The New Kellogg
HE High Contracting Parties solemnly I declare, in the names of their respec- tive peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instru- ment of national policy in their relations with one another.' Thus article one of the Kellogg Pact, signed by, among others, Germany, Japan, Italy, Britain, France and Kellogg Pact, signed by, among others, Germany, Japan, Italy, Britain, France and the United States. Within four years Hitler was master of Germany, and the world had embarked on the bloodiest phase in its history.
Forty years later, at Geneva, the world leaders are now engaged in drafting a second Kellogg—this time to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the enterprise is successful (which is far from certain) and an agreed treaty emerges, there is no reason to believe that it would be followed by the disasters that followed its predecessor. But there is equally no reason to suppose that it would be any more effective in preventing them.
That is one good reason why there is not a single major non-nuclear power that is happy about signing the treaty. Ger- many, Israel, Italy, India, Canada and Japan have all made their objections more or less plain. Indeed, the only real sup- porters of the enterprise are the three nuclear would-be signatories, America, Russia and Britain (France and China will have no part in the treaty whatever hap- pens), which is hardly surprising since the whole purpose of the treaty is to prevent the other countries from reaching their status. And these countries must not only renounce the acquisition or (more realisti- cally) manufacture of offensive nuclear weapons: they must also forswear any form of nuclear missile defence.
Indeed, they must not manufacture any nuclear explosives at all, not even small ones for civil purposes, which in the years ahead could well develop important appli- cations in excavation, mining and so on. And, of course, they have to leave to the nuclear powers the monopoly of techno- logical spin-off from the military into the civil nuclear field. Then, again, if the non- proliferation treaty is to make even a pre- tence of being more than a scrap of paper, the non-nuclear powers (unlike the nuclear signatories) will have to agree to inter- national inspection of all their civil nuclear plants to make sure they are not manufac- turing nuclear explosives: an open invita- tion to industrial espionage. What, then, do the non-nuclear powers get in return for the sacrifices they are making? Certainly no guarantee of protec- tion against aggression (or, more likely. nuclear blackmail) by one of the nuclear powers, such as India seeks against China. Nor is there any effective sanction (shades of Kellogg again) against any non-nuclear signatory unilaterally withdrawing from the treaty and 'going nuclear': the knowledge that other nations may then also withdraw is hardly a sufficient deterrent. All the non- nuclear countries are offered in the Russo- American draft treaty that is now under discussion is that the nuclear powers for their part make a solemn declaration of intent (reminiscent phrase) to stop the arms race and to begin negotiations for a com- prehensive test-ban treaty and for an agree- ment to cease the production of weapons- grade fissile material and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—all this, of course, with no guarantee that any agreement of any kind will actually be reached.
If the dissatisfaction of the non-nuclear powers in general with the draft treaty that America is trying to bulldoze them into signing is understandable, so is the even greater sense of outrage that is emerging within the Common Market countries—in particular in Germany, Italy and within the Brussels Commission. Let it be said at once that this journal is utterly opposed to Ger- many becoming—as it is already techni- cally competent to be—an independent nuclear power. But if a treaty is needed, Germany is already bound by the Paris Treaty of 1954, of which Britain is a sig- natory, not to manufacture nuclear weapons; and no country is going to be so foolish as to give them to her. By making a public spectacle of a further treaty the Russians and the Americans are simply playing into the hands of the extreme Ger- man nationalists.
The Europeans object, first, that the treaty introduces a major discrimination (between France and the rest) into a com- munity which is dedicated (the Paris Treaty excepted) to complete non-discrimination between its members. More important still, they point out that the requirement that all inspection be done by the International Atomic Energy Authority based in Vienna completely cuts the ground from under the feet of Euratom, one of the three Euro- pean community authorities, whose prin- cipal raison d'être at the present time is in fact the inspection of the member nations' civil nuclear energy installations.
But their crucial objection is that the draft treaty that Britain, America and Russia have agreed rules out any possi- bility of a European nuclear force until such time as the six countries of the EEC are genuinely one. That is, it rules out a European nuclear force at the intermediate stage envisaged by the Rome Treaty and almost all believers in European unity as the only possible route towards full inte- gration : the stage at which decisions are taken by majority vote. And by ruling out a nuclear Europe at this stage it puts a road-block on the path to unity at any date.
Britain's attitude towards the non-pro- liferation treaty was therefore seen by most Europeans as an acid test of the genuine- ness of Mr Wilson's attempt to join the Common Market—had he not even de- clared that Britain wanted to join Euratom in order to put 'new life' into it?—and of this country's readiness to consider itself European. For all the European objections add up to one simple truth: the object of European unity is to create a new world power on a par with Russia and America; while the object of the non-proliferation treaty is virtually to prevent this.
Had Britain, like France, declined to sign the treaty in its present form, every nation • of Europe would have followed her ex- ample. Had we quietly agreed to sign and said nothing (for the real negotiations have inevitably been between the Ameri- cans and the Russians) this would have been accepted by the Europeans without in any way affecting the chances of a non- proliferation treaty ultimately being con- cluded. But instead, in pursuit of Mr Wilson's eager search for a worthless `peace' triumph he can wave at his Viet- nam-angered left wing, Britain has been actively pqnniuting and touting the non- proliferation draft treaty throughout the length and breadth of Europe. Not only that, our one and only contribution to the evolution of the treaty has actually been to persuade the Americans to eliminate the 'European clause' that was in their original draft, which would have permitted a European nuclear force controlled by majority vote. For good measure, we have privately made clear to the Europeans that this means that Britain would only agree to a European nuclear force before Euro- pean unity is complete if there were to be a British veto on it.
In fine, the Government's conduct over the non-proliferation treaty, at a time when it is ostensibly seeking member- ship of the Common Market—and, in par- ticular, Italian and German help in gaining it—represents one of the most inept epi- sodes in the annals of British diplomacy. It may well be that no treaty ultimately emerges; but the harm has been done. The French have not even needed to put up obstacles: we have created them ourselves. If, this time, the General fails to use his veto, it will be for one reason only: that the negotiations do not begin at all.
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