OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.
ACCORDING to the latest diplomatic news when we write this article -there is a tendency in France to be more moderate, to yield a point or two and to try to avoid the catastrophe of breaking up the Entente. This moderation, however, applies only to the attitude to be adopted towards Germany in maintaining the work of the inter- Allied Commission and in dealing with the return to Germany of the ex-Crown .Prince. In other and even more important respects there are no signs of moderation, and nobody, so far as we know, pretends that there are any.
For proof of this statement one need refer only to the speech by M. Poineare last Sunday in 'which he declared that that part of Germany which is occupied by France would, " in virtue of the Treaties," be retained not merely until the Treaties were " completely executed," but until France was " firmly secured against the further possibility of aggression." Thus M. -Poineari goes even further than he went before. He has continually appealed to the letter of the Treaty of Versailles while, from the British point of view, doing the utmost violence to its spirit and its legal .sense; but now .a new demand altogether is made. 'If he really means that France will occupy the Ruhr, or even parts of the Rhineland, till France is secure _against the .further possibility of aggression, he intends that France -shall stay there for ever. His phrase is .a new version of " The Greek Kalends," or of that old legal phrase about John Smith riding to Roane in one day—phrases which signify that some condition or agreement described is to continue in perpetuity.
Some of M. Poincare's own countrymen were con- siderably stnrtled, as well they might be, at what he- said last Sunday. Accordingly an official statement was subsequently made that M. Poincare's words referred only to the left bank of the Rhine. This makes a geo- graphical- difference, to be sure, but scarcely a moral one. The Versailles Treaty expressly did not extend the French frontier right up to-the Rhine, though Marshal Fcich would have liked it to do so. Yet now we have 111: Poincare stating that this extension will be made " in virtue of the Treaties." For our part, we regard the Treaties as pledges to be honoured in the spirit as well as in the letter, and not things to be twisted out of all recognition while lip-service is continually done to them. In virtue of the facts, therefore, we are con- strained to say that the time has come to declare finally that unless France changes her policy fundamentally, Englishmen must regard the Entente as unpreservable because unworkable. As it is, it is broken ; it does not function, and by far the greater part of the blame must rest upon France. if Fiance has nothing more to. offer in the way of moderation and concession to the point of view which has been stated over and over again with obvious sincerity and distress by British statesmen, we see no hope of a- revival of the Entente. For our part, regarding it as dead, we feel that. we may just as well say so. " Things are what they are and the consequences will be what they will be. Why, then, should we wish to. be deceived ? "
Let us take to ourselves,_ however, what: share of the blame is our due. We admit that we have allowed France far too long to go on thinking that if only she argued a little more, if only events were allowed to drift so as to-make each step taken by her more difficult to retrace, Great. Britain would be bound in the end to consent to what she could not remedy. The Entente would be put in going order once more with the blessing of everybody. Such expectations were formed in pro- found misunderstanding of British feeling. The average Englishman desires peace with every sense in his body. He knows the traditions of his country in not pressing a fallen enemy after a Treaty has been. signed ; he is also practical, and he knows that the only way to obtain money out of a debtor is to put the debtor in a position to pay. For all these reasons the typical Englishman loathes and deplores the French policy of heartless logic, intrigue and force. He would have been sincerely glad if the memorable Note of August 11th had been followed up by instant British action—by the summoning of an International Conference to which France should have been invited, but which would have proceeded even without her consent. As it was, alas' our Govern- ment, still shrinking from the very disagreeable. course of repudiating the Entente, still shuddering at the very idea of saying • an unnecessary wont to offend France,. temporized and hesitated, with results which in the long run have been much more injurions.to the Entente than any other conceivable course would have-been.
Frenchmen in the mass have had too little conception of what Englishmen. feel, and they have accepted the statements. of the Daily Mail as the voice of Great Britain. We do- not apologize for writing. very plainly, because what has happened shows only too. clearly that much more harm is done by pretending than. by truth- telling. If it is true that many Frenchmen are now rather scared by the state of Franco-British relations, we can only hope that even at- the last, hour good may come out of their apprehensions. The question foi them to- decide is whether they do or- do not want in the future' the sympathy and support of Great Britain. We cannot give either of those things on terms which we regard as immoral, and if France can do without them they must, of course, be bestowed elsewhere.
It is unnecessary to look further than the Mediter- ranean to see where our friendship would be valued.
We cannot indefinitely be indifferent to the interests of other Powers in order to prepare for the contingency that France one of these fine days may still like to lieni us heart-free and in the mood to work with her. Both Spain and Italy are great Mediterranean Powers, and so far as we can see there is no reason in the world why we should take a French view of Mediterranean questions, whether at Tangier or anywhere else, when both Spain and Italy have such strong claims to be heard and are so ready to accept our co-operation. The ghost of the Entente haunts many people in this country, but that is no reason why it should pursue us to the Mediter- ranean and terrify us into action there which would be disliked by Spain or Italy.
Let us act with both those countries in stabilizing conditions in the Mediterranean. A conference to consider the whole matter ought to be summoned. It would be an excellent thing if sense were at last allowed to outweigh sentiment, which has governed us too long, and a deal were clone with Spain about Gibraltar. We should be better off in every way if it were exchanged for Ceuta. The Spanish people would be overjoyed, and besides winning their attachment we should probably be able to engineer without any difficulty a commercial Treaty of considerable value. As for Italy, she would be greatly pleased, we believe, with some extension of her African possessions. These are subjects well worth consideration. We should be dealing with practical and conciliatory men and no longer be wasting our time delivering elegant thrusts at feather beds or working up. our fears. of bogies that would have given us He trouble if only we had made up our minds to face them.
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