23 SEPTEMBER 1843, Page 18

NASH'S HISTORY OF THE WAR IN AFFGHANISTAN.

Tars volume professes to be founded on the "Journal and Letters of an Officer high in rank": and a few passages here and there have evidently been written by some off-hand penman, with more frankness in the expression of opinions and freedom in the choice of words than always coexist with comprehension or soundness of judgment. As regards the purpose of the volume—a history of the war in Affghanistan—Mr. Nese seems to have rated his manuscripts at their true value, for they contribute nothing in a general way towards the historical narrative ; which has been com- piled from very accessible sources. The introductory sketch of the geographical features of the country, with the accounts of the people and of the last or Doorannee dynasty, is compiled from ELPHINSTONE ; the discussion respecting the policy of the war is derived from the common state-papers, or rather from the views of the policy put forward by its authors ; the newspapers and despatches, with an occasional though we think an insufficient use of the late military publications, furnish the materials for describing our victorious advance and occupation of the country, as Lieutenant EYRE and Lady SALE are the authorities for the retreat ; whilst the newspapers again furnish the materials for the defence of Jells- labad, the second invasion, and the reception of the conquerors by the Governor-General.

It will be seen from this that Mr. NASH'S History of the War in Affghanistan is merely a compilation : and, though fluent and read- stile enough, it is a poor compilation. Whoever has perused the ori-

ginal accounts will be able to trace the compiler's steps ; but will find a very faint reflection of some of the most striking pictures—

such as the march through the Bolan Pass, the disorganized state of the army in cantonments, and the fearful disasters of the retreat. It is a clerkly and clever abridgment, but not a well-done com- pilation in a literary sense, still less such a fusion and reproduc- tion of the existing materials as to be entitled to the name of history.

The precise purpose of this publication is not very clear. We are perhaps too near the event for the production of its history;

and the reading public has read too much in the daily and weekly journals, as well as in the books of Ours/at, ATKINSON, EYRE, and Lady SALE, to want a manual of a story whose temporary at- traction ceased with the conclusion of the war. Perhaps the most useful part of the volume is the defence of Jellalabad, about which no book has been published, any more than there has respecting the second invasion; a significant hint that the public interest in the subject has died away.

liadAnore-ability been-displayed by Mr. Naas, olumaiebt4sese conceived he had been put forward by the War party to defend their doings; for he is a thoroughgoing partisan of the invasion, though his arguments are none of the most cogent, and their co- herence not the most remarkable. With an easy indifference to logic, he assumes the point at issue ; putting forward the opinions of the Russophobists as conclusive of the necessity of the war, though the soundness of their views is one of the points at issue. Untaught by facts or the event, Mr. NASH counts as nothing against the policy of the war, the fearful sufferings of the ad- vancing army in the Bolan Pass—the tremendous loss of animal life which reduced the troops to almost famine—the certainty, ac- cording to his own account, that had the passes been defended the army must have retreated before reaching Candahar—and the gross ignorance of the character and state of feeling of the Af- ghans. hans The opinion of the Duke of WELLINGTON he thus dis- poses of- " Bat another alternative, admitting the impossibility of forming a satis- factory alliance with these governors, has been advocated by many in prefer- ence to making a hostile demonstration in Afghanistan : that alternative was, that we should have taken our stand on the Indus, which forms the natural boundary of the country, and have watched with careful eye the progress of events. This opinion has derived immense weight from being generally un- derstood to have received the sanction of the first military authority of the age. If such be the case, the writer cannot help thinking, with due deference, that rather too mach of the soldier enters into this view of the question. The views of the politician appear to yield to those of the mere military leader, who in a spirit of confident bravery, and intent upon a particular ma- nceuvre, would restrain his men till the enemy approached near enough for his purpose. and then with a gallant up, lads, and at them,' lead them on to the attack."

The disasters of our retreat—for it cannot be called expulsion, since none were left to expel—are put upon financial causes and subordinate agents ; as if it had not been the business of the Indian Government, which undertook the war, to calculate the expense and to choose efficient instruments. But as the total failure of the scheme cannot be denied, Mr. NASH arrives at this crumb of comfort- " It is probable, that had Lord Auckland known beforehand all the diffi- culties which have beset us in the country of the Afghans, his policy might have undergone some modification. People reason now upon a full knowledge of all that has occurred, and forget that their information has only been derived from the misfortunes they condemn. But sad as these have been, it is impos- sible to deny that much good has still resulted from our occupation of Afghan- istan. We are now acquainted with the impregnable nature of the country on that aide of our Eastern dominions, and shall never have the same fear of an enemy's approach from that quarter as was previously entertained."

But that the author is obviously in earnest, one might have taken this for a sarcasm : going to war to extend geography ! The best part of the book is the defence of Jellalabad—at least its comparative novelty gives it greater freshness : and from it we will take a passage or two.

THE SECOND DRUBBING.

