AUSTRIA'S NIXON

Robert Rhodes James sees a disillusioned electorate ending the career of Kurt Waldheim

THE eerie similarities between the down- fall of President Nixon and the impending doom of President Kurt Waldheim of Austria became even more remarkable when it was announced shortly before the end of the year that the latter had been invited to pay an official visit to Egypt. It will be recalled that Nixon, in extremis at home, tried to change the domestic politic- al climate by travelling abroad. Egypt was his last frantic throw. It did not do him any good.

The Austrians have only slowly come to appreciate the enormity of what they have done by electing Waldheim. They have as their President not only a proven liar and an international pariah, but, as the 50th anniversary of the Anschluss in March approaches, a living symbol of the fact that the Austrian part in the Nazi horrors was not small, that Hitler's return to his coun- try was wildly popular, and that the slaugh- ter of the Austrian Jews was an abomin- able chapter in their history. The latter has not, so far, done Waldheim as much harm as might have been expected. As I was told by an eminent Austrian, 'You must realise that there are very few Jews in Austria nowadays'; he was disconcerted when I asked him why that was so. Did they go to Belsen, Buchenwald, or Dachau for their summer holidays? The somewhat mis- judged, although wholly understandable, attempts of the World Jewish Congress to expose Waldheim's past enabled him and his followers to depict him as the victim of an international Jewish conspiracy and actually improved his vote. But because of the accusations against Waldheim, many thoughtful Austrians began to re-examine the history of their country in those years. In a strange way, this development may turn out to have been the best — indeed, the only — service that Waldheim has rendered to Austria.

When Waldheim's bundle of yarn began to unravel, even those politicians and journalists in Austria who were appalled by the revelations were indecisive about how to handle the problem. The uproar abroad, particularly the American decision to place him on their 'watch list', offended Austrian national pride and led to a rallying behind the President. Austrians were assured that the charges were base- less, and would be answered in full in due course. Waldheim's posture as the unhap- py young victim of tides too strong for him, or anyone else, to ie gist won him much initial sympathy. The -esult was that, with some brave exceptions, Waldheim was given the benefit of the doubt.

But, as with Watergate, although it took some time to sink in that the elected head of state was a liar, and, as the evidence mounted, something considerably worse, those who had become convinced that he must go began to mount a gradual but collectively devastating assault. The pub- lication of a White Paper by the Austrian government that has been distributed to Austrian embassies, largely compiled by Waldheim's son, is so unconvincing indeed, in some respects genuinely comical — that it has not merited serious consid- eration. Waldheim is now rubbishing the international Historical Commission in advance of its findings, exactly as Nixon tried to do when first the Senate investiga- tors and then the judiciary committee of the House of Representatives broke through the barrier of lies, evasions, and legal trickeries to approach the truth. Nixon claimed executive privilege and stridently reminded everyone that he had been democratically elected by the people, to whom alone he was responsible; Wald- heim now takes the line that, constitu- tionally, the Historical Commission that he had welcomed has no validity. That did not work for Nixon: nor will it for Waldheim.

My own personal involvement in this extraordinary story began slowly. I had served in Waldheim's private office at the United Nations between December 1972 and June 1976, and, though I had never particularly liked him, I admired his qual- ities of hard work and stamina, if not his inordinate egomania and violent temper. When the first disclosures were made by the World Jewish Congress as a result of the pioneering work in the UN archives by Professor Cotler and his team from McGill University, I did not believe them. I did not want to believe them. I could not believe them. Surely, before his election as Secretary-General of the UN in December 1971 his war record had been checked by the British, the Americans, and the French, who had automatic access to the papers of the War Crimes Commission? Above all, as a volunteer worker for, and strong supporter of, the UN, I did not like the unholy glee with which its enemies, particularly in the United States, pounced upon the story.

When I saw the transcripts of the Cotler dossier it became clear that, at the very least, Waldheim was a liar. In his now infamous memoirs Waldheim had de- scribed how he had been wounded on the Eastern Front at the end of 1941, which had ended his war service. This was his account:

I was evacuated home, but it took several months in a sanatorium in the mountains before my leg started to heal properly. walked with a bad limp, and to my undis- guised relief was discharged from further service at the front. I made a formal request to be permitted to resume my law studies and take my Master's degree and, rather to my surprise, this was granted. I still had my pay as lieutenant and this helped to see me through ....

It was impossible to leave Austria. The borders had been closed and were heavily patrolled. Even ordinary movements were restricted and the authorities dealt arbitrarily with anyone who did not conform to the regulations. This complicated my studies for a doctorate in law....

As the researchers burrowed deeper it became clear that Waldheim had not only been a senior intelligence officer in the notorious Army Group E in the Balkans but had actually been indicted by the Yugoslays as a Category A war criminal. Reading the indictment one could see why, and a full account was given in the Yugo- slav journal Duga in the issue of 31 May-13 June 1986, of which I was given a transla- tion by Mr Mark Wheeler of Channel Four News. He was hot on the track, but for reasons that remain unfathomable to me was called off by his editor after making remarkable progress. I appealed to his then chairman, with no success.

