POLITICS
Another bombing raid to cheer up the President's supporters
FERDINAND MOUNT
`A
s different as chalk from cheese' — Sir Geoffrey Howe. 'It's quite a diffe- rent situation' — Mr Larry Speakes, Presi- dent Reagan's spokesman. The idea that there might be any comparison to be drawn between the American' raid on Libya and the South African raids on Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana received the most superb put-down from the Highest Quar- ters. Only the rougher sort of hack or backbencher would dare to suggest such a comparison. The Times headlined its lead- ing article RAID AGAINST REASON and alluded nowhere to its robust leader on the Libyan affair which, you will recall, was entitled THE CASE FOR THE RAID. The American raid could 'bring closer a safer and more secure world for decent men and women' (Mr Reagan himself). The South African raids were 'outrageous and inex- plicable' (Mr Speakes). No comparison at all.
Serious responsible persons, one was given to understand, ought to concentrate their minds on the matter in hand. What, for example, is the effect on the Eminent Persons Group? Has it irremediably des- troyed any chance of their success? Or was their mission doomed anyway? Or, per contra, were they getting too close for Mr Botha's liking to the arranging of a truce with the African National Congress? I confess to finding it hard to apply myself to such questions. The concept of an Eminent Persons Group is in itself so risible. Who can say that the modern age has lost the mediaeval art of inventing honorifics when we have given birth to both the VIP and the EPG? When it was set up, the Group was universally recognised as a figleaf to cover the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' failure to agree on sanctions against South Africa. And figleaves do not usually bear fruit.
Whatever the Highest Quarters may say, the only interesting aspect of these raids is the comparison with the Libyan one. For the comparison does throw a fascinating if rather eerie light on our confused and contradictory attitudes towards terrorism and the response to terrorism. The two raids are as nearly alike as any two events in an untidy world. The governments of Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe may not sponsor terrorism in quite the same way as Colonel Gaddafi does; but the distinction is not a crucial one. For the 'front-line states' (and what can you be in the front line of, except a war?) may claim to be against terrorism (so does Colonel Gadda- fi); but they naturally support the 'struggle' inside South Africa, and passively if not actively shelter the ANC exiles. In a sense, you could say that the South African government had more excuse for its repris- als, since even in his wildest dreams I do not think Colonel Gaddafi hopes to over- throw the elected government of the Un- ited States. And it may well be that the raids would have marginally more practical effect in deterring terrorism than the Li- byan raid did, since the front-line states are more responsive to and dependent on South Africa than Libya is on the United States. It is also possible that the South African targets were more apposite (as well as the loss of innocent life being less), whereas expert opinion in the case of Arab terrorism suggests that Syria is the real centre and that Libya is a melodramatic sideshow. Expert opinion may well be wrong, but it is all we have to go on.
The reality is that the South African raids, like the United States one, were undertaken to cheer up the President's own supporters and for no other cause, and it is self-delusion to pretend otherwise. It is also naïve to imagine that President Botha did not draw some encouragement from President Reagan's example.
Paid-up Buffers and card-carrying Wimps are exempt from these strictures. If you believe that any government is entitled to bomb any terrorists anywhere and that such great measures are in fact the only way to defeat terrorism, fine. Equally, if you believe that the defeat of terrorism is essentially a matter of internal security and international co-operation and that bomb- ing civilian centres won't help, fine again. But if you attempt to draw a distinction between these two cases, you are quickly thrown back upon the last line of defence: that violence by African 'freedom fighters' is in some respects justified while violence by Arab 'terrorists' is not; that the South African system is a uniquely evil system which is based on injustice and which must be overthrown, whereas the relative situa- tions of the state of Israel and the Palesti- nians are at worst unfortunate and that United States policy from Truman onwards cannot be blamed. This is a line which can be defended. All the same, it remains uncomfortably true that if there were ten million American citizens of Arab descent and only a handful of Jewish or African origins, the current situation and the cur- rent United States policy might be some- what different — worse, you may say, but surely different.
In fact, this is not really a criticism, almost the reverse. The willingness to support kith and kin in far-flung places is a benevolent instinct, however unfashion- able and however distant the kinship. But every virtue has its defect. And the defect in this is the failure to keep in mind the Others, the non-kin who live in the same place. Again and again in the more honest memoirs from regions riven by conflict, one comes across the confession that the author and his fellow-tribesmen did not really 'see' the Others; Moshe Dayan admits that the Israelis did not see the Arabs; Conor Cruise O'Brien, that the Catholics did not see the Protestants and vice versa. This sort of unconsciousness is intensified at one remove in the imperial power whch has ties of kinship, history and affection with one side only. Its diplomats may shuttle dutifully between one side and the other, attempting to negotiate the fairest possible settlement. But the politic- al instincts which rise to the . surface in moments of tension remain obstinately one-sided. The task of the political leader — judged by the highest standards — is to remain two-eyed at these difficult moments, to continue to remind his audience of the existence and the rights of the Other. This is not quite the same as impartiality; it would be too much to expect the great power not to do what it can to help its closest relatives. But there should be a continued attempt at openness of vision (I am sorry not to pin down this elusive quality more exactly), and under most American Presidents since the war there has been. President Reagan does seem W me to be an exception in this. Ah, one is told, but that is because you don't like America walking tall again; you resent your inferiority. I don't think that is a sufficient explanation. America walked extremely tall under Truman,EisenhOwer and Kennedy, and in Europe we, if any- thing, walked even smaller than we do now. But there was a feeling of openness; of self-confidence about America the which was a little different. Simon Jetik: ins's article on page 18 may explain better what I mean.
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