Arms sales
hypocrisy
David W. Wragg
An interesting point about the fighting in Cyprus is that both Greece and Turkey use almost identical American armaments. That the aircraft, ships and weapons involved are meant to help both countries meet their NATO commitments rather than fight each other is underlined by the fact that the equipment was not so much sold to them as given under the Military Aid Programme. The Greek-Cypriot National Guard, outside of NATO, mainly uses obsolete Russian and abandoned British equipment. The only objections to military aid to Greece or Turkey have come not from Congress, but from the two recipients, with each feeling that they have a right to a monopoly of military strength against a traditional enemy. Hardly any British equipment is used by either Greece or Turkey, with Greek interest in purchasing British warships sternly discouraged. But political controversy over arms sales is a relatively recent phenomenon, probably because it naturally coincides with a holier-than-thou attitude towards the internal affairs of other countries, or rather certain other countries. Not one of the countries black-listed by conscience-stricken radicals even remotely poses a threat to the United Kingdom, while rather less criticism is heard of those regimes which not only pose a threat, but which, in spite of self-sufficiency in arms supply, frequently seek and obtain access to British technical expertise. There have indeed been some notable British achievements in the armaments sales field in the past. The celebrated Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighter, which played a leading role in the Battle of Britain, as in every other air campaign within Europe in the second world war, would not have been so ready so soon had the prototype not been able to use a Rolls-Royce Kestrel engine while development of a German engine was awaited. More recently, the Soviet Union, blessed with an abundance of captured German jet fighter designs at the end of the war, was able to get its MiG-15 jet fighter into the air with the help of Rolls-Royce Derwent and de Havilland Ghost engines bought from Britain. The purchase of these engines must have given Russia a five-year advancement compared with the time which it would have taken to design and develop engines of her own, in addition to which most post-war Russian jet engines have been developments of these early engines.
Recently, of course, the main area of controversy has been South Africa, and sales of Hawker Siddeley Buccaneer jet bombers and Nimrod maritime-reconnaissance aircraft. Neither aircraft could be used against the African population — even if South Africa showed such inclinations — since both are too fast and too sophisticated for counter-insurgency use. On the other hand, both could be used to protect British and other Western shipping on the exposed Cape route, which will still have to be used by tankers and the largest container ships even after re-opening of the Suez Canal. The Buccaneer could operate against surface vessels and the Nimrod would be an effective counter to the Russiah submarine menace—and by the level of Soviet naval activity of late, it would seem that the Russians appreciate the value of the Cape route to the West, even if we choose to ignore it.
Cant and hypocrisy reach a high level, however, with the sale of armed Jet Provosts under the last Labour government to the Sudan, whose Arab rulers used them for several years against Negro insurgents. The moral
must be thatit is quite in order for the Arabs to do such a thing, but not for a European government to guard against the eventual possibility of intrusion from adjoining 'free' African states. The African nationalist movements themselves have base areas in Tanzania which in their extent are on a par with Aldershot. Arms embargoes are seldom effective, and that for South Africa is a case in point. Not only can South Africa provide its own small arms generally, but the standard counter-insurgency aircraft for the South African Air Force, the Italian Macchi MB326 Impala, uses a licence built British Bristol Siddeley Viper turbojet engine, a point for the arms ban advocates to ponder. This underlines the point that any success which any arms ban may have works not against South Africa's internal security, but against the security of communications of the western world as a whole.
A considerable degree of exaggeration typifies much comment on arms sales, a good example being Chile's very modest requirements being presented as arming to the teeth. Apart from being an old ally, the present Chilean government is politically of the centre rather that the right, while Chile is today something of an area of calm amongst the traditionally turbulent South American political scene.
Chile's defence problems in the future could arise out of a recurring border dispute with Argentina, or the uncertain political situation in neighbouring Bolivia. Stability is not, and never has been, the natural order of things anyway, so to deny a friendly power adequate means of defence can only be described as wickedness. No doubt, had Allende, with his minority Marxist government, remained in power, pushing through his 'reforms' with the very rough and all too ready assistance of the workers and students, not a murmur would have been heard from trade union circles here about frigates and submarines for his regime.
Yet, all these cases fade into insignificance compared with proposals to build a factory in China to produce Rolls-Royce Spey turbojets, and to sell that country the Concorde supersonic airliner_ China has for some years now been virtually cut off from her traditional supplier of aircraft, the Soviet Union, and has always had only limited success in attempts to produce Soviet designs under licence on a really large scale. More to the point, she lacks an aircraft or a missile capable of delivering her nuclear weapons.
Although the Spey engine which would be built in China is the one which powers the Hawker Siddeley Trident airliners in Chinese service, it is also the basis of the military version which powers such advanced militarY aircraft as the Buccaneer and certain versions of the Phantom fighter. So not only are the Chinese obtaining a modern engine with considerable development potential, but the knowhow needed to establish a production line as well. As for Concorde, the aircraft is so fast that only the Soviet Union and the United States have tighter aircraft capable of intercepting it, and its range and payload make it suitable for conversion to a bomber — and even a crude conversion could suit China well enough to terrorise South-East Asia, Japan and the Indian sub-continent.
A conscience is all very well, but it is a luxurY in a world in which the law of the jungle still applies and our own survival is not assured. In any event, the radical conscience seems to he misdirected to the extent that right and wrong is dictated by political dogma and theory rather than by genuine goodwill and reality. Unfortunately, as events in the Eastern Mediterranean have shown, even the most laudable arms supply policy can misfire, but the dilemma posed by traditional enmity and the danger of Soviet strength cannot be easily resolved, still less avoided.
David Wragg specialises in transport and defence matters. Ms recent books include Speed in the Air arid Flight Before Flying
Previous page