So much discouraged were the enemy by this defeat, that for the next fort- night nothing serious was attempted against us; and the operations of the as- sailants were confined to attacks on the working-parties. A desire to spare the scanty supplies of ammunition made the General bear these, until they began seriously to interrupt the progress of the fortifications. On the 1st of December, accordingly, a column of six hundred Europeans and Native In- fantry, with two guns, some rappers and juzailchees, and all the cavalry, rushed from the Cabool gate under command of Colonel DennW, and diverging to the left, swept the space in front of the walls round to the rocky mounds on the main road to Cabool. A series :of brilliant movements were now executed with great rapidity, and in uninterrupted succession. The troops were in the highest spirits, and an animated cheer burst from them as they found them- selves beyond the walls. They were met by a heavy fire on the part of the insurgents:: but nothing could withstand them and their impetuous leader, who broke into the enemy's strongholds, drove them from all their positions, and chased them across the plains. They were then hotly pursued to the river's bank and up the cliffs by the juzailchees and skirmishers of the Thirteenth Light Infantry ; Captain Abbott pushing his guns at the gallop to a point which commanded the stream, committing great havoc among the flying Af- ghans with his round shot and shrapnell. Many of them fell under his fire, as well as that of the infantry and irregulars : many rushing into the river, and missing the ford in their consternation, got into deep water, and were swept away and drowned. The cavalry, in the mean time, were doing excellent duty in the plains, everywhere vigorously charging the foe; while the sappers, by a sudden onset, surprised and dispersed, with much slaughter, another large body, moving apparently with the intention of attacking the southern front of the works.

The effect of this victory was electrical. The insurgents not only fled from the nearer forts, but retired from those of the whole line of the Char Bagh, and only rallied at Thar Khail, at the cautious distance of twelve miles from the ramparts.

DEFEAT OF AMUR.

Although these reports could not be fully depended upon, accompanied as they were by counter-reports of another revolution at Cabool, the defeat of the Kbyberees, and, by one account, of the intended, and even actual retreat of Akbar Khan to Lughman, General Sale, on a full consideration of the various circumstances and rumours, resolved to anticipate the last-mentioned event by a general attack on the Afghan camp, in the hope of relieving himself from blockade and facilitating General Pollock'a advance. He accordinglygave directions to form three columns of infantry ; the centre consisting of the Thirteenth Light Infantry, five hundred rank and file, under Colonel Dennie ; the left, of the Thirty-fifth Native Infantry also five hundred strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel Monteith ; and the right, of a company of the Thirteenth Light Infantry, another of the Thirty-fifth Native Infantry, and the detach- ment of Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant Orr, three hundred and sixty osronhg , gcoumnmoafn dNedo b by Captainfi eHda vbealtoekry. , These Cwaepret aisnu pAbrbteodtt ,b yo t hw hificrhe

Captain Backhouse was also attached ; and by the whole of the cavalry force under Captain Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne. The troops issued from the Cabool and Peshawar gate at break of day on the morning of the 7th : and so far from Akbar Khan having made dispositions to avoid the encounter, his whole force, not falling short in all of six thousand men, was formed in order of battle for the defence of his camp ; the right resting on a fort, its left on the Cabool river ; and even the ruined works within eight hundred yards of the place were filled with Ghiljie marksmen, evidently prepared for stout resistance.

The attack was led by the skirmishers and column under Captain.Havelock; who pierced at once the enemy's line of works, drove them from their intrench- ments, and proceeded to advance into the plain. Meanwhile, the heroic Dennie with the central column dashed forward against a strong square fort, which had been repaired by the Afghans, and now maintained an obstinate resistance : but, when within only five yards of it, a ball from one of the enemy's guns struck him on the hip, lacerating his side fearfully ; and before he could witness the success of the attack he was so valiantly leading, his gallant spirit had passed away. The troops, however, continued their progress ; and the rear of the fort having been gained by passing to its left, General Sale gave orders for a combined attack on the enemy's camp. It was in every way brilliant and successful. The artillery advanced at the gallop, and directed a heavy fire on-the Afghan centre, xhilst two of the columns of infantry penetrated their line at the same point, and the third drove their left back from its support on the river, into the stream of which some of their horse and foot were forced. The Afghans made repeated attempts to check our advance by a smart fire of musketry, and throwing forward heavy bodies of horse, xhizh twice closely threatened the troops under Captain Havelock, and by opening against us three guns from a battery, screened by a garden-wall, and said to have been served under the personal superintendence of Akbar Khan himself: but in a short time they were dislodged from every point of their position, their cannon taken, and their camp involved in a general conflagration. The battle was over, and the enemy in full retreat in the direction of Lughman, by about seven a.m.

Two of their cavalry standards fell into our hands ; the whole of their tents were destroyed ; and, chief trophy of all, we captured four guns, lost by the un- fortunate Cabool army, the recovery of which was the source of especial ex- ultation to the whole force.