PING-TONG PAX
The swift succession of public diplomatic events which have succeeded the overt Chinese friendliness in the matter of visit- ing Western ping-pong teams and which indicate much covert diplomacy, have properly received widespread welcome in Europe and America. The relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China have caused unneces- sary muddle for several years.
Public stances which do not correspond with the status quo but which instead em- body attitudes appropriate to some alto- gether different and imaginary status confuse policies and people. The objection to America's Chinese policy (like that to Britain's Rhodesian one) is that it has been based on a sentimental feeling among many influential and noisy people, in this case that China had and has no business to go and remain communist but that instead it should resume its rightful place (which in fact, it never occupied) as a kind of Baptist-educated satrapy of the American President. This missionary-included Amen- can feeling towards China has also been responsible for the crusading zeal which has characterised the rest of America's initially foolish and now disastrous Asian policies. The Vietnam experience has brought the United States to its senses. The withdrawal from South Vietnam is now politically irreversible; and when the United States finally disentangles itself from the Asian continent it will be sadder and wiser, and weaker, as a result of its entanglement. It will, however, remain quite strong enough. It is a sign of its strength, diminished but vast, and its wis- dom, insufficient but increasing, that the United States now takes steps to regular- ise its relations with the People's Republic of China, to recognise it fully, and to get itself on speaking terms with the govern- ment of that great communist and national- ist power. A resumption of full diplomatic relations between the United States and China would be good for both these countries and for most of the rest of the world besides. The Chinese seat on the Security Council, preposterously occupied by the Chiang regime, should be given to the Chinese government if they want it, and they obviously do. China should be accorded the face and the place appropri- ate to her power. If major or world war is to be avoided, then a niodus vivendi is required; and it is most likely that the major hostile, competing and friendly nations of the world will best find a way of living with each other when none of them pursues policies aimed at the violent overthrow of the status quo and when all of them demonstrate in their public stances an acceptance of the situation as it now is, or (in the still-disputed areas) is settling down to become.
However, we would be prudent to temper our enthusiasm for the civil affirmation of Realpolitik expressed by recent Chinese and American exchanges and diplomacy. The nature of Chinese society continues to appear most alarming to western eyes. Ever since the communists finally clenched their grip on the Chinese mainland during 1949, and very likely for centuries previously, the Chinese people seem to have possessed a disconcerting capacity for regimentation. All six or seven or eight hundred millions of them, except for a few million killed and a few hundred thousand in positions of authority. move like lifeless great drifts of leaves whichever way the wind blows. The entire nation is as one msonstrous rent-a-sub- continent, which, at a sign from Mao, upheaves itself into an instant rent-a-cul- tural-revolution. It is not so long since Chinese diplomats in London were charg- ing out of their privileged mission build- ings to hit people over the head, and there- upon retire behind very offensively secured and closed doors. Now the same, or similar, diplomats fling their doors open and welcome visitors inside with every show of friendship and warmth. Their new look is welcome; but we might as well remember their capacity to switch on the old look whenever they are so instructed. Although their smiling faces are nicer to look at than their scowling ones, both expressions must remain inscrutable and impassive to us, since the smile, so far as we can discern from our experience, may be exchanged for the scowl at the slightest hint or gesture from Peking, just as now the scowl has been suddenly wiped off their faces and been substituted by their chirpy grins. Doubtless they do not trust us. We should not trust them. There are further solid grounds for caution. China may well resume its traditional imperialist and expansionist policies. If so, it is most unlikely that Chinese ambitions will be satisfied with the establishment of an hegemony over south-east Asia. These lands, although potentially rich, are, like India itself, already heavily populated if not over-populated. Their conquest would do little or nothing to relieve the constant threat of famine in China, nor, short of massive genocidal campaigns, would much enmity territory become available. China could, in theory, seek to expand overseas. Australasia is comparatively empty; but it is unthinkable that the western powers led by the United States and this country would permit a Chinese conquest, or that the Australians themselves would allow their continent to fall, through subversion, by default. The African continent is a far more likely temptation. The west would be well advised to take active note of the present large and growing Chinese presence in East African states facing the Indian Ocean, which already constitutes a greater threat than the Russian naval activity of which we have heard so much. It is more than likely, indeed, that the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean is as much concerned with keeping an eye on the Chinese as with establishing any threat to the west. Lastly, and most likely, China—which has little experience of oversea expansion—threatens the empty lands of Outer Mongolia and Siberia. Here the existing threat is directed against the Soviet Union; and it is, of course, neither an accident nor a result of doc- trinal disagreement that in recent years China and Russia have come close to blows. The natural direction for Chinese expansion to take is westwards; and the route is familiar and overland.
Thus, while welcoming the smile on the face of the Chinese tiger, prudent caution is counselled. China should be encouraged to take her proper place and fill an appropriate role. China should also be watched : and it may well be that in the watching of the emergent purring Chinese tiger, both the United States and the Soviet Union will see a common inter- est and will exercise a common vigilance. Provided that this legitimate common in- terest and vigilance is not allowed to develop into a common hostile front towards China, then it may be that the conditions of a broader-based peace than has hitherto been envisaged could yet come about.
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