THE SPECTATOR
THE TEST BAN GAMBIT
There can be no doubt that Soviet- American relations are entering a critical and delicate phase. The next couple of months will determine whether the Soviet and American leaders will have another summit meeting this year, as agreed be- tween them in Geneva last year, and if so, on what terms. This week, Mr Gorbachev has played his fairly predictable pre- summit gambit: an extension of the Soviet Union's own unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapon testing, coupled with a further call to the United States to join the moratorium. Such an agreement, he says, would be the 'main real outcome' of this year's summit, and 'a considerable step on the road to halting the arms race'. Now plainly Mr Gorbachev would not propose anything that is not to his country's advan- tage. But Washington should consider very carefully before rejecting this initiative outright. So much is at stake.
American officials say that a test ban would not be verifiable and in any case would be to Moscow's advantage, since the Soviet Union has already tested its latest weapons while the United States has not. So far as the layman can judge, the first objection now seems considerably weakened by advances in monitoring tech- nology. The second objection is more powerful, although some of its power derives from the fact that — making all due allowance for Soviet secrecy — the United States probably are currently developing a wider range of more technically advanced nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly, there would be some military price to be paid for any test ban. But the real political question which the Reagan administration must address is: what might we get for paying this price? Or to put it another way: is this not what the economists call an 'opportunity cost'?
It may be. There is, after all, a great difference between political and technolo- gical time. A year in politics is a very long time. A year in nuclear testing is not. It is very hard to believe that the United States would suffer any-disastrous military dam- age by joining the Soviet moratorium for, say, the calendar year of 1987. Mr Gor- bachev, by the wording of his speech, left the door open for such a short-term, open-ended, renewable (or disposable) agreement: he did not categorically de- mand a long-term Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, despite his heavy denunciation of US militarism, he did not positively insist on a stop to Star Wars research or the negotiation of more sweeping arms control agreements as a pre-condition to this year's summit. So his stated price is not impossibly high.
The first political advantage of paying this 'opportunity cost' would be, quite simply, to keep the top-level dialogue going. This, in itself, would be a very considerable comfort to most of the Euro- pean partners in the Western alliance, and of course to European public opinion. It is also important to consider Mr Gorbachev's domestic position. That position is rather less dominant that most Western commen- tators have routinely assumed. From the outset, Mr Gorbachev has associated him- self with a policy of renewed dialogue with the United States. By now, he rather badly needs a success from that policy. Last year's summit was not quite it. He went to Geneva declaring that the one true mea- sure of success or failure would be progress on arms control, and specifically a stop to Star Wars. He came away with a basketful of smiles, but no progress on arms control. If he could come away from this year's summit saying that the United States had `joined the Soviet Union' in its nuclear test moratorium, that would pass for a success. The main purpose of Western policy is certainly not to help Mr Gorbachev con- solidate his own domestic position. But it plainly is in the West's overall interest to convince a Soviet leader who may be with us for a long time that something may be gained from a continuation of the East- West dialogue. Finally, it is not necessarily the case that the United States would be giving now in the uncertain hope of receiving later. Arms control is top of the Soviet agenda for summitry: indeed, it often seems to be the only point on their agenda. But the Amer- icans attach almost equal importance to `I believe I can find some work for idle hands.' other areas, such as regional issues and human rights. If Mr Gorbachev were to come away with an agreement on a test ban, why should not Mr Reagan come away with some concessions in other fields?
With the world chess championship being played in London, the metaphor is irresistible. Mr Gorbachev's opening is the Test Ban Gambit. Mr Reagan should accept it — in the spirit of Kasparov.
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