Commonwealth and Foreign
. DANZIG, GERMANY AND POLAND
By JOHN KAESTLIN
RECENT developments in Danzig have once more focussed world-wide attention—or rather would have done were it not for the gravity of the general political situation—on the vexed problem of the " Corridor," allowed to lapse since the conclusion of the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934. It may be that the precise significance of these developments have been misunderstood in view of more important considerations in East and West.
By the final dissolution of the Catholic Centre the Nazi Government have at last completed the policy of Gleichschaltung which has characterised Herr Greiser's term of office as Presi- dent of the Senate. The Committee of the Centre had, in the circumstances, deemed it expedient to " refrain from using their formal rights of complaint " in return for a general amnesty. This " voluntary " liquidation might be—and in some quarters certainly is—considered to legalise the pro- cedure. At any rate, with the disappearance of the last non- Polish oppositional organisation in the so-called Free City, the National Socialists have finally and conclusively achieved an object in which they failed, despite all the resources of the Reich's propaganda, at the more or less democratic elections of 1933 and 1935—namely, the securing of the two-thirds majority in the Diet permitting them to alter the Constitution. Today two Polish civilians are the only un-uniformed members of a Diet of 72.
An Anschluss, therefore, the possibility of which was to be deduced from the governmental battle cry Zurikk zum Reich, would merely confirm a fait accompli. In view of the reality of political, if not legal, annexation, such .a declaration could only have an economic significance. And, however desirable they may consider the former, even the most extreme Danzig chauvinists are not blind to the disaster concomitant on the latter.
Danzig, first of all, gives a " free and secure access to the sea " to the " territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations " ; such access is essential to the very existence of an " Independent State " in Poland's .particular geo- graphical and political position, sandwiched between the U.S.S.R. and the Reich. The remarkable development of Poland's maritime trade has, moreover, been the result of the various restrictions and prohibitive tariffs in neighbouring and generally hostile countries during and after the Crisis.
Today 8o per cent. of Poland's foreign trade is shipped through the ports of Gdynia and Danzig. On the other hand, the difficulties encountered in Danzig, under stress of German revisionist tactics, and the consequent insecurity of that territorial access to the sea which alone guarantees Poland's economic and political independence, necessitated the construction of Gdynia after the Danzig Dockers' Strike of 1920 ; Danzig refused to permit the entrance of military supplies for the Polish army during the Bolshevik invasion.
Moreover, Gdynia was necessitated by the various technical deficiencies in the port of Danzig, due to its deliberate neglect under Prussian rule. On the other hand, any faith placed in Gdynia's ability to cope with the entire export traffic has, despite her almost miraculous development, long been abandoned.
Danzig is perfectly aware that its natural hinterland is neither East Prussia, nor Germany, nor even Pomerania, but Poland. For this reason the attitude of the great majority of her population, her industrial, commercial and working classes, whether Social Democrats, Liberals or Centrists, towards. Poland have changed little despite the show. of swastikas. They have always opposed the tactics of govern, mental friction-makers depending financially on Berlin.
Throughout the long tragi-comedy of Polish-Danzig relations, commercial interests have continually demanded a commercial rapprochement between Danzig and Poland. In previous disputes Poland has always been victorious because she leaned on the. Danzig bourgeoisie. Hence the continual efforts of the small clique of Germanophil. authorities to destroy the power of that bourgeoisie.
Yet even these authorities cannot be entirely oblivious of present and historical facts. There is, for instance, the considerable increase of export and import traffic since Danzig's incorporation in the Polish customs area and the regaining of her status as a port of world importance.
The economic interests of Danzig and Poland are identical. Thus, the demand for an economic Anschluss is unlikely to come from Danzig, where,. however much the political opposition be eliminated, the economic opposition is still in power. Just as the recent anti-semitic violence was immedi- ately checked by the threat of boycott on the part of Jewish and non-Jewish houses, so the extreme pan-Germanism of Danzig's authorities must be limited by her commercial interests. Danzig's economic frontiers do not coincide with her proposed political frontiers. And this is why, despite all Greiser's and Forster's verbosity, despite the inspired -articles to the Danziger Vorposten, the Senate is unlikely to push to its logical conclusion a policy diametrically opposed to Danzig's welfare. The question is less whether the Danzigers want to be Germans, which ethnically nobody denies them to be, than whether they are prepared to sacrifice themselves on the altar of Germanic chauvinism and to a propagandist cause. " Propagandist " 'because a formal declaration of annexation confirming a fait accompli could not be of economic or even of strategic interest to either Danzig or Berlin. The loss of official independence could only spell impoverishment to a port relying entirely on its Polish hinterland, and the addition of a third-rate port to an EaSt Prussian hinterland notorious' for agricultural bankruptcy and already -incapable of adequately supporting the ports at its disposal, could be of no interest to Berlin save as an opportunity for establishing there a Baltic naval base—and this Danzig would inevitably become in case of war, whether the declaration were made or no.
Strategically, formal reunion can hardly constitute a vital necessity for Berlin for the simple reason that, officially or no, actual 'political annexation has already progressively converted Danzig into a fortified town. Detachments of German regiments and• air force units are stationed in the so-called Free City, fortifications have been erected, Danzigers do military service in Germany and, in case of mobilisation, would serve with the German forces. • The presence of a German military base at the- mouth of the Vistula must, quite apart from economic considerations, be a source of anxiety to Warsaw authorities today, as was its prospect to Pilsudski. And in accusing Colonel Beck of responsibility for the continual delimitation of the political power of the pro-Polish bourgeoisie by his fatal tolerance of Forster's coups d'etat, M. Strassburger would -seem almost purposely to avoid explaining the Polish Foreign Minister's vacillating ' and—it would seem=delibertiely negligent policies, by pointing to the precise degree in which they are both imposed by the vulnerability of Pomorze. To a _dis- passionate observer, the alternative would seem to lie between a Warsaw-Berlin détente on the basis of those pacts, involving a Danzig policy prejudicial to. Polish interests, and a policy favourable to Danzig involving pressure on Danzig authorities, consequent friction with Berlin and the weakening of Poland's hold on Pomorze—a dilemma that would explain a foreign policy lacking the approbation of large sections of the Polish public, if not altogether justifying Colonel Beck's active and totally irrational support of Greiser at Geneva.
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