PEACE TERMS.
.MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S speech is not open to the criti- cism that it went too far. In our opinion, indeed, it did not go far enough in several important particulars. We are naturally delighted that he took as the basis of his answer to the German peace proposals the words which we suggested last Saturday as the text for his reply—Lincoln's refusal to negotiate with the South in the Civil War : " We accepted this war for an object, a worthy object, and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God I hope it never will end until that time." That was the spirit in which Mr. Lloyd George met the German Chancellor's proposal, not for peace terms be it remembered, but to fish in what the Germans erroneously suppose to be the troubled waters of the Alliance. In vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird. One does not talk to people who so obviously ask one to come and be entangled. Our Jehu gave the proper answer to the man who made an offer so naively disingenuous as that in the German Note : " What hest thou to do with peace ? Turn thee behind me.
The mere invitation to negotiate—the Germans while re- fraining from stating their own terms do not even specifically ask us to state ours, but merely ask us to talk with a view to ending the war—could have no other answer, as all the Allied Powers independently and spontaneously felt, than that of " Turn thee behind me." We are, however, by no means adverse to the Allied Powers formulating and publishing to the world, not simply in outline but in considerable detail, the terms upon which they will grant peace to their enemies at the present time. This statement, however, must carry with it the proviso that these are the most favourable terms which we shall be willing to grant, and that the German, the Austrian, the Turkish, and the Bulgarian peoples must remember that if they do not accept those terms now they will become later not more but very much less favourable. In other words, the German offer to negotiate, and the deep,we had almost said the pathetic, interest excited by that offer in Germany, give the Allied Powers just the opportunity which we have always de- sired for putting in operation our policy of the Sibylline books. The Germans have shown us the way to that policy. What is more, they have provided us with the strongest possible reasons for putting it into operation. The Germans evidently thought that they could use our refusal to negotiate to rally Germany for one more great effort, and perhaps they still think so. But it is becoming apparent that =hey are far more likely to depress their own people, and to raise in Germany a really strong public opinion in favour of making peace while there is yet time, and of saving as much as possible from the wreck. Now that is a position which may become very useful for us, and very embarrassing for the German Government. Even if the German Government want peace, they certainly do not -want the Allied Powers to know that they are being pushed on from behind. What a Government in such a situation always desire is to be able to say : " We cannot do this or that. Our people would never dream of allowing it."
But it cannot be doubted that the Sibylline policy, if we have sufficient firmness and sufficient imagination to carry it through, if in other words we make it a reality and not a piece of bluff—a manoeuvre which we have never contemplated— must increase the depression in Germany. As the Germans see the time slip away and the terms growing worse, it must tend to raise in their minds the feeling, which will be the literal truth : " If we do not force the madmen who are now ruling us to make peace, we shall be utterly undone." If that were not the truth, it would be dangerous to set it forth so plainly as we are now doing. But as it is the truth, not harm but only good can come from tabling our cards. If the Allies were not in reality in such a strong position owing to their absolute determination to get Reparation and Security, and Security not merely in name but through material Guaran- tees, talk about the Sibylline books would be dangerous. As it is, we are merely urging the Allies to make the best possible use of a mighty asset which lies ready to their hand, but which they are not now using properly.
One very great advantage ensuing from the Allies stating in specific terms the conditions of reparation, security, and material guarantees upon which they will grant peace is that it will make them do what they have hitherto been possibly a little shy of doing—getting together and thinking out their plans in detail. Yet it is obvious that it would be exceedingly advantageous to the Allies to enter upon such negotiations. —Let us say here that we are not in the state of mind of certain naive writers in the Press who seem to imagine that the ground has not been explored at all. We are well aware that in every country confidential Committees have been inquiring into the conditions, and that there have already been several agreements on difficult points, like that of the thrice-blessed agreement under which Russia will not only get Constantinople but the Straits.—The Allies will want to be able to answer quickly and definitely when the next German demand comes. That demand will be sprung upon us suddenly, and will no doubt take the form which the Allies cannot reject—a request to know on what terms they will grant peace. If things are then in the state in which they are now, that is bound to cause no little embarrassment, because, say what we may about continuing the war—and we must not dream of discontinuing it under an armistice—it is in effect somewhat paralysing to conduct a great push involving casualties by the hundred thousand when it looks as if the Germans were ready to agree to almost any terms.
