THE FRENCH BREAK WITH CHINA.
AT the time we write, there has been no formal declara- tion of war between France and China ; but so many wars have occurred without any formal declaration of war,
and the diplomatic breach, both at Pekin and in Paris, is now so formal, that we cannot see any reasonable hope that war can be avoided. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that France wishes to avoid war, whether China wishes it or not.
It is clear from M. Ferry's last speech in the Assembly that he looks upon a high-handed Colonial policy as the best means of compensating France for her loss of influence in Europe, and though he would certainly have preferred peace with cash as well as what is termed honour, to the burdens, the dangers, and complications of war, he could hardly recede further from the original indemnity demand already so rapidly reduced. We expect, therefore, to hear immediately of active operations by the Fleet against the arsenal of Foochow, and probably of some attempt to seize the Island of Hainan, as well as to extend the hold already acquired over the Island of Formosa. For the rest, France—unless she pursues the vigorous policy of a demonstration against Pekin, which means a most serious military effort, such as there is no reason to believe that the Government at present contemplate at all—will probably restrict her military operations to the defence of Tonquin' against the irruptions which will shortly be thronging over the Kwang-si frontier. The disinclination to ask for a heavy money-vote will probably be so serious, that we do not expect to see France attempting a serious blow at the Chinese capital, and the hope of some of the French news- papers that the first victory on the Kwang-si frontier will bring China to her knees is, no doubt, pure illusion. China dislikes greatly, no doubt, the prospect of war with France, and went a good way, for such an Empire as the Chinese, to avoid it. Whether the unfortunate event at Lang-son was really due to Chinese treachery, or, as appears not improbable after the explanations in the French Assembly, to a real misunderstanding, there seems little doubt that if France had not insisted on an indemnity, and so hastily taken Kelung as a pledge for the payment of that indemnity, peace might yet have been concluded. We do not think that M. Ferry's Government was so culpably dictatorial as others of our contemporaries think it in treating the Lang-son attack as premeditated. That may have been, and perhaps was, a great injustice to the Government of China ; but undoubtedly, on the first blush of tha case, the French view was the natural one ; and the only fault we find with France was the irritability with which her Government gave effect to the impulse generated by that first impression. The French nation are apt to be impatient on such matters ; and the Republican Government, conscious of the necessity of obliterating the memory of recent humiliations, are probable even more impatient than the French nation. What we blame much more severely than the impatient action of the Government, was the monstrous magnitude of the indemnity first demanded, and the subsequent seizure of Kelung before even negotiations had been broken off. The very way to make China incredulous of French sincerity, was to ask £10,000,000 at first, and then to lower her demand to less than a third of that sum. And no more telling confirmation of that want of sincerity could have been given, than the hasty seizure of Kelung as a security for the payment of an indemnity not yet conceded. The policy of taking what you want first, and extorting the con- cession of right afterwards, is inconsistent with negotiation. It is war, without the forms of war.
However, as France is now practically at war with China, and we may expect to hear shortly how she intends to con- duct that war, it is no longer of much use to discuss the exact amount of moral culpability which the French Govern- ment have incurred in the proceedings which led to that war. It is not often that any nation dealing with what it believes to be a greatly inferior Power, shows as much magnanimity and forbearance as it might ; and we see very little use, and much possibility of mischief, in the tendency which has sprung up amongst us to inflict daily moral lectures upon France for her dealings with China. Of course, we ought to form some judgment on these proceedings, if only because it is of importance to us to gauge the spirit of the French Administration ; but having formed that opinion, it is by no means desirable to impress upon France that Eng- land is so pleasantly occupied in exposing and condemning her iniquities that she has no time to consider the French view of those proceedings. We shall not make the French operations in China less high-handed by continually dinning into the ears of Frenchmen our thanks to Heaven that we are not as other men are, nor even as M. Ferry's Government.
Unless the French Government has the financial and mili- tary audacity to prepare at once an expedition against Pekin,— which, if successful, would, though at great expense, soon put an end to the war,—we should expect it to do little beyond reinforcing strongly the Tonquin army, extending its grasp over the more profitable portions of Formosa, and perhaps seizing Hainan and the arsenal of Foochow. More cannot be done without great expense, and even this much will probably far exceed in cost the sum already voted by the Chamber. Formosa, however' has valuable coal-mines in the immediate neighbourhood of Kelung, which might not only be extremely useful to the French Fleet, but might even prove a consider- able source of profit in those otherwise coal-less regions ; a-nd it is said that the sulphur mines and petroleum wells, also in the close neighbourhood of Kelung, and of Tam-sui, which the French fleet will probably soon capture, are of considerable value. If it be so, we may be sure that the French will soon get to work at them, and try and pay themselves by the new stimulus to commerce for their sacrifices as taxpayers for the war.
It is to be hoped that the French will avoid as much as possible any interference with German, and English, and Russian trade. One great danger of attacking the Treaty ports—and France is now almost certain to attack one or more of them—is that it is hardly possible to avoid inflicting injuries, not merely on the Chinese themselves, but on foreigners whose Governments are sure to put forward protests, and to claim indemnities as the con- sequence of these injuries. Such a result, if it led to unpleasant reclamations and repudiations of claim, between Germany and France, would be like dropping a spark on tinder ; and even in the case of England, it is not so long since the Tamatave incident occurred that we should forget how very near the country was to an impulse of fury against France, which, under other circumstances, might easily have caused a rupture, and perhaps even a struggle. This is why we are so anxious that the English Press should not at once fall into the habit of declamation against France.
We can all see that France has been blameable in her first demands on Anam, and perhaps even still more blameable in her indemnity requisitions and her premature seizure of Kelung. But it is certain that the evil of one war will not be diminished by the engendering of more wars.
There is nothing more necessary than the exercise of a strict self-command by all neutral nations whenever great States go to war. We must not be too ready to take offence either with China or with France for what may happen as an in- cident of that war. Of course we must defend our own rights and firmly protect our own citizens, but we must do so with the most patient temper, and remember how extremely diffi- cult it is for any two combatants to avoid inflicting what may look like superfluous and wilful injuries on peaceful bystanders. We may expect to have much vexatious news, and must take pains not to hear it with inflammable minds. Neither China nor France will wish to make fresh enemies ; but both China and France will find it impossible to avoid inflicting serious grievances, which, of course, they will be inclined to minimise in treating with the complainants. It will be the first duty of the neutrals to treat all such attempts to minimise the injuries actually suffered by them with patience, and not to make them occasions for irritating and angry criticism. Therefore we would discourage from the first the eager indulgence of that pleasure in reprobating the sins of France, which, if it be persisted in, will surely lead to mutual re- criminations and, in all probability, to mutual injustice.
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