Political Commentary
By CHARLES CURRAN BEHIND the Suez talks,' you can 'now hear in London the sound of many voices asking questions. The voices belong to politicians. At the moment, they are muffled. put once the Suez crisis moves out of its present phase, Sir Walter Monckton, the Defence Minister, will have no difficulty in hearing them. Their central question is : 'How long does it take Britain to build a build-up?'
Suppose (say the voices) that when Colonel Nasser nationalised the Canal he had blocked it as well. What could Britain have done at that time? If immediate action had been necessary, were we in a position to take it? Would the time-lag have been a matter of hours, or days, or weeks? What sort of forces were in existence, not potentially but contem- poraneously? Were we ready to cope with a sudden emergency —or were we not?
These are not matters of historical importance only; they go to the root of our defence policy. That policy is based on the proposition that the primary purpose of armaments is to act as a deterrent; the more effective they are, the less likely it is that we shall have to use them. But if deterrent power is to count, it must exist—not in pigeon-holes, but in three dimensions, before the emergency confronts us. Unless it does, it is a delusion. Our diplomacy is left to act in a power vacuum, with all the handicaps that necessarily follow.
For' the first time in his Ministerial career, Sir Walter Monckton will face a great many interrogatories when Parlia- ment resumes in October. The story of the Suez build-up will give added point to those familiar conundrums : 'What in fact have we got to show for our defence expenditure? Is our arms bill giving us anything like the results that we ought to expett, measured in terms of value for money?'
The Suez shock is unlikely to be the last from the Middle East; for the uneasy areas that supply us with oil are in a state of ferment. Contemplating this fact, some people are now pondering the desirability of changes in our defence strategy.
Hitherto, that strategy has centred around NATO. Does it need to be widened? With Middle East possibilities in mind. it is now being urged that Britain ought to have, in addition to her NATO commitments, a striking force that would be available in an emergency for the protection of our specifically national interests. We must expect several years of difficulties in the Middle East; a counterpoise weight made of conventional weapons may help to maintain stability.
Political opinion has suddenly awakened to the implications of our oil-based economy. It is now recognised that we have become vulnerable as we have never been before in peace-time. Our industrial structure is seen to be dependent on a gamble— the gamble that the feudal autocrats who rule the Middle East oil States will both stay in power and will stay friendly to us. The food and the livelihood of the British people are staked on it. If it turns against us, the results will be immediate and terrifying.
None of the slogans has any relevance to this peril. Nor is it at all easy to see how our policy should be shaped so as to lessen the risks, and to preserve the quaking stability of the oil States. Some of those States display the classic pre- revolutionary pattern with a starkness that has never been known in Europe outside the covers of pamphlets : a primitive, ruthless governing class living in luxury on top of a swarming heap of degradation and hunger. To increase our royalty pay- ments to the rulers is not necessarily any solution; for it merely provides still more funds for air-conditioned luxury, with no guarantee at all that the money will percolate to the misery underneath. In fact, increased payments may even add to the tension, by heightening the contrast between the luxury and the misery. Yet if misery revolts, it is the inhabitants of Great Britain who will suffer, far more than the oil grandees.
In this patchwork of tensions, there is only one State that is civilised in the western sense—the State of Israel; for the protection of our economic life, the arguments for keeping Israel viable, for strengthening the links between her and Britain, have now become clearer than ever. She is almost the only State in the Middle East that is not threatened from within. We must also continue to ask : 'How can we reduce the depen- dence of British industry on Middle East oil?' The possibilities of intensified investment in atomic power stations will be studied with more and more attention.
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