We can make our meaning clearer by means of some- thing in the nature of a forecast, which we give in all humility, but which nevertheless we think is more than likely to come true. What we expect is that the Germans will now try to make the very most they can of their submarine campaign, to which will be added a good many ingenious projects for the raiding and invasion of these islands. It is exceedingly likely that our food conditions, fog, and a public holiday will appear to the Germans to offer a suitable opportunity. The German is convinced not only that all serious work stops from Saturday to Monday in this country, but that during our public holidays we are so much engrossed in pleasure, travel, and eating and drinking that nobody is at home to answer the national bell. Of course any such attempts at raiding can only end in disaster for the Germans ; but in the state of mind in which they are now that will not worry them, any more than a gambler is worried by the thought that it is thirty-five chances to one against the number 10 turning up. His mind is fas- tened on the thought that 10 may turn up. If it did he would be made a rich man. Lord French is quite right, then, in warning us perpetually not to rule out an attempt at in- vasion, but rather to expect it. It will probably collapse on the water. It is certain to end ruinously on land, for the invader cannot bring cannon or wheeled transport, and certainly will not find either of them to his hand on the East Coast. He may creep to our shores unperceived in a fog, but landing and unloading in a fog must mean destruction for the invaders. Before they are half-way through their task the one thought of the men and of almost all the junior officers will be how to get comfortably through the " Karnerad " ceremonial. But when the submarining and the raiding have proved disap- pointments, which we are confident they will ultimately prove, and when the March winds are rapidly beginning to dry up the ground in France and Flanders, and further, when the results of our increased munitions output are about to give us some- thing like a double superiority on the Western front, when in fine the German perceives that all things are ready for our great spring push, we venture to forecast that his action will be as follows.
He will argue to himself : " We are going to be made to fight, and fight at a great disadvantage. As the French and British showed at Verdun and on the Ancre, even when the mud is hip-deep they can if they like stretch out their hands and take seven or twelve thousand prisoners, as the case may be. And this when the artillery fire was something like equal I What is likely to happen now when their superiority is so much greater, when the ground is dry, and when their man-power in the case of Britain is at its height, and in the case of France rejuvenated by the sense of coming victory ? What for us is the meaning of these facts ? It is that if things go as badly as we are bound to think possible, we shall get much worse terms for ourselves, and even for our allies, than we shall if we make peace now. Though our enemies may be confident, they cannot be absolutely sure that we may not be able to deal them a very terrible wound, even though they conquer us. We may fall, but we may drag them down with us. Therefore it will certainly be better worth our while to try to make peace before they have put out their strength than after it. If we have to make peace after the great push, when they are sore with wounds, they will be much more merciless than they are now." Accordingly we expect the Germans to make practical peace proposals somew ere about the first fortnight in March, or say a fortnight beforethe time at which the weather conditions seem to point to a new and vigorous push. But if this happens it will clearly be an immense advantage if the Powers can simply refer the Germans to the statement of January, 1917, in which they laid down the conditions under which they would grant peace, plus certain additions to those terms which are the result of their not having been accepted in January, 1917—in a word, the result of the application of the Sibylline policy.
We shall have something more to say later about this Sibylline policy. On the present occasion we merely wish to urge the Government very strongly to enter into negotiation with all the Allies in regard to the conditions and then to publish them. We cannot negotiate with the Germans, but we can and ought to negotiate with our friends. That is the way not to invite but to avoid those dissensions upon which the Germans are so foolishly " banking." And here let us say a few words on behalf of the policy of a clear statement of the conditions upon which peace will be granted. It is bound to bring about a severance of interests between the Central Powers. The first thing which will be apparent from a statement of these conditions is no doubt that, except for Alsace-Lorraine, the German colonies, the "ton-for-ton" policy, and the matter of money indemnities, Austria and Turkey will have to pay the piper. That might seem injurious at first sight, and help to make those Powers, already weakened in their subserviency to Germany, cling tighter to her. That would be true if there were no Sibylline policy. If, however, that policy is insisted on, the Austrians and Turks may well be brought to see that by the nature of things its application means taking more and more away from them. They are the raw material of that policy. Therefore they are likely to argue that it is clear that the longer the war goes on the more certain is their complete destruction. Our first terms may leave something to the House of Hapsburg. The conditions of, say, two applications of the Sibylline policy may leave them nothing. So with Turkey. Turkey may in the end be left with nothing, whereas there might be a certain remanet of Ottoman power left to her under the primary conditions. To sum up, a statement of the conditions, plus the Sibylline policy, will act as a kind of signpost for Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria, marked in clear letters : " This Way to the Precipice."
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