China's gamble with Russia
David Bonavia
Hong Kong China's weekend assault on Vietnam was not in itself unexpected: the Peking media had clearly been preparing Chinese and international opinion for it for many weeks. In fact it had reached the point where China would have suffered a loss of credibility if she did not attack her southern neighbour. Nevertheless many observers refused to believe that China — which has always prided itself on keeping its troops at home — would risk the condemnation of people throughout the world who see no justification for letting a political squabble and a border dispute escalate into a full-scale war.
The fact that China went ahead and took this action shows that, for all the leadership's recent globe-trotting, it preserves a world view fundamentally different to that of the Western hemisphere and the Soviet Union. China has, for example, never accepted the idea that limited war is a dangerous first step towards nuclear conflict —or, for that matter, that nuclear war in itself is an unmitigated disaster. Indeed it is unlikely that even the Russians —obliged by treaty to help their Vietnamese allies if necessary — would want to engage the Chinese in the north so heavily that nuclear weapons were brought into play. However, the situation could risk such an outcome if it ran out of control — as wars have a way of doing.
The overwhelmingly important motive behind the offensive —which it is impossible to view merely as a means of settling territorial disputes by force — is to show that China may not be taken lightly by any power. The smallness of Vietnam in relation to China is not seen as a moral impediment, since Peking has classified it as a 'Trojan horse of Soviet socialist imperialism.'
The Vietnamese, busy enough holding down Kampuchea while the new regime there consolidates itself, seem to accept the fact that they cannot adequately defend themselves against Chinese attack. Their forces have retreated quickly — a tactic they became used to when fighting the superior fire-power of the Americans. Vietnam is probably counting on Chinese fears of becoming bogged down as they themselves have become bogged down in Kampuchea, and looking back to the 1962 Sino-Indian war it would be a predictable Chinese tactic to declare an early ceasefire and eventually a mutual disengagement. If China is mainly cut to prove a point, and at the same time show that it is not as impotent an ally of Kampuchea as it has seemed, the war need not drag on long, though the resulting frontier negotiations are likely to be lengthy.
The real question concerns the reaction of the Soviet Union since the fighting has brought to a head several important matters affecting Soviet global strategy. First, the Chinese have shown that they are prepared to shed blood, whereas their reputation for the past decade or two has been one of great caution and avoidance of any armed conflict which is not forced upon them. Second, China is demonstrating that the recent partial agreement with the Americans over Taiwan means a growth of confidence about the defence of what used to be seen as the country's 'soft underbelly' — its southern frontiers and coastline. Some of the troops fighting the Vietnamese are believed to have been withdrawn from the coast of Fukien province, opposite Taiwan, for this very purpose. And it is clear that Peking has at last dropped its fears of a sneak attack from Taiwan. Third, China's vice-premier, Teng Hsiao-Ping, is showing that, despite his cordial reception in the United States recently, China's new friendship with western countries does not mean that it will go along with what it sees as their appeasement of the Soviet Union. And, fourth, Peking is evidently calling Moscow's bluff over its treaty with Vietnam.
If Mr Teng gets away with this gamble, then, he will have significantly altered the way in which the world's balance of forces is seen. He will have demonstrated that China is not dependent on any other country for support in implementing its foreign policy. And that neither the worried frowns of the Americans nor the threats of the Russians will deter it from looking after what it considers to be its vital interests.
China has certainly suffered severe provocation from the Vietnamese over the past year. The territorial disputes can doubtless be argued either way, and it is impossible to say who fired the first shots in border incidents last year. But Vietnam's callous expulsion of some 200,000 of its ethnic Chinese residents has been both an insult and a severe burden. Not only have the refugees from Vietnam presented a difficult problem of resettlement in China itself but they have also become highly troublesome to Hong Kong, with which China is now cultivating better relations.
Of course, China did not attack Vietnam because Hong Kong was worried about refugees. But it is one aspect of the complex of problems which confronts the Chinese in South-East Asia. Peking is anxious to be seen as responsible and benevolent in its dealings with the countries of that region.
China has tried hard to convince other regional governments that the real villains of the piece are the Russians, who, it says, are using Vietnam as the instrument of their 'socialist-imperialist' aims. By taking military action, it has shown that it takes its own words seriously and, if this elicits a military response from the Soviet Union, it will at least have demonstrated that Russia is now a South-East Asian power and should be dealt with warily as such.
None of this will satisfy people like the American Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, who career is dedicated to avoiding conflicts and improving detente. The Chinese have never been rude enough to assail Mr Vance openly for this policy, which they consider fundamentally wrong-headed; but their sudden slash at Vietnam will at least convince America that they are more than muddle-headed theorists mainly concerned with domestic economic development. For better or for worse, China is once more a world power to be reckoned with.
Previous page
