The Koje Menace
The problem of controlling the vast prisoner-of-war camps on Koje island is not one that can be solved quickly by a few determined American officers. The prompt action of General Mark Clark, the new commander, in relieving of their posts both General Dodd, who was recently captured by the prisoners, and General Colson,- who secured his release by an allegedly injudicious surrender to blackmail, is evidence of a will to end any inefficiency on the part of the American forces. But it cannot end the difficulties created by the prisoners themselves. It is recognised that -prisoners, whatever their nationality or politics, massed together with little to do but wait for the end of the war, will always get up to mischief. Communists, and in particular Chinese Communists, have a very highly developed technique for. extending the influence of a few determined leaders over large masses of people. The ringleaders, besides being highly trained in their tasks, are peculiarly elusive. Some of them have even turned up in the camp on the mainland at Pusan which is supposed to be reserved for those prisoners who have renounced Communism or who never had anything to'do with it. The Geneva Convention rules are reasonably effective in themselves, provided the prisoners can be thoroughly taught their rights and duties under those rules and also provided they are willing to abide by them. But there is little evidence that the Pusan prisoners, although they have been treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention, have ever understood, or wanted to understand,-the right way to respond. And those —they may well be a majority—who wished to behave decently have been at the mercy of Communist leaders who were quite willing to resort- t9 intimidation, torture and murder to get their way. It is possible that General Boatner, who now takes over at Koje, may do better than any of the long line of his predecessors. But it is unlikely that anything short of the end of the Korean war will solve all his problems.
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