BOOKS.

THE PAN-GERMAN PLOT UNMASKED.• Tan English translation of M. Cheradame's latest book has come at an opportune moment when tho Germans are filling the air with talk of peace. Now is the time to be circumspect, to be firm as well as just ; and we cannot commend to our readers a better collection of facts from which to derive a wise caution at this critical turn of events than is contained in this important work. For twenty-two years M. Cheradame has studied German policy, and during that time he has often written for blind eyes. But he has come into his own. Ho has proved to be a true prophet. And the success of his latest book in France shows that he has created an atmosphere of confidence in himself, and that in future all his warnings about German schemes and intrigues will be listened to with attention.

We do not say that on every point M. Cheradame convinces us.

Sometimes he seems to us to use facts as proofs of his theme when they are not quite in the nature of evidence but are rather illustrations. But substantially ho has been right throughout, and the least we can do now is to take his warnings for the future as also substantially justified. In our opinion, before any one ventures to discuss the nature of the terms which would comprise a satisfactory peace he would do well to read this book carefully. This is in effect the advice which Lord Cromer gives us in his introduction. " I entertain," he says, " a strong opinion that M. Cheradame's diagnosis of the present situation is, in all its main features, correct." There can be no doubt that if Germany were able to secure at this moment what is called a " negotiated peace " the dream of the Pan-Germans would still be in a considerable part fulfilled. Austria-Hungary (which, we must never forget, is mainly not a Teutonic but a South Slav State), Bulgaria, and Turkey would still be under her direction. If in the haggling over terms she could retain only a comparatively small piece of territory where the barrier (formed by Serbia and Rumania) across her road to the East is at its thinnest, it would still be open to her to construct a continuous military State stretching to the Persian Gulf. That would form a stronger Power than even the Germany we brew at the beginning of the war. If German militarism itself be not killed, or renounced by the people, Germany might have within those borders a worse opportunity for evil than ever. Even if her new plans went somet►mes astray, she would certainly prosecute thorn with all her old sinister talent, and she would remain a permanent focus of restlessness and a menace to the world. From that terror of the future we must at all costs be delivered. For our part, we do not want to deprive Germany of legitimate opportunities of trade. We do not believe in trying to cure the world of its ills by implanting a grievance in any nation. But the destruction of German militarism is essential. If Germany continues to confuse a military overlordship with industrial expansion, the blame will be upon her, not upon her present enemies. Her militarism must be brought to an end no matter what legitimate interests she in her madness causes to be dragged down with it.

Pan-Germanism, which was the source of the war, aims at creating

a great military Empire stretching from the North See, to the Persian Gulf. In 1911 Tannenberg described this scheme in a form famous throughout Germany, and it was in that year that it took what may be called its authorized and final shape. M. Cheradame sums up the scheme of 1911 in four formulas : " Berlin-Calais ; Berlin- Riga.; Hamburg-Salonika ; Hamburg-Persian Gulf." In 1909, when Austria-llungary obediently annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina at the dictation of Germany, a first step was being taken towards building up the grandiose ideal of Pan-Germanism. M. Cheradame, in pursuit

of his object of enlightening the world as to what Germany was aiming

at, lectured in some towns in Scotland, where, he tells us, though he was cordially received, his warnings were listened to with polite smiles of incredulity. Even his own countrymen regarded him as a man with a bee in his bonnet. Now look at what has happened. The Germans are not at Riga, but they are very near it. They are not at Calais, but they are at Ostend. They are not at Salonika, but they are trying to reach it. Finally, Turkey is completely under their • The rang:terms» Plot Unmasked : Berlin's Formidable Pease-Trap of " Tits Drawn Tt'ar." By Andre Cheradame. Translated by Lady Frazer. With an Introduction by the Earl of Creaser, O.M. With Maps. London: John Murray. 125. 012. act.'

control, and Turkey stretches -to the Persian Gulf. In other words, even as the situation is, Germany has executed nine-tenths of the Pan- German plan of 1911. Germany proposes peace because she knows that she is at her high-water mark of achievement, and that next year she will infallibly be forced back. What we have to do is to remember that Pan-Germanism is .a reality, and to test any thoughts of peace by the question : How far would such a peace serve the Pan-German idea, and how large a remnant of the-scheme could thereby be saved by Germany ? We are looking at the problem for the moment purely from the point of view of tho necessity of killing German militarism. Of course Germany must make ample reparation to the nations she has criminally victimised. That goes without saying whatever terms of peace we contemplate.

,Pan-Germanism still aims at establishing a huge military Empire on the ruins of conquered nations. At the beginning- of the war Germany hoped to establish that Empire—such was the almost incredible extent of this unparalleled plot—on the ruins of France and Russia. If she had succeeded, Britain's turn would have come in due course. The plot was not far from succeeding. But even now if we made an unwise peace Germany could save enough from her partially disappointed hopes to be a perpetual danger to the world. M. Cheradame earnestly warns the Allies against making a separate peace-with Austria-Hungary or Bulgaria or Turkey, for all these countries are hopelessly-under the thumb of Germany, and if they were treated with some indulgence now (as might easily happen in the event of a separate peace being made with any of them) it would be Germany that would enjoy the ultimate advantage. Again, he points out that the only sure way of preventing Germany from stretching -her military power over the whole of the Balkans is to create a new South Slav kingdom. We. have so often -urged the importance and the justice of this move that we need -not do more than say here that we are absolutely at one with all that AL Cheradame says on the subject.

