THE FRENCH CRISIS. T HE Orleanists in the French Senate have
lost a great opportunity of gaining real political weight, both for themselves and for the Senate itself. The Senate, if it is ever to have any genuine weight in the Constitution, must show its capacity not only for yielding with a good grace at critical moments to the popular will, but even for identifying itself with that popular will as its supreme law. One such moment has just occurred, and has been thrown away. Had the Orleanists, instead of hesitating between two opinions, offered to support the Left in strengthening the hands of the popular Chamber, at the same time screening the Marshal as much as possible from personal responsibility for the sins of his evil advisers, they would have made the Senate, at one stroke, a real power in the State, and themselves a real power in the Senate. But, "Unstable as water, thou shalt not excel," should be the motto of the House of Orleans. They neither "sin strongly," nor do right strongly. They waver, and vacillate, and draw meaningless distinctions, and put half their weight into one scale and half their weight into the other, till they become cyphers where they might be powers. In the vote of Monday they would not support the Due de Broglie, but they did support the snub given to the Chamber of Deputies. In- stead of making themselves felt as a bulwark of the Constitu- tion, they made themselves felt as a stumbling-block in the way of constitutional action. The Duo de Broglie could not get from them what he wanted but the people and the Chamber of Deputies, far from obtaining any support, only got a tacit re- buff. That is not the way to gain influence. It would have been quite possible to shield the Marshal,--which appears to have been their object, so far as a party so vacillating can be said to have had an object,—from anything like personal responsi- bility, and to shield him far more effectually than they have done, and yet to have strengthened the hands of the majority in the Chamber. Had they supported the Left in s deci- sive refusal, on Constitutional grounds, to interfere NN ith an inquiry which the Chamber of Deputies had full right to order, but at the same time insisted on expressing their confid- ence in the Marshal's resolute constitutionalism, and his wise determination to call to his counsels only moderate men, they would have really gained a grand position for the Senate, and done all that could be done, after the follies of which the Marshal has been guilty, to separate him from the criminal policy of his advisers. Doubtless, the Marshal might have resigned,—which we still think will be the solu- tion of the deadlock,—but the Senate would have not only struck a blow on behalf of the Constitutional theory of the President's irresponsibility,—but it would have gained for itself,—the Conservative element in the Constitution,—an altogether new prestige. That the Orleanists had not sense or nerve to take such a line as this, is unfortu- nately in perfect accordance with their whole past history, but it is a bad augury for the future when the intermediate party, which really holds the balance, shows so little sagacity, so little firmness, indeed so little aptitude even for policy, as the Orleanists showed on Monday last. If the arbitrator between conflicting parties has neither mind nor will, the chances in favour of firm and temperate guidance are small indeed.
Nevertheless, though the Orleanists have failed to score for Conservative institutions what they might have scored, they have not thrown the Senate into the hands of the miserable Government which is now a thing of the past, and there is much reason to hope that the Marshal's resignation will yet solve the difficulty, though it will leave the Senate even feebler, and even more in danger of coming to a deadlock with the Chamber of Deputies than it was five months ago. There is little reason to fear that the Senate will grant a second dissolution. And without granting a second dissolution, the Senate cannot furnish the Marshal with any consti- tutional pretext for continuing the contest. Of course, however, unconstitutional pretexts remain. The Marshal may, if he likes, persuade himself that he is bound to "save society," that ho is bound to afford France that display of force which reactionaries assert to be so agreeable to France, that he is bound to protect the Prefects whom he urged to a policy of combat, that he is bound, in short, to strike a coup d'itat. Only there are two reasons against this which even the Marshal will feel keenly. First, that if he succeeds, he will succeed only at the cost of his honour,— which has so often been pledged to the Constitution,—and also, at the cost of the Constitution ; and next, that he is exceedingly likely to fail, and that if he does, he will not only risk civil war, but set an example which the Radicals in their turn might find it convenient to follow. We do not give the Marshal much credit for his action as President of the Republic, but we do credit him with really feeling, and feeling very keenly, both these considerations. He is honourable enough to realise how base it would be, after indignantly reproaching the Republicans for their suspicions of an unconstitutional use of military force, to justify their suspicions by his own deliberate act. And he is sensible enough to feel extremely reluctant to hazard civil war, and to risk setting an evil example which his foes might follow, for the possibility of a success by which only the Imperialists could profit, and which is only a possibility, after all. We do not know which of these two considerations will weigh the more heavily with the Marshal, but we believe that combined they will more than outweigh his reluctance to fulfil, M. Gambetta's prediction that he must either submit or resign, while resignation will certainly be easier to him than submission., It is impossible that he should not see that his name would, lose all its right to figure in history as that of a soldier who, unfit as he was for politics, knew the full meaning of the word "honour," if after so often declaring his loyalty to the Con, stitution—as interpreted by himself—he were to tear it to pieces with the sword. It is impossible, too, that he should not recognise the enormous difficulty of success,—the number of Generale who would refuse to order their men to support an attack upon the Constitution,—the probability of a civil war of which the issue would be doubtful,—the certainty thl'at whether he succeeded or failed, the whole labour of founding a Constitution would' have to begin again. Hopeless as the Marshal may be, and probably is, of any good result from the Constitution he haa found it so difficult to obey, it is hardly likely that hey who can neither found a dynasty, nor find a dynasty- with which the country would be satisfied, would desire to . incur the responsibility of bringing back chaos. On the other hand, as he cannot find advisers who will advise him to do anything which he does not detest doing, unless he takes them from the party who mean civil war, as he is isolated in a position where to be isolated is to be helpless, the natural thing for him to say is that, having failed to mediate successfully between the Conservative party and the Constitution, and not feeling at liberty to identify himself with any principles which are not Conservative, and above all, having found the Senate unwilling to .support him in the only • policy by which he could hope to elicit a new set of instruc- tions from the nation,—he knows that he can be of no further use, and must leave it to the majority of the Chambers to find some one to replace him. This, as we quite hope, will be the ultimate solution of the struggle in Prance, and far the best that could now take place. But, in the meantime, the Senate have lost a great opportunity, which is hardly likely to recur,—an, opportunity of softening the Marshal's fall,—of modifying materially the Government which must succeed him, —and of obtaining for itself a distinct character as a body at once Conservative and popular, at once cautious and wise.
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