THE NEW MILITARY FRONTIER IN FRANCE.
NOTHING could afford better proof of the deep impression made on the French mind by the German war than the efforts the French have made and the sacrifices they have en-
dured to render impossible for the future catastrophes like those which befell them in 1870 and 1871,—the surrender of Sedan, the fall of Paris, and the humiliating Peace of Frankfort. The armies of France may be beaten in the field—no measures taken beforehand can make victory sure—but it is no longer possible for them to be surprised and overwhelmed in a few weeks as they were fourteen years ago. Ready and strong as Germany is, she cannot now hope to overcome France without a struggle so terri- ble and prolonged, that short of some unbearable provocation the attempt will probably never be made. So far, therefere, the new French frontier is favourable to peace, the more especially as the present system of universal military service and bloated armaments renders wars so costly and exhausting, that it is
not in the nature of things they should be long. A twelve- month's strife between two great military States would place either one or both of them bors de combat.
The new French military frontier is to the old one what the repeating-rifle is to the flint-lock musket. During the war of 1870 the border was defended only by two or three first-class forts, and some fortresses of the second rank, built at haphazard before the idea of girdling the country with a chain of strong _places had been conceived. Now, thanks to the genius of her engineers, and an unstinted expenditure, France is perhaps even more thoroughly and scientifically defended than Germany herself. The idea of the strategists who planned the project was less to construct a continuous line of fortifications, which would have both been too costly, and required for their efficient defence too many men,—than so to place the new fortresses as to protect the more important roads and compel an invader to march whither he might meet with the greatest difficulties, and be encountered with the greatest chance of success. Thus, powerless to surprise, he would be forced to attack at the very points where the defenders were the best prepared, and the latter might mass their forces without fear of being surprised during the process, or letting the hostile General know at what point he himself was likely to be assailed. On these principles was the new French frontier planned ; and according to a paper lately read before the Military Society of Geneva by Colonel Coutau, of the Federal Army, and a dissertation on the subject by M. Eugene Tenot, a French Deputy, the work has been effectually accomplished.
The first line of defence runs before Metz (the Germans would say behind), along the-course of the Moselle, in itself a serious obstacle, and, by means of the entrenched camp of Toul, is practically continued to the Meuse. The right bank of the latter river is formed by a chain of hills, known as the Cotes de Meuse, on which have been built a series of forts with crossed fire, and these, supported at one extremity by the Camp of Toul, and at the other by the Camp of Verdun, render the line exceedingly strong and ill to break. As, owing to the vicinity of Metz and the nearness of Paris, this region is con- sidered particularly dangerous, all the roads and bridges are barred by "works of art," some of them so strong that they could only be taken after a regular siege. Taking this route to the capital, an invading host, marching from the East, would be forced to swerve either to the right or the left. If they adopted the former alternative, they would have to cross successively two rivers, the Aire and the Aisne, and the hilly and wooded coun- try of the Argonne, the latter very easy to defend, even against superior numbers. This done, they would find themselves before the second line of defence, formed by the entrenched camps of Rheims and Laon. If, on the other hand, the invading General should decide to operate by his left, he would have to pass, as through a defile, between the entrenched camps of Toul and of Epinal. Advancing further in the same direction, he would encounter the two strong places of Langres and Dijon, the one barring the road to Paris, the other forbidding access to- Lyons and the South. It is no longer possible, as it was in 1870, for an enemy to slip in through the gap of Belfort, between the Vosges Mountains and the Swiss frontier, for the gap is now occupied by an entrenched camp, supported on the north by Epinal, and on the south by Montbeliard. Behind this formidable fence come the strong places of Langres, Dijon, and Besancon. Together with the frontier forts of the Jura, and the entrenched camps of Belfort and Epinal, these works form a vast pentagon, at whose either angle is placed a fortification of the first order, with which, think French engineers, no enemy, except in numbers utterly overwhelm- ing, will attempt to engage. Nor is this all. After the invader had subdued or masked all these strong places, he would have to count with the numerous detached forts that, besides rendering Paris almost impregnable, cover the north and west of France, and the equally formidable ramparts of Lyons, covering the valley of the Rhone and the South. The issues of the Graian Alpes are guarded by Grenoble, the works on the Isere and the forts of Briancon. On the side of Belgium, the border is defended by Dunkirk, Lille, and Valenciennes, all enlarged and modernised ; on the side of Italy by the old Alpine forts, and in the second line by the new works lately constructed at Nice and Toulon.
