEt."]

SIR,—You have discussed and criticised in all its bearings the Hare plan of the Alternative Vote. Allow me to describe another scheme, generally preferred on the Continent, and not liable to the same objections. Its present form is the result of an elaborate discussion by the Committee of the Proportional Representation Society,—who. however, have come to no collective decision upon the relative merits of the two schemes. This scheme, which has been called the Joint Candidate Scheme, might take as its motto Mr. Morley's maxim,—" One man one vote, and every vote of equal value." The constituencies to which it is applied must return at least three Members, but each elector has only one vote (which, however, he may divide among as many candidates as he pleases). In this way, fair proportional representation is made possible, for in any con- stituency where 20,000 Reds can return two Members, 10,000 Blues will necessarily be able to return one. This gives the Blues all they are entitled to, but the Reds also require pro- tection. They must be saved from the danger of wasting their votes by heaping them in unnecessary numbers on a favourite candidate. They must be free to express their individual preferences between the candidates of their own party, and must be relieved from the strict drill which is one of the chief causes of the dislike felt to the present limited vote.

These and other objects may be attained by allowing candi- dates of similar views to be nominated, and to stand as Joint Candidates,—a proposal whose meaning and effect will be best SPRII by a sample voting-paper, and a short description of the count at an imaginary election:--

[Five Members to be elected. VOTING PAPER.

Place for Mark.

TBRIGHT JOINT BROWN CANDIDATES. CHAMBERLAIN

MUNTZ (BURNABY

JOINT

CANDIDATES. CHURCHILL (JONES

ROBINSON INSTRUCTIONS TO THE VOTER.

The voter may vote for as many candidates as he pleases by placing a cross opposite the name of each. If he vote for one candi- date only, his vote counts one to that candidate; if for two, the vote counts a half to each ; if for three, a third, and so on.

Votes given to a joint candidate (if not required to return that candidate) may be used to assist any other of the candidates bracketed with him. They will be applied to return as many of the set as possible, in the order of the number of votes polled by each of them.

Suppose that on counting up the votes, the numbers are found to stand thus :- Bright 20,000 Brown 5,000 Chamberlain 15,000 Muntz 10,000-50,000 Burnaby 11,000 Churchill 16,000 Jones 6,000-33,000 Robinson 14,000 As between themselves, the order of priority of joint candidates is determined by the number of votes polled by each. Accordingly, the order in which the Liberal joint candidates are to be elected is —Bright, Chamberlain, Muntz, Brown.

For the same reason, the order in which the Conservative joint candidates are to be elected is—Churchill, Burnaby, Jones.

The votes of each set of joint candidates are then distributed among them, so as to make them all equal. This gives :- Robinson 14,000 Each of the four Liberals 12,500 Each of the three Conservatives 11,000 It is clearly impossible that all three Conservatives should be elected, and therefore Jones, as the lowest, is rejected. Jones's votes are then divided between Churchill and Burnaby, bringing up their score to 16,500. This gives :— Churchill and Burnaby, each 16,500 Robinson 14,000 Each of the four Liberals 12,500 It is now seen that all four Liberals cannot be elected, and Brown, who stands lowest on the Liberal list, is in his turn rejected. His votes are distributed between the three remaining Liberals, making the score :- Bright, Chamberlain, Muntz, each 16,6661 Churchill and Burnaby, each 16,500 Robinson 14,000 The lowest candidate is now Robinson, who is accordingly rejected, and the remaining five are declared elected.

A result which is obviously satisfactory.—I am, Sir, &c., Western Club, Glasgow, August 13th. J'. PARKER SMITH.