TOPICS OF THE DAY.
JEALOUSY, NOT CONFIDENCE.
THE reply made by Ministers to the representations of Lord Lynd- hurst on the subject of the several treaties to which the Western Powers and the German Powers are parties is not quite satisfac- tory. The peculiar reciprocal bearing of the texts of the several treaties between the Western Powers on the one hand and the German Powers on the other, and the Four Powers collectively, we pointed out in the Spectator of the 10th in- stant. Lord Lyndhurst has shown that our interpretation of those texts was not overstrained; but from the reply of Lord Clarendon we are forced to doubt whether even yet he rightly un- derstood the nature of the complication. The objects of the several treaties are not one, but different. 'Whereas the Western Powers are pledged to enforce the evacuation of the Principalities, and to obtain from Russia a guarantee against future encroachments upon the independent rights of the European states,—and whereas the German Powers are pledged only to request the evacuation of the Principalities, and not to seek for any further guarantees at the conclusion of peace,—those two parties, entertaining objects so different, are bound together by the protocol concluded at 'Vienna on the 23d of May last. The connexion thus established between the Four Powers might possibly prove embarrassing after their joint efforts should have secured the common object of the Four Powers, and when the Western Powers might propose to go for- ward for the attainment of their object. We need not again refer to the texts in order to reestablish that position. Not limiting his citations to those instruments, but bringing additional evidence that Russia is not to be trusted on her treaty, Lord Lyndhurst established the necessity for more forcible coercion of that Euro- pean disturber, at the same time that he showed how the Western Powers might be trammelled by these narrower compacts with the German Powers.
• The reply of Lord Clarendon on these points consists of two parts. In the first place, he shows that the original protocol adopt- ed by the Four Powers on the 5th of December, which Lord Lynd- hurst cited, had been concluded while the Western Powers were agreed to protect the freedom of Turkey and the independence of the Sultan as essential to the equilibrium of Europe, but before Russia had refused the demands of Austria, and before Aus- tria had taken the independent course in which she is now engaged. It would indeed have been a sufficient reply to say that the circumstances are altered; that Russia has re- jected even the moderate demands of Austria and Prussia ; that the negative pledges volunteered by Austria in the Prussian convention are therefore cancelled as towards Russia; that Austria has committed herself to a more active policy ; and that we must deal with the events as they exist, and not go back upon parch- ment stipulations which are out of date. That would have been a perfectly intelligible reply, practical in its bearing, and inclining us to trust that Lord Clarendon was disposed to rely more upon acts, upon the independent interests of states, and upon the influ- ence which this country can secure through the display of her strength, than upon mere legal instruments, which have been so extremely discredited by the very dispute now in progress.
But Lord Clarendon will not permit us to suppose that he places his reliance upon free action ; because the second part of his answer consists in going back upon the texts of the Austro-Prussian treaty, and, resting too exclusively upon that instrument, putting what we believe is an entirely new construction upon the whole situa- tion.
"The allusion to the status quo, though somewhat ambiguously expressed, has reference solely to German interests on the Lower Danube. The occu- pation of the Lower Danube by Russia had already greatly obstructed the freedom of commerce and the navigation of the Danube. That I have at- tributed the correct meaning to the declaration, is evident from the paragraph which states that a vast field is opened ror German industry in the East, and that it is essential that the great outlet by the mouth of the Danube should not be obstructed. The object of the declaration is to announce that the contracting Powers would not consent to territorial changes in any of the great states of Europe which would injuriously affect German interests."— Times, June 20.
