THE YALTA COMPROMISE
By DR. GILBERT MURRAY, O.M.
IT was often said at Geneva that, to have a fair chance of success, the League ought at least to start in a peaceful world. The old League did not quite do so, but the new League will be infinitely worse off. It will start its message of peace and content- ment in the midst of extreme misery, bitterness and discord, amount- ing in some countries to threats of anarchy and civil war. Nor is there among the nations in general that approximate equality of conditions which makes for the rule of law. The world is at the mercy of three—some would say of two—Powers of enormous strength.
The first and greatest danger is that the Great Three, though compelled to co-operate during the war, might recoil into isolation or mutual hostility when the necessity for union ceases. Two of them are isolationist by tradition and are sure to find co-operation difficult ; on the other hand, both feel the extreme need of peace. Consequently they have undertaken not only to continue their co- operation ; they go much further than that. They have agreed upon "the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a general organisation to maintain peace and security." This means salvation to a shaken world ; any failure to achieve it would mean ruin.
The next obvious danger, and far more tempting, is that the Three might set up a mere triumvirate to govern the world. But this also they have conscientiously avoided. In the Dumbarton Oaks scheme there is not a single organ in which the Three stand alone or possess any special privilege. The Security Council, no doubt, has special powers, but the Three have only reserved for them- selves three places among the five permanent members. They have co-opted France and China on terms of equality with themselves, and given six places to representatives elected by the Assembly. They have in fact fallen back on the model of the old League, in which there was no such dangerous preponderance. Neither in the Assembly nor in the new and highly important Social and Economic Council do the Three claim any special legal privilege. They trust for their influence not to rules but to the imponderables.
They are quite safe in doing so ; for the difficulty is not that the imponderables will not weigh enough, but that they weigh so much. The Great Powers will have a preponderant influence, in part no doubt dependent on the goodwill and trust they inspire, but chiefly proportionate to their strength. In any case, if ever coercive action has to be taken it is the Great Powers whose opinion matters, because it is only they who can effectively act. Consequently, while according to abstract justice any nation that tries to commit aggression should be prevented or stopped by the collective strength of the rest of the League, to lay down such a rule to that effect would, apart from technicalities of voting, be quite impracticable. Action. might well mean war ; and surely before committing itself to war the Council would have to be quite certain, not only that it was in the right, but also that it would be successful and that its successful war would not do more 'harm than good. Suppose, for -example, that, in pursuit of some policy to which it was wedded, the U.S.A. or Russia were found to be doing wfong to some small,nation, can anyone maintain that it would necessarily be wise or in accordance with the League spirit to start a great war of uncertain issue in order to correct what might be a comparatively small injustice? I do not say that the League should never act against -a Great Power ; only that it cannot make a rule to act against all. aggressors, great or small, irrespective of circumstances. The rule of abstract justice— quite a different thing, by .the way, from real justice—is flatly impossible. What is the alternative?
It seems that the first plan advocated by Russia was simply that in any dispute before the Council every Great Power should have a right of veto both on discussion and on action. It was not likely that other nations would agree to that. At Yalta two very important concessions were made. First, that there should be no veto on free discussion ; secondly, that, in accordance with the ordinary rule of international law, the parties to a dispute should have no vote. The second of these concessions is important, not so much because it affects the voting, but because of the complete reversal it produces in the position of a Great Power making an unjust or disputable claim. Instead of saying "This is my business ; I shall do as I think fit and no one else shall speak," the Great Powerlias to recognise that as a party to a dispute it is on terms of "sovereign equality" with the other nations ; it can argue its case, but it cannot be judge in its own cause. The first concession is of even greater value. It means that no Great Power can commit an aggression unobserved. Every sex-thus dispute is thrown open to the full light of public opinion, or—may we say?—to the .conscience of the world. I think no one who has experience of international business will underrate the great influence which such public discussion exercises on any nation in a normal state of mind. It is extremely difficult for any statesman to stand up before the assembled nations of the world and say: "Yes, my country does intend to break its word and act in bad faith."
So far all is well ; the improvement is immense ; but there remains the intractable difficulty of the Great Three, who are too strong to be coerced. Since it is no good making the Council undertake to coerce them, it is now proposed that any decision of the .Council involving coercion or the imposition of " sanctions " should requir "an affirrruitive vote of seven members including the concurrin votes of all the Permanent Members." That is, any single Grea Power can veto any coercive action by the Council.
At first sight this seems a good workable compromise, but it ha serious disadvantages. First a moral disadvantage. It is difficult to acclaim as a rule of law and justice a system which not only admits the fact that some States may be strong enough to defy the law, but actually gives them a legal right to do so. There is a vast difference between accepting an injustice because you cannot help it and positively prescribing injustice as part of the law. Secondly, ir actual practice does not the privilege go too far? It is granted to all the five permanent members, but it is by no means certain that in all circumstances all of the Five would be able to resist th Council's decision. One can think of possible cases in which eve one of the Three could probably be compelled to give way. Again, the system seerns to encourage the vicious growth of satellite States. It is invidious to name particular nations, but it would be very easy for a Great Power to make a pet or a tool of some small State, encourage it to make aggressions and then protect,it by its veto. That is one of the most obvious tricks for eluding any Leagu system.
I think perhaps the mistake is to try to lay down a fixed rul beforehand for circumstances which are unknown and may va greatly. Would it not be wiser to have no rule about voting, but having already taken a pledge from all members of the Council tha they will, collectively and individually, do their duty in preventin war or aggression, to leave them in each case to consider how tha duty should be done, what support they command, and what the military and economic advisers say? It "night in some cases be quit practicable to take effective action without a seven-out-of-eleve majority ; in others quite impracticable though you had ten again one. It would be madness to imperil the establishment of th International Organisation ; it may be wiser for San Francisco leave certain points undecided than to decide them ilL
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