An American tragedy
RUSSIA DEV MURARKA
Moscow—The Russians are bewildered. There was Washington, crying out with every drop of a bomb for a gesture from Hanoi, and protesting its love of peace and the Vietnamese (of a certain variety at any rate). And when last month the gesture came and the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister stepped back from his original precondition for talks, Washington simply pretended that it was not there. Moscow tried with all the means of proclamation at its disposal to draw the emperor's attention to the newly made clothes, but the emperor insisted on remaining naked.
The Russians have a certain expertise in detecting ideological nuances; they are even better at understanding and playing the game of power politics if it is necessary. But what is Washington up to? The Russians no longer understand. The Americans never miss a chance of telling their guests how they would love the Russians to solve the Vietnam crisis—as if Hanoi was some sort of Santo Domingo and the Russians had only to send a detach- ment of marines to make it kneel, as if the Russians had no other job but to pull the American chestnuts out of the fire. Yet when the chance came, Washington looked the other way.
The Russians are angry. Step by step the process of escalation threatens to bring the day of confrontation nearer. This is not a choice made by the Russians. Moscow is prepared to recognise American prudence in leaving alone the Soviet supplies to Hanoi, 80 per cent of which are now going via the sea route and not via China. The Americans only try to bomb these supplies when they have been loaded into smaller North Vietnamese craft. This is an act of caution, however, which the Russians find meaningless, for it only allows Hanoi to stiffen its resistance and brings the end of the war no nearer. It is also a very close-run thing, and one of these days the Russians will be hit directly and the flames will inevitably spread.
The Russians are worried. China is still in a state of convulsion and Moscow has to be prepared to deal with any awkward situation which may arise. At the same time, the war in Vietnam leaves her more at the mercy of the Chinese than she would like to be. It is not only a question of supply routes to Hanoi, important as this is. There is also the ideologi- cal question within the Communist camp; the longer the Vietnam war goes on, the better the chances of the Chinese rehabilitating them- selves quickly after the ravages of the cultural revolution. What worries the Russians even more is the sudden admiration—whatever its motives—for Mao and the cultural revolution which has blossomed forth in the most unlikely places, and above all in Washington. More than ever they are convinced now that collusion in principle, if not as yet in reality, between Peking and Washington may turn out to be a formidable geopolitical problem of the future.
The Russians are furious because they be- lieve the Americans are holding up a historical process and mutilating a natural development of South-East Asia along the paths of inde- pendence. Given time and peaceful conditions, they see Vietnam reasserting its traditional fear and independence of China. The Russians are even more convinced of this now that they have seen this process taking shape in North Korea. Time was when relations between Pyongyang and Peking were all brotherly love —to the detriment of Moscow; now, however, Pyongyang does not have one kind word to say for Peking and the Chinese are pouring out a string of invective against their Korean brothers. Meanwhile, the Koreans come to Moscow to embrace the Russians in gratitude. It is the old, old story. The nearer a small country is to a big power, the more afraid it is of domination. It should be the same with Vietnam and China, and, as the Russians see it, all that the Americans have done, at enor- mous cost, is to substitute themselves tem- porarily for China as the object of Vietnam's hatred and ridicule.
The Russians are uncomprehending because they know that the Vietnam conflict in no way enhances America's prestige or furthers her aims in other parts of the-world. They note that, because of Vietnam, world opinion grows ever more hostile to Washington. They are eager to grasp at any realistic proposals for peace which do not compromise the North Viet- namese, but they insist that the beginning of any such proposals must be an unconditional stoppage of bombing, and here the American stop-go approach merely puzzles and angers the Russians still further. Yet at the same time the Russians believe they do understand something of the nature of the American tragedy. They see the Americans thinking that, because they have the guns or the dollars, weaker powers must surrender to their will.
The Russians themselves understand this pro- cess, but what the Americans overlook is that North Vietnam is a small country, with a tough and entrenched Communist leadership and which is given strength by the presence of mightier Communist nations behind it.
Russian interest in South-East Asia has been variable partly because of the difficulties which the Soviet Union faces in establishing a real political base there. Now, however, Moscow knows perfectly well that American actions could play into Russian hands; the Soviets have a reasonable chance of appearing on the scene as disinterested partners in the develop- ment of the area. This is not to say that the Russians do not want peace; they do, but not at any price. There is also the problem that they are genuinely puzzled about how to get it. The Russians, indeed, are weary of answer- ing calls for peace in Vietnam. Their standard response is now please apply to Washington and Hanoi where the solutions lie. And this is the honest truth, because while Moscow has great persuasive power, the last thing she wishes to do is to persuade Hanoi to accept some- thing it does not want.
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