TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE RUHR AND THE NEED FOR PLAIN SPEAKING. NNE are confident that the intentions of the Govern- ment in face of the perils of the European crisis are sound. They realize the dangers before them. They face the facts. They know that France cannot do any good for herself by her policy and is certain to injure the interests of this country and of the world at large. Further, they know how easily the hopes of Europe's recovery may be shattered and how quickly the whole of the ground gained since the Peace for commercial revival may be lost. The jack to lift the overturned engine which blocks the line had with infinite difficulty been got into place, and there was a chance, or more than a chance, of getting the wreckage out of the way. And now France is busy pushing the jack aside, driving away the breakdown gang, and insisting on the use of high explosives which, instead of clearing the line, will blow it to pieces and make the work of reparation impossible !
But this understanding of the dangers, this absolute refusal to take any responsibility for the policy pursued by France, is not enough. We are face to face with a situation which cannot be met by standing aside, by mere negation. Our attempt to remain neutral on this great issue—this pretence, for such it is, that we can avoid responsibility by inaction—will, if persisted in, bring consequences as terrible as those which followed from President Wilson's decision to stand neutral on a moral issue. The consequences of not-doing may be as great as those of doing. You do not escape from a flood by watching or lamenting its rise. We shall not save ourselves or Europe, we shall not even avoid the enmity of France, by doing nothing. Action will, no doubt, be bitterly resented by France, but inaction will not satisfy her. The bitterness, however, will be stronger and fiercer when the inevitable failure of the Ruhr policy has been achieved. The blame for that failure will be laid upon us in either case. But who can doubt that the misfortune of estrangement from France will be increased and not diminished when it is coupled with the ruin of European commerce, and with revolution, chaos and Sovietism in Germany ? We can bear French ill-Will for a time if we have trimmed the boat. If we let France upset the boat she will be just as furious, and we shall not even have the consolation of dry clothes.
The mistake that we are making in not warning France in unmistakable language as to what will be . . . our course of action if she persists in a policy calculated to, bring ruin on all concerned is analogous to the terrible blunder made by Mr. Asquith's Government at the end of July, 1914. The German Government were hesitating as to whether they should or should not back up Austria's attack on. Serbia. If during those days of hesitation the British Cabinet had in plain terms warned Berlin that we should stand by France at all costs and prevent her destruction, not merely by our Navy, but by every form of force at our command, there would have been no war. Instead of telling Germany that she must not trust to there being no binding agreement between us and France we made, with the best intentions, the appalling blunder of refusing to say what we should do if war came. We did not act. We stood undecided, or apparently undecided. While we gave Germany good abstract advice, we insisted upon the fact that we were not in any way pledged to help France, but were quite free to stand out. We did this, no doubt, with the misguided hope that we should thereby avoid the risk of inciting France and also Russia to an unreasonable stiffness in opposing Germany and Austria. Of course, this last hope was vain. All we did was to make the Germans say to themselves, " England would never have said that if she meant business. It's all right. She's going to leave France to her fate. We can safely go full-steam-ahead with a bold war policy. But we'd better do it at once before there's a change of Government and perhaps of policy. So here goes for a chance that may never occur again." Our desire to be fair and not to provoke war hurried it on, nay, made it inevitable. Are we not, at this moment, in obedience to the same virtuous and well-meant punctilio of non-provocation, making a similar error, and may not the consequences be as terrible ? We believe that we are. Further, we believe that to commit two such awful faults in the management of great affairs within ten years is more than the world can bear. Therefore, though the last thing the Spectator wants to do is to attack or bring discredit upon Mr. Bonar Law's Administration, we feel bound to implore them not to ruin themselves and the nation by a policy of inaction. Such inaction is bound to mislead France, and is, indeed, misleading her already, into thinking that we shall continue to acquiesce in her plan of campaign, whatever its consequences, and that in fact we have given her a free hand !
To allow France to think this is to do her a cruel wrong. It is the most unfriendly act imaginable. It is in reality, though so good in intention, an act of treachery to our late Ally. We all know in our hearts what will happen here when a few more fatal and petty triumphs have brought France into collision with the German population as a whole. Picture the French soldiers, after another six weeks have elapsed, terrified at the insecurity of their military position, demanding a blow at the heart of the enemy as the only method by which security can be obtained. Picture at the same time the French financiers, driven out of their wits to find money for a " plan " which is costing a hundred millions of francs a day and producing in coal in one week only half as much coal as was produced before the occupation in a single day, telling the Government that the springs of money are getting exhausted and that it has become necessary to seize on more German assets or " screw " from Germany at all costs real treasure, i.e., gold, not paper.
What is going to happen here when such a situation has been produced in the Rhineland and when the French are hanging and shooting civilians, burning towns, and paralysing commerce to prevent " sabotage," as every form of passive resistance will be called ? There will be a demand from all classes to stop the French invasion and save us from the new Great War. Then, but to late, we shall send " rough " Notes to France, and follow them up with rougher ultimatumi. But who can expect France under such conditions to be raison- able ? Her disillusionment will be so bitter as to drive her mad. She, unfortunately, does not yet know our mental attitude—our incurable unwillingness to say disagreeable things to our friends, our hesitancy, Out weakness of purpose, our impotence of mind, up till the very moment when we suddenly change from .what sounds like snivelling hypocrisy to the fiercest and most persistent exhibition of force of. which human beings are capable. We " havered " for a precious week in July, 1914, and then threw ourselves into the fray with a Berserk rage. We shall do something very like it now unless we at once speak: out plainly and make France, understand that we are not merely cautious,, but that we condeinn het" policy- root and branch nOyf that we see it in action, and that she must remember that we shall hold her responsible for any and all un- favourable consequences that may result. Further, we must tell her that we reserve to ourselves the right to take any action which we may deem necessary to secure our own welfare and that of every part of Europe affected by the Treaty of Versailles.
If we say that now and openly, though of course not with the politeness of diplomatic usage, we believe that the effect will at once be very great. After the first explosion of disappointment a reaction will set in, and France will soon find ways of saving her face by invoking a complete reconsideration " of all the circumstances" connected with Reparations and also of those on which the Allied indebtedness to us and America depends.
But supposing this is a vain hope, we are no less con- vinced that we must speak our minds. If we do so we shall—when the time comes, as assuredly it will, to say to France " Thus far and no further "—find the hateful task made not heavier, but lighter, by the fact that we had warned her in plain terms of what must be the consequences if she pushed her policy to extremes.
J. ST. LOE STRACHEY.
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