TOPICS OF THE DAY.
M. THLERS' LAST SPEECH.
THE great importance ascribed in France to M. Thiers' speech at Arcachon is hardly intelligible to Englishmen, because they do not quite realise the position of M. Thiers in France. He is the one person who might conceivably be elected Deputy by her eighty-six Departments. This fact, which is so serious that it is said to be one of the many rea- sons for M. Buffet's decision in favour of the scrutin d'ar- roncliseement, would of itself explain the interest attaching to M. Thiers' opinions, and this is but one fact among many. M. Thiers is, in many respects, the typical Frenchman of his epoch. Eloquent and vivacious, full of vain-glory tempered by worldly shrewdness, daring and cautious, a Voltairian who thinks a respectable Church essential to mankind, given to theories which never stand in the way of able admin- istration, capable of chauvinism, but almost cunning in his pursuit of French interests, M. Thiers exactly expresses to the people their present selves, the mood which may endure for this generation. His personality has reached down even to the peasantry, who, moreover, do not forget the incidents which he, with his pleasant vanity, is so very apt to recall,—how he found France defeated, and her richest Departments occupied, and her capital in the power of a sect soon to be known as "Communists ;" how he concluded peace and restored order, and found the stupendous sum—six milliards in all, he says, or £240,000,000—required for the liberation and reorganisation of the country ; how he esta- blished the Republic ; and how France, under his rule, rapidly grew prosperous again. They credit him with the good har- vests as well as the liberation of the country, with the general order as well as the revival of the army, till they almost feel towards him the sentiment of personal loyalty, which is said to have died in France because for a hundred and fifty years it has never been thoroughly deserved. Expelled from power, a childless man, and seventy-eight years of age, he would still, in a frank plebiscite, be a dangerous competitor for the Presidency, or even for a throne. His opinion affects millions, and the fact that, after all his experience, after his expulsion from the Presidency, after two years of the Septennate,—that strange course in which the driver always urges his horses with his eyes looking wistfully behind him,—he still pronounces for a Republic, still declares a Monarchy impossible, still be Heves that the Republic will live, seems to all parties of immense importance, and is so, because his belief helps to disseminate his creed. Millions who would doubt if he doubted, are reassured by his sanguine speech.
Moreover, M. Thiers, though always historian before all things, did not at Arcachon confine himself to history. He touched, as usual, on the burning question of the hour. That question in France, with all parties, is the agency through which the Republic is to be solidified. To whom is it wise or safe to entrust power, not only in the State, but the Provinces ? To us, say the Bonapartists, for we can govern with iron hands. To us, say the Legitimists, for if the Comte de Chambord is im- possible, the Republic is to us the least offensive interregnum. To us, say the Orleanists, for what are we but Republicans who prefer an hereditary President ? To us, finally say the Republicans, for we alone are, or can be, loyal to the heart. Amid these cries of parties, the shriller answers of their chiefs may be recognised by a marked difference of timbre. Power may be entrusted to all, cries the Marshal-President, who are soldiers or Conservatives. It may be consigned to all, replies M. Buffet, who are Conservative or clerical. It may be trusted to all, shouts M. Gambetta, who are Republican, or whom I select. It may be trusted to all, closes M. Thiers, who are Republicans, and who do not explain their Republicanism by their hopes of a Monarchical or Imperial revision. There are too many of these last, too many "functionaries who represent policies, who are ashamed to speak of the Republic," and who talk instead always of France, "a name which, however dear to all, should not be used in order not to pronounce another." There are functionaries who, "first of all, repulse the Radicals personally ; next, they repulse those who, without being Radicals, would lead the country to Radicalism by their way of doing things. In short, there are, first of all, Radicals who must be guarded against ; next, those who, without being Radicals, would lead to Radicalism ; and lastly, by natural con- sequence, those who would lead to toleration of Radicals ; and continuing these classifications, one would finish by admitting to the service of the Republic only those who never wished for it, and to-day are just the same." In other words, there are Administrations like that of M. Buffet, with Ministers-who. acknowledge the Republic, but trust only those who,, if they could have their way, would overthrow it,—whe "were not Republicans of the eve, and to-day like the Republic. as little as before." Every line in that sentence is condemna- tory of the men who are now in power,—of the Marshal, because he will not govern with a Liberal Cabinet ; of M. Buffet, be- cause he snubs even colleagues when, like M. Leon Say, they venture to approve the vote which made the Republic legal; of the majority of the Assembly, because they approve the mea who do these things. When "France approaches the urns"— observe, M. Thiers does not condescend to discuss whether a Dis- solution is advisable or not, but assumes it—." she must remem- ber that if she add to the immense labours to be encountered by the next Assembly, a great division of parties, she will enter upon chaos." He desires, in fact, that there should be a work- ing majority of Republicans in the next Assembly—Republicansr content with the Republic—and that M. Thiers desires this will help, as M. Buffet well knows, to bring the result about.. M. Thiers put down the Communists. )1. Thiers does not fear- the Republicans. Why should we, who know so much less, believe that the Republic will become a Commune? That wil] be the syllogism of the electors, and it is an ominous one for the Conservatism which M. Buffet desires,—a Conservatism which opposes the reign of Dictators only to establish a regime of gendarmerie.
