POLITICS
Mr Putin's KGB past may not be a problem
BRUCE ANDERSON
Moscow lotlot of Russians now fear that the KGB is back in control. When Vladimir Putin took office, he retained a lot of Boris Yeltsin's associates — the so-called 'family' — though the jesters and drinking compan- ions are being eased out of power. But Mr Putin is gradually introducing his own men. Though these include one or two free-mar- ket economists from St Petersburg, the important positions are going to the new President's former colleagues, from his years in the KGB.
This is causing widespread anxiety among educated Muscovites, many of whom agree with one of the leading commentators here, Alexander Goltz. He said that his main objection was not to the Putin circle's KGB past; what really alarmed him was that they were so proud of it. Russians who think like Mr Goltz will inquire almost angrily why Western leaders have been so quick to wel- come Mr Putin: what has he done to deserve it?
These Russians may be wrong, however, and even if Messrs Blair and Clinton were less concerned with geopolitics than with photocalls, they may have adopted the right approach. It is still impossible to assess Mr Putin's personal qualities. In his inscrutability, he reminds one of a Christ- child in an early Russian icon, though no one is suggesting that Vladimir Putin is a holy man. Over time, we will doubtless learn what, if anything, the inscrutability conceals; it is far too early to make a judg- ment. But his KGB background may prove an asset, not a liability.
In Soviet days, the KGB had two advan- tages denied to most Russians. It had access to information and to an under- standing of the West (some historian, or novelist, ought to describe the tensions imposed on KGB officers who had to pro- claim the superiority of the Soviet model while knowing that this was nonsense). In Mr Putin's case this appears to have left him with some helpful convictions. He knows that the West is no threat to Russia, and that throughout the Cold War our position was a defensive one. He is also attached to Europe; he does not want Russia to be cut off in some unstable Euro-Asiatic hinterland. He may not fully understand the free market, but he knows that the Western system was vastly superi- or to the Soviet one, and that Russia must have a free economy. He may also acknowledge — this is less certain — that the West's economic successes depend on democracy as well as on free markets. But even if he is less committed to democracy than to prosperity, there is no reason to fear that Mr Putin has some secret agen- da, and would like to repeal the last decade's reforms.
He would like to restore Russian pride, prestige and greatness; he would also like to restore order. But these are not ignoble or threatening objectives, unless one is a Chechen. The Chechen war will continue indefinitely, a drain on resources and on morale: a moral and military mess. Mr Gor- bachev's foreign-policy adviser, Gennardi Gerasimov, was once asked why the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan. 'Because we had not read our Kipling,' came the reply. His successors do not appear to have read their Tolstoy. Hadji-Murad documents the folly of making war in Chechnya; noth- ing has changed since then.
But the Russians can claim that Chech- nya is their sovereign territory; there is no reason why this limited conflict should poi- son their relations with the West. Nor is there any reason to be alarmed by Mr Putin's wish to restore order. The arrest of Mr Gusinsky was an abominably botched affair, and has only succeeded in strength- ening his prestige at the expense of Mr Putin's. But though Mr Gusinsky is one of the better oligarchs, he is no saint; his busi- ness record ought not to be scrutinised by the authorities.
Equally, these authorities are now turn- ing their attention to the privatisation of the Norilski nickel mine, which was a scandalous affair. Norilski produces 40 per cent of the world's palladium, 24 per cent of its platinum and 20 per cent of its nickel; it was sold for a bag of sweets. The Russian state is entitled to try to recover assets which were, in effect, stolen. If Mr Putin shows himself willing to move against the oligarchs, this will be a sign that the rule of law is being imposed rather than violated. But it would be fool- ish to be over-optimistic. It is more likely that one or two minor oligarchs will be prosecuted than that the whole clan will be made to refund the $100 billion or so which they have embezzled.
There is one further question: whether future privatisation will be conducted rela- tively honestly, with any discounts for Mr Putin and his friends on a Robert Walpole scale rather than a Mobutu one. For some time to come, it is unlikely that any Russian leader will leave office as a poor man.
In retrospect, there was an element of naivety about most Western analyses of Russia during the Nineties. There was too much absolutism; too much willingness to believe that Russia was trembling between glory and chaos. In the early to mid- Nineties, Lady Thatcher and others were worried about 'losing Russia'. But before the 1998 crash, there were some ludi- crously optimistic assessments; some Western banks are still making provision for the ensuing bad debts. In truth, Russia was both a rougher beast than most West- erners realised, and a more robust one. Adam Smith said that there was a deal of ruin in a nation; Russia is proving him right.
This is a country with immense natural and human resources, and there have been dramatic changes. Though many Russian clerks still protect their backs with paper — as they have since Tsarist times — so that simple transactions such as buying a train ticket to St Petersburg can entail an epic of form-filling, there is now a comput- er and credit-card class. The consensus among Western employers in Moscow is that their bright 23- to 35-year-old Rus- sians are as good as any of their contempo- raries, deficient only in management skills which they still have time to acquire. Moreover — an astonishing development in a country where vodka has been the opium of the people — a lot of these young Russians hardly drink.
Assisted by a high oil price and a deval- ued rouble, the recovery from the 1998 economic implosion has been much more rapid than most observers predicted. The Russian middle class, though still small, is rapidly increasing in size. Most middle- class Russians are still gloomy about their prospects, but gloom comes easily to them, fortified by endless precedents from their nation's dire history. 'The Time of Trou- bles': Russia has hardly known anything else. But the despairing tone of dinner- table conversations is not carried through to the practices of daily life. Russia is in transition, and will be for decades to come, but there is no reason to be pessimistic about the ultimate destination.
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