Now this is quite true as regards the Austro-Prussian treaty, which had reference to the territories of Austria and Prussia; but in the "additional article," the two Courts declare their wish "to avoid all participation in the war that has broken out between Russia on the one hand, and England, France, and Turkey on the other, and at the same time to aid in the reestablishment of peace"; and they limit their claims in the "single article" to the speedy evacuation of the Principalities and the suspension of all further advance of the Russian army into the Turkish territory. This treaty, however, is annexed to the protocol of the Four Powers, which is expressly a document in continuation of the series already adopted by the Conference at Vienna. To that series belongs the protocol of the 5th December, in which "the un- dersigned plenipotentiaries" record with satisfaction "that the existing war cannot in any case lead to modifications in the ter- ritonal boundaries of the existing empire." This principle was put still more comprehensively in the memorandum addressed by the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin to their envoys at the Diet of Frankfort, in which they declare that "the war should under no circumstance have for result any change in existing terri- torial positions." We have now a consecutive history of the fixed idea in the Austro-Prussian council ; which is this, that there should be no disturbance of territorial positions, either in the boundary between Russia and Turkey, or in the boundary of Austria with any other state, or in the boundary of Prussia. The motive for this idea is evident. If the principle of disturbing existing territorial arrangements were admitted, the question of Austrian or Prussian tenure on more than one part of the border would be inconveniently thrown open. These stipula- tions and allusions have evidently originated in a strong feeling on the part of Austria and also of Prussia : the feeling manifests it- self in the memorandum of the two Courts to the Diet at Frank- fort, in the protocol of the 5th December, in the Austro-Prussian treaty, and in the protocol of the 23d May. It is more than a sti- pulation; it is the expression of a wish—of that which the two Courts considered fundamentally essential to their interests and safety. Now it would be greatly straining the effect of the Rus- sian rejection, to suppose that this stipulation, this understanding, this common wish between Austria and Prussia, should be can- celled by that rejection from Russia which only cancels the obliga- tions of the German Powers towards Russia. Again, it is true that the German Powers have not expressly pledged themselves to abstain from modifying the Russian boundary ; but the dis- tinction is this—that whereas the Western Powers have declared their desire for an object which involves the modification of that boundary as an essential accompaniment and guarantee of peace, the German Powers have declared for no such object, but they have recorded their desire for an object incompatible with it, namely, the non-disturbance of existing boundaries.
The true question at issue in the debate was not the present prosecution of the war, but the prosecution of the peace after the war. If Lord Clarendon relied on the moral influence of the hearty cooperation which Austria promises—upon the reactive in- fluence of companionhood—as certain to produce a frame of mind on the part of our allies harmonizing with our object of securing a "material guarantee" for the peace, his answer might pass. But when he falls back upon nice and isolated interpretations of one treaty divorced from the series to which it has been annexed by its authors, he compels us to fear that he relies upon combinations not calculated to forward that ulterior object. The " material guarantee," as a barrier against Russian encroachment, is entirely an English and not a German idea ; and when Lord Lyndhurst points out this discordance of view between Germany and the West, avowing the apprehension that at a future stage an embar- rassing diversity of council may follow, Lord Clarendon replies by reference to the text of a treaty belonging to the series which prove that diversity of view and motive, as if he did not see even there the difficulty which Lord Lyndhurst so lucidly discloses and so logically "produces" in its future consequences. The necessity of a clearly-defined view on the part of our Fo- reign Secretary is rendered more apparent when we turn to the view sustained by an important colleague. To Lord Aberdeen must perhaps be conceded the indulgence due to a personal feeling when he comes to the subject of war. The effect of this feeling is so strong that it blinds him to the force of facts, lie can see no danger to Europe from Russia, her power or her
aggression. He denies that after the treaty of Adrian- ople Russia had made any acquisition of Turkish territory : reminded of" two or three small ports" on the Asiatic coast, he corrects himself, and says, but not an inch of territory in Europe ; and then again he is forced to admit the disastrous results of the treaty of Adrianople in reference to the Danube. He might also remember, that if Russia has made no acquisition of territory, she has altered her tenure in Poland, has made a perpetual attempt on Circassia, and has been detected in systematically undermining whole provinces, if not the whole empire of Turkey, for seizure by surprise. • If Lord Aberdeen's assertion were more accurate in spirit than it is in the letter, it would be most imprudent for the chief of Queen Victoria's Cabinet Council to plead, at this day, even the "services" of the country's enemy. But, conceding to Lord Aberdeen every allowance for strong personal prejudices, we cannot omit the fact of his sitting in the Cabinet, and of his enter- taining these views so ardently that he cannot repress even the public expression of them, as a circumstance in the false position of our Foreign Secretary. It is evident that Lord Clarendon is sur- rounded by temptations to take too lenient a view of the enemy to whom he is opposed, too favourable a view of external rehances. It is the more necessary, therefore, that his own view should be clear, sharply defined, and stern. If he would not be the object of the jealousy which Lord Lyndhurst inculcates as more befitting the oc- casion than confidence, he must be the instrument of that jealousy.
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