Nothing can be more definite to French ears than M. Thiers' speech on the internal politics of France, and if on her ex- ternal politics he is less clear, we must remember that he is- speaking to men who do not need to be told two facts of which Englishmen are apt to be forgetful,—that France will not fight again if she can help it without an ally,. and that Legitimists and Bonapartists assert every day with some acceptance that a French Republic will never find one. How, think even Republicans, can we expect a, Czar of Russia, or an Emperor of Austria, or even a Bing of Italy or Spain, to be heartily friendly to a Republic, and es- pecially a Republic in France, whence ideas spread so rapidly t That thought chills many Republicans, and to that thought M. Thiers addresses an argument which is we at once hope and fear unsound, but which deserves attention. Europe, he says, is to-day "perfectly rational," and will sympathise with any Government that is perfectly "rational" also. Its rulers are- no longer imaginative, no longer alarmed, no longer wishing for interventions. So far is this reasonableness pushed, that. when the troubles broke out in the Herzegovina, the first thought was to keep out of them ; the second, not to profit by them ; and. the third, to teach Sovereigns to grant reforms, and subjects to. obey their rulers. There is not a Prince in Europe not re- forming, not a country not engaged in this task, "save, indeed, England, which, in obtaining liberty, obtained the germ of all reforms." That sketch of Europe is, of course, as inaccurate as it is sanguine. Germany is reforming nothing, nor intent upon reforms,—is, on the contrary, absorbed in postponing reforms to a battle with the Roman Church. She is not " rational," in M. Thiers' sense ; nor is Russia, nor France herself, except perforce, while irrationality covers Spain at once with soldiers and disorder. We see no evidence- as yet that France has become incapable of a delirium of ideas, or Germany of a burst of military ardour, or the here- ditary rulers of Europe of care for the safety of their power,, their fortunes, and their dynasties. But it is true, perhaps, that Europe is indisposed to crusades, that it is willing to- leave each country to work out its internal fate, that it would resent an attempt to conquer merely because the conquered were acquiring new force and trying new ideas. It did so. resent the menace of April, 1875, and in the present state of French minds, full of reminiscences of 1870, and nervous as wounded horses, to be assured that invasion will not be provoked by forms of government has a tranquillising effect. That is all that M. Thiers is trying to produce, and he produces it, though by means which illustrate one of the greatest weaknesses in his character,—his readiness, when he thinks it needful, to use the Chinese ignorance of his country- men. If he had wanted agitation, all Europe would in his bril- liant periods have been menacing France because she had not adopted this or that panacea for her social troubles. There exists even now, when power has moderated him, and misfor- tune has educated him, and universal respect has opened his heart, a trace of cunning in M. Thiers' intellect, a suggestion of a possibility of being false in the interest of France, that, so to
speak, streaks a character which otherwise is well worthy of the world-wide respect it has so miraculously acquired. English- men always forget their own history, but to statesmen of sixty that Englishmen should wish M. Thiers endless years of life and a supreme place among his countrymen must seem a marvellous change. And yet it is true. M. Thiers is the single Frenchman of this generation to whom all Englishmen without distinction of parties have wished well.
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