24 JUNE 1911, Page 11

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

THE SURREY VETERAN RESERVE.

[To THY EDITOR or THE "Srscreron.-1 SIR,—The Army and Nary Gazette, when commenting upon Lord Roberts's inspection of the Surrey Veterans at Guildford on May 20th last, said that it " marks a further advance in the evolution of what we have no doubt will be in time one of our greatest national assets." This encouraging pronouncement, however, I do not think goes far enough, and I should like to supplement it by pointing out the far-reaching effect the Veteran Reserve, when fully developed, may have not only on this country but upon the Empire at large, and also to indicate the lines upon which such development might proceed. With a little effort and encouragement on the part of those County Associations which have not yet come into line, I think the number of registered men might easily be increased from 25,000 to 100,000 in the course of this Coronation year, a sufficient body, in my opinion, to form a nucleus upon which to found an organization independent of any other Force. There appears, from within, to be a strong objection to the Veteran Reserve being exploited for the benefit of the Territorials, who should not in any way be encouraged to lessen their efforts to maintain their own cadres at their fullest strength by the prospect of the Veteran Reserve making good, in time of emergency, any deficiency in their numbers. Both Cmsar and Napoleon learned from actual experience that an independent reserve force was a valuable and necessary adjunct to an army, and when it is borne in mind that in the event of invasion civilian employ- ment would practically cease, and large bodies of idle and hungry men would be let loose upon the country, the presence of the Veteran Reserve in their midst would undoubtedly

act as a valuable check upon what might otherwise prove a serious menace to public safety, and a hin- drance to defensive military operations. Now let us for the moment assume 100,000 or more men are obtained and properly organized. What deductions then may we draw P We must begin by thinking Imperially, and in this connection with the Royal Navy. Experts tell us that our fleets should on no account be tied to our coasts ; that they should have absolute freedom of action; that their proper and most effec- tive role is to take the offensive. Now, if the Navy is com- pelled to act on the defensive and police our shores, because the military forces at home alone are not strong enough to protect them, then our Colonies are absolutely at the mercy of the first coiner, since once the radius of action of the Navy is curtailed the command of the sea is gone from us. Hence it is necessary that our land forces should always be capable of performing their appointed task without requiring the support of the Navy. We have, however, to remember that the Army at home may at any time be seriously depleted in strength owing to the necessity of despatching a large force over seas, and from this we deduce that those who remain behind must be fully equal to cope with any sudden emergency that may arise. As wise men, too, we had best set aside at once the idea that any invader will grant our auxiliary troops six months' time in which to prepare for action, and rather assume that no days of grace will be vouchsafed them what- ever. We then arrive at bedrock. And of what does it consist P For the most part of Territorials who on January 1st last were 1,514 officers and 44,106 men below the authorized strength, and of those enrolled nearly one-third were under the age of twenty-one. We now see how important becomes the question of an adequate Veteran Reserve. Surrey has shown how a strong contingent of men in the prime of life may be raised in a very short space of time, and what one county can effect it is but reasonable to assume others can do equally well. Unfortunately the authorities, in a Memoran dum dated March 21st last, announced that " In peace time the Veteran Reserve will be developed mainly as a social institution." This decision I believe to be a mistake, and if persevered in will probably wreck the whole scheme The men themselves do not wish it, and, as the success of the movement rests mainly on their good-will, it is quite clear nothing should be done to make them with- draw or withhold their support. The best way out of the difficulty seems to be to allow the officers and men, after enrolment, to elect on which of two lists—say A and B— they wish their names to appear, with liberty at any time by notice to transfer from one to the other. The A list might comprise all those who wish to be " developed mainly as a military body," and the B list could include those who prefer to be developed mainly as a social institution." A social club has already been opened in connection with the Chertsey and Egham Company, and the men have readily responded to the invitation to attend drills, so it is clear the two ideas can be worked in conjunction and are not incompatible. The authorities would then know exactly what duties to assign to the men of each list, and which of them to arm and clothe in the first instance. I am strongly of opinion that steps should be taken at an early date to provide a distinctive uniform for such of the Veterans as are willing to attend drills and rifle practice—the A list men—for there seems to be a growing distaste on the part of many to appear in a body in. public in civilian attire. To my mind it is not business to damp the ardour of those who are willing to come forward and take a practical part in supporting the movement—which in the fulness of time is to become " one of our greatest national assets "—by withholding from them a privilege already enjoyed by such non-military bodies as the Boy Scouts and the Church Lads' Brigade.—I am, Sir, &c., CHARLES WALKER HOLMES, Captain, Surrey Veteran Reserve; Acting Commandant, Chertsey and Egham Company. Arlington, Oatlands Park, Weybridge.