By this stage it was known that I had taken up the Waldheim case, as a result of two singularly ill-received questions in the House of Commons and brief appearances on television and radio, notably the World Service of the BBC, a vital medium. I did so partly because I was by now quietly outraged by Waldheim's betrayal of his former UN colleagues, but also because it so happens that I am not Jewish, and can hardly be described as being part of any conspiracy. Material came from many quarters, and I insisted on photocopies as well as transcripts. When I had collected a formidably large dossier I showed it to Merlyn Rees, who was equally convinced. In presenting these papers to the Gov- ernment, I was careful to exclude certain matters on which the evidence seemed doubtful, principally about the fate of the British commandos whom Waldheim had interrogated. Some survived the war, but others did not. It is clear enough that the latter were executed under the Hitler order relating to commandos, but researches undertaken by the Ministry of Defence came up with nothing conclusive, although the fact that they vanished after interroga- tion may be evidence enough for most people. Nonetheless, as the MoD had come up with nothing, I did not include these particular allegations. It was at this time that I received the only letter I have received from Waldheim during the whole saga. It was written in almost piteous terms, but contained the statement that the British Government had investigated the charges and had exoner- ated him from the charge of having interro- gated British commandos. In fact, it had done no such thing. The overall perform- ance of HMG has been cautious to the point of negativism, but it had established that Waldheim had indeed been an interro- gator; in view of the documents I showed them, it had little choice. When I informed Waldheim of this interesting fact our cor- respondence ceased.

As the facts began to emerge, Waldheim constantly changed his story. First, he had not been in the Balkans at all, but was at the University of Vienna. Then, well, yes he had been in the Balkans, but only in a very junior and humble capacity. When his real position was disclosed, yes, he had been an intelligence officer, but knew nothing about atrocities or reprisals or forced deportations of thousands of civi- lians to their deaths (in which case he would have been the worst intelligence officer ever known). Then, yes, he had heard something about them, but was not involved at all. After the ghastly Kozara massacre, he was awarded the silver medal of King Zvonimir with oak-leaf clusters. This was awarded to nine men for `courageous bearing in battles against re- bels in western Bosnia in spring and summer 1942'. Of the list of nine, Wald- heim was placed third; it has been proved that the other recipients were deeply in- volved in the Kozara massacre. Once again, the net tightened, and the story had to be changed.

Then, he knew nothing of the deporta- tions. Again, it would have been odd if he had not, being number three in Army Group E's intelligence hierarchy, but the relentless researchers have conclusively proved otherwise. And so, another part of the yarn unravels.

No objective person reading the docu- ments can avoid the clear impression that Waldheim would have faced grave difficul- ties had he been charged for war crimes. Why he was not became clear when we discovered from unimpeachable sources that the Russians had demanded the Wald- heim indictment from the Yugoslays in 1946: as this was before the the Stalin-Tito split, the Yugoslays had complied. For their own reasons, the Russians had done nothing. It was on this legalistic point that the Foreign Office thankfully based itself. As these charges had never been tested in a court, they could only be regarded as unverified allegations against the democra- tically elected head of state of a friendly neutral nation. To my question of what had happened — or, more precisely, what had not happened — in 1971 when the Russians had pressed Waldheim's candidature for the secretary-generalship so ruthlessly and successfully I received no answer what- soever. If we did know, what game were we playing? If not, why not? To me, this is the most interesting question of all, but it is one on which HMG remains adamantly silent.

But the Foreign Office, while conveying this advice to 10 Downing Street, on which it acted with a somewhat curt and dismis- sive letter from the Prime Minister, had seen enough to convince them that a state visit from President Waldheim was un- thinkable. An ingenious formula was con- cocted, that stated that 'the Government has no plans to invite President Waldheim to this country'. The absence of the usual word 'immediate' was very significant in- deed. HMG would not go as far as the Americans by actually banning him from landing on our shores as a private citizen, but there was no way he was coming here as President of Austria. I suspect that this was one of the most wounding of all the blows Waldheim's vast self-esteem has suffered, although the removal of his por- trait from the UN foyer — ostensibly for cleaning after a swastika was found painted in a corner — may run it very close.

Among those who took an intense in- terest in the General Election campaign in Cambridge was the Austrian media. Un- like the other journalists and television crews that flocked from far and wide (including Indonesia and Singapore!) they were not at all interested in Mrs Shirley Williams but in the Conservative candi- date. It was then that I realised that my new course, to take my case to the Au- strian people by radio, press interviews and television was working. The tactic of put- ting the onus on the people who had elected him, and with the sinister anniversary of the Anshcluss approaching, was paying significant dividends. It is the disillusionment of his fellow-countrymen that will do for him, as it did for Nixon.