This rapid resina affords only a very inadequate idea of the activity and energy of the French engineers, and the vast- ness of the work which they have achieved. Let the traveller who stops for a day at Dijon, or Besancon, Dunkirk, or Valenciennes, look for himself and judge of the rest by what he sees, bearing in mind that within the space of ten years France has been fortified afresh with works of the most formid- able description, and that wherever railways for the union of these works were wanting, they have been made.
There are now but three ways by which France can be invaded from the North. Two of these ways lie through the gap of the Meuse and the Argonne, and the gap of the Moselle ; Out the difficulties they present, by reason of the chain of fortifications we have described, are so great, that an invading General would be strongly tempted to take the third way and strike at France through Belgium. French strategists believe so firmly in the likelihood of this contingency, that in fore- casting the future they reckon carefully how many men Belgium could bring to the aid of France for the defence of her neutrality. On the other hand, German strategists deem it far from improbable that, on the outbreak of war, the French might issue from the passes of the Jura, and, by a swift march across Northern Switzerland, try to reach the Rhine and take Germany at advantage where her frontier is most open. This possibility has been much canvassed in the Con- federation, where it has excited, and still excites, a good deal of needless apprehension. For, to say the least, France, in the unhappy event of another contest with Germany coming to pass, would not find it easy to hold her own ; her population is less, and does not increase ; she has garrisons to maintain in many distant possessions, and
in point of numbers would be decidedly overmatched. To incur in such circumstances the hostility of Switzerland, a country which could put into the field a quarter of a million of soldiers—when defending their own mountains more than a match for as many Frenchmen—would be sheer madness.
For analogous reasons, Germany is not likely to violate the
neutrality of Belgium. England is the guarantor of that neutrality ; and though we do not count our soldiers by the million, Prince Bismarck or his successor would think twice
before taking a step which would force this country and Belgium into an offensive and defensive alliance with F.-ranee.
If the existence of Germany were at stake, her Generals would naturally stick at nothing ; but that contingency is so very remote that it need not be considered. In no event, however,
is Germany likely to trouble Switzerland. The objective of a German invasion of France must always be Paris ; and it is a roundabout road to .Paris by Basel and Geneva, even if the Fort de rEcluse, the other forts that bar the passes of Jura, and the strong place of Lyons, did not stop the way.
All these considerations should be matter of rejoicing for the friends of peace. The more difficult it becomes for France and Germany to get at each other, the less likely are they to go to war. It would have spared both countries enormous treasure and no little anxiety if Alsace and Lorraine, instead of being annexed to Prussia, had been added to the Swiss Con- federation, for in that case the two Powers would have been permanently sundered by a population of five millions, mostly of Teutonic race, who would always have been ready to take sides against aggression, from what side soever it might cqme.
Some English, and other writers, have questioned the utility of the new French frontier. They think that the fact of being surrounded by strong places will tend tO weaken the morale of French soldiers and render their Generals less active and enter- prising. It maybe that from a purely military point of view these writers are right. But they forget that a nation is not com- posed exclusively of soldiers, and fail to realise how much the French people were cowed by the disasters of 1870 and 1871, and how necessary it was to restore that sense of security with- out which life is hardly worth having. Rightly or wrongly, they now believe that, albeit they may possibly be involved in another war, the measures they have taken will keep its horrors from their own doors. This being the case; their new frontier, costly as it has proved, and apart from its merely military advantages, cannot be looked upon as an unwise investment.
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