Now that we know more for certain about German •plans we can all see how the German Emperor's appealto the Moslem world delivered at Damascus in 1698 slips into its place in the vast Pan-German plot. Lord Cromer says :- "When, in November, 1898, William II. pronounced his famous speech at Damascus, in which be etated that all the three hundred millions of Mohammedans in the world could rely upon him as their true friend, the world was inclined to regard the utterance as were rodo- montade. It was nothing of the sort. It-involved the declaration of a definite and far-reaching policy, the execution of which was deleyed until-a favourable moment occurred and, notably, until the Kiel Canal was completed."

• The Baghdad Railway scheme was of course all part of the plot-and' we cannot help r eflecting how little support the 'Spectator received from many persons who are tremendously wise about German policy now when we protested against the contemplated acceptance by the British Unionist Government of a crazy scheme for the joint financing of-that railway. According to the scheme of those days, the British repre- sentatives on the Board were to be permanently outvoted by the'Ger- mans. Another matter on which M. Cheradame dwells at some length is the Treaty of Bucharest. In his opinion this instrument was a blow, due to- the accident of events, at German ambitions in -the Balkans. It was therefore very favourable to the Entente Powers. But the Entente Powers never recognized their advantage and did their best to help Bulgaria, who -they - thought had been over-punished for her treachery in attacking her Balkan allies. As a matter of fact, that -treacherous attack was inspired by Germany, and its failure, which resulted in a barrier being drawn right across the path of 'Germany to the East, had never been foreseen by the instigators. Even -during the present war the Allies, according to M. Cheradame, hopelessly erred in trying to win the support of Bulgaria, for as it was the Ger- manophile group was weaker than-the pro-Entente group in the Balkans, and Bulgaria's adhesion could-be purchased only at the cost.of offending the pro-Entente States. The Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 was indeed, according to M. -Cheradame, the determining factor in the Kaiser's mind when he decided-to provoke a warto save the Pan-German lehenie from' being gradually -defeated by the course of events.

We now come to what in the light of the moment is the-most- remark. -able and the most salutary part-of At Cheradame's volume. He foresaw effect,-when he wrote this hook lean summer, the very move which Germany has just made in proposing peace. He -tells us explicitly -what the German intention would be if she did this. He believed 'that 'she would propose an armistice. She has not done that, it is true, but the meaning of her dImarche is just the same :—

4' The. Germans will perhaps try to play en the Allies the armistice strick."Here, again, we should -have a cunning calculation founded

once more on the weariness of the combatants. It is, indeed, con-' eeivable that a simple armistice might end in allowiug Germany to hold .finally most of her actual territorial acquisitions ; but it could so end only by means of a manoeuvre which we must now expose. No doubt ' they must make at Berlin the following calculation, which theoretically. 'has something to be said for it : If an armistice were signed, the Allied soldiers would think : "'They are talking, therefore it -means peace, and demobilization will soon-follow." Under these conditions the effect,

will be the moral slackening of our adversaries.' The Germans could not!

ask for anything better. They would open peace negotiations with the following astute idea. To understand the manoeuvre we must remember; sthe proposals of peace which that active agent, Dr. Alfred Hermann Fried, of Vienna, was charged to throw out as a feeler on the 27th December, 1916. in an Article of the Nouvelle Gazelle de Zurich, which made -a great stir. These proposals were mixed up with provisos, which would allow the. discussion to be opened or broken off at any moment desired. For -example, -Belgium-would preserve her independence, but

on condition of treaties, perhaps also of-guarantees,-which would render impossible a repetition of the events of 1914,' The occupied departments of France would be restored unconditionally to France, but some small rectifications of frontiers might perhaps be desired in the interests of both parties' (Journal de Genies, 29th December, 1915). Assuming -that the Allies committed the enormous mistake of discussing peace on soneh treacherous terms, Germany still entrenched behind her fronts, which would have been rendered. almostimprepiable, would-say to the Allies, I don't agree with you. After all yen cannot require of me that I should evacuate. territories from which you aro powerless to drive me. -If you are not satisfied, continue the war.' As, while the negotiations were pending, all needful-steps would have _been taken by the German agents to aggravate the moral slackening of the soldiers of such Allied countries as might he mind wearyad _the _struggle, the huge military machine of the Entente could not again. be put in motion as a whole. The real result would be, in fact, the rupture of- the Anti-Germanio Coalition, and -finally the conclusion of -a peace more or less based on actual occupation. Berlin's goal would thus have been reached. Finally, when the armistice trick' shall have also failed, and the situation of Germany shall have grown still worse, we shall see Berlin play her last trump. Petitions Against territorial annexations will be multiplied on the other Bide of the. Rhine. In an underhand way-they will -be favoured hy the Government of Berlin, which will end by saying to the Allies : ' Let us stop -killing each other. I am perfectly reasonable. give up my claims. on snoh of your territories as are occupied by my armies. Let us negotiate peace on the basis -of the "drawn game."' -On the day when this proposal is made, the Allies will -have to face the most astute of the Berlin tricks, the most alarming German trap. At- that moment the tenacity, the clearsightedness, and the solidarity of the Allies must be put forth= to the-utmost."

A peace on the principle of the " drawn game," as M. Cheradame goes on to explain, would mean that Germany would still control all her own Continental territory plus Austria-Hungary (-where German officers are -now in charge), plus Bulgaria (already a German satellite), plus 'Turkey (already., fooled And bound). In short, she would have the resources to renew her intrigues -after a short interval The reader . may have guessed that IL Cheradame, by the necessity of his logic, is a very strong-Salonika-man. He even goes solar as to talk of the " bane- ful -theory-of the Western front." We have always appreciated the good tense -of the -Salonika argument on -which the French insisted so enthusiastically. -But the Western front must "be - regarded as the 'front. • However, we need-not dispute -a strategical point, about which. after all, we might find ourselves in agreement with-M. Cheradame if we came to definitions. The substance of-the whole book is a most impressive political argument, very cogent and extraordinarily opportune.