RED SYRIA
THE swing to the left in Syria with the appointment of General Bizri as Commander-in-Chief and the allega- tions of an American plot against the security of the State will have for its first result a still further break-up of Arab unity. Each Arab State now has its own special position on a scale ranging from Syria supported by the Soviet Union to Iraq in the Baghdad pact and the Lebanon firmly attached to the Eisenhower doctrine. The two people most likely to be embarrassed by this are King Saud and Colonel Nasser. Both of them aspire to lead Arab nationalism, but both of them, in varying degrees, dislike the idea of offending the United States. King Saud in addition sees himself personally threatened by the left-wing approach of the army officers who are trying to make history everywhere in the Arab world today. As to Colonel Nasser it may be that Syrian extremism will lead him to more moderate behaviour. There are some signs—for instance, the permission given to some ships recently to pass through the Suez Canal on their way to Israel —that this may be so.
It is not easy to see what is actually happening inside Syria itself. President Kuwatly has found it convenient to make one of his visits to an Egyptian hospital, and it is doubtful if he will return. Power in Syria has been for a long time in the hands of warring groups of army officers, and the shifts resulting from personal attitudes are bound to be obscure. For that matter it is by no means certain just how left-wing men like General Bizri and Colonel Sarraj are. They are probably not Communist in any usual sense of the word, but rather nationalists who wish both for complete independence from the West and for an end to the corruption and exploita- tion which have marked most Arab administrations. Britain and America should realise that the strength of Russia in the Middle East—as indeed in Asia generally—is its ability to attract idealists.
However, whatever the real views of Syria's rulers, there is no doubt that their rupture with the US has put them decisively in the Russian camp as far as the world power struggle is concerned. For America, Britain and the Baghdad pact powers it can only be a very serious business to have Syria established as a potential Russian ally on the Medit- terranean. Yet this fact should not lead them to indulge in a policy of adventure. In the present state of Arab feeling any hint that America was trying to get rid of a Syrian government could only have the effect of strengthening it. The correct policy here would be one of watchfulness combined perhaps with more successful approaches to other Arab States than have been possible in the past. For Colonel Nasser, at least, must be feeling annoyed with the Syrians. They have made his favourite game of playing off East against West much more difficult, and US diplomacy should be able to take advantage of this fact, though any appeasement of Egypt should cer- tainly be avoided.
The divisions in the Arab world have now gone so far that the only thing which could produce a sudden unity to the disadvantage of the West would be some action by Britain and America which might be construed as an affront to national pride or a colonialist threat. We are now in a good position to put our relations with the Arabs on a sounder and more realistic basis, but to do this we must resist the temptation of getting into a new Suez or of placing too much reliance on pacts. Paradoxically, the Syrian crisis presents us with an opportunity, for the overt appearance of extreme left-wing elements at the head of the Syrian Government may well cause a reaction in favour of the West among some sections of Arab opinion.
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We must not bully the Arabs, but equally we must not appease them. The present situation should be rather favour- able to Israel than otherwise, and there had been signs until recently that the West had learned its lesson after Suez and was not prepared to sacrifice Israeli interests for approval from Cairo or Amman. This evolution, unfortunately, re- ceived a sharp check with the announcement that two British oil companies—one with a Government majority holding— were to cease trading in Israel. The reason given for this was that their installations there were uneconomic, but it is quite clearly a question rather of politics than economics. What- ever the intentions of the companies may be—and they are suspect—the result of this action is to assist the pressure of the Arab blockade of Israel, raise Arab hopes of disposing of Israel and, thereby, increase tension in the Middle East. This is a case in which the British Government should exert its influence on the companies, and it is the kind of thing which must be avoided completely if the Arab-Israeli quarrel is ever to die down.
The news from Syria does not mean any radical change in the Middle East. It simply emphasises the uncertainties which attend.the whole evolution of the Arab world, inflamed by nationalism and competed for by two rival power blocks. Any settlement in the area will be made far more difficult if the West allows itself to be stampeded into any precipitate action. What ought to be happening is a steady evolution away from a diplomacy of coups de main and petrol, towards the reasoned standards of behaviour as between nation and nation which are to be found in other parts of the world. The Arab world has been ruled up till now by governments of adventurers; but.that is no reason for the West to get into bad habits and regard a diplomacy of Sixth Fleets and para- chutists as appropriate to the circumstances.
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