THE WAR SURVEYED : THE BELGIAN INITIATIVE
By STRATEGICUS
THE events of the last week call the attention back to Holland, and it is impossible to gather what is Germany's intention with regard to it. Obviously if Germany could make use of Dutch territory without the trouble of conquering it she would be well pleased. But the formal warnings to Holland and Belgium not to fire on German aeroplanes crossing their territory can hardly be expected to produce immediate effects ; nor can the reproaches about non-observance of neutrality with regard to England. The role of such manoeuvring is to attempt to write off the sympathy which many other countries feel with two small nations faced by a threat to their independence. Germany has no respect for international morality, as is shown by her inhuman and illegal resort to the use of un- notified mines. The moral factor simply does not enter into her calculations. But it is now known that Italy and Spain had privately informed the German Government of their interest in the independence of the Low Countries, and it is said that the United States took similar action. It is impossible that Germany has failed to note the detached attitude of Italy and Spain ; but she can hardly wish that their detachment should be increased, and she may not desire to challenge the United States, at this moment.
Indeed the whole of this episode seems to suggest that, for the present, Germanys desire is to limit her commitments. This becomes the clearer from the consideration of another factor. It now seems certain that the day had actually been fixed for the invasion of Holland. On the eve, it has been stated on what seems reliable evidence, Belgium decided not to submit to having her main line of defence turned by an advance south of the Rhine and across Dutch Brabant, and this fact became known in Berlin almost at once. Obviously, if that were the case, there could be no alterna- tive to calling the invasion off. As I pointed out last week, it is precisely in this southern area that Germany hoped to secure a suitable taking-off ground for her offensive against England. Much of the Dutch territory to the north would be under water, difficult to seize, more difficult to hold. Flushing and the Scheldt estuary, with encouraging glimpses of that " pistol aimed at the Heart of England," Antwerp, were the prizes Germany most hoped to gather, and had the best reasons to anticipate. If she were to be restricted to the un-inundated area, Holland would lose most of its value. Worse still, an attack confined to the country north of the Rhine would hamper the German deployment and, at the same time, allow the Dutch to make better use of their small army. The invasion would be thrown out of gear by the same stroke which robbed it of most of its value even if successful.
The German plan was to seize air and sea bases, with a buffer State holding off the Allies. The Belgian threat removed the buffer State idea, and threatened positive measures against Germany. Clearly the plan had to be, at least, postponed. Evidently there was neither desire nor intention to attack a million fresh troops, even if their quality was not equal, and, then, find the Allies prepared to give battle when the challenge had been accepted. The season is discouraging. The odds would be bad The issue would be, at least, problematical. It is not problems but solutions that Germany wants.
This analysis of the situation should not have the effect of depreciating the strength of the enemy. It is not strength but weakness that plunges gaily into the unknown. The German method is to examine and weigh every constituent of a problem and then plan down to the last detail of the foreseen. The vigour, looseness and dispersion of an offen- sive once launched do not conflict with this generalisation. In the German tradition everything is forgiven but lack of initiative and decisive action. At more than one moment in the Polish campaign German units were plunging all over the country like bees released from a bag. But the plan of the campaign had been most carefully thought out, and all that skilful foresight could do had been done before the attack was launched. It may have been a little over-sanguine to imagine that Belgium would stand idly by and allow its defensive plan to be thrown into complete disarray without striking a blow. But to call off the plan when it was realised that the problem was entirely different ; this was charac- teristic of the Germany that is formidable.
If we attempt to weigh the difference that Belgian inter- vention would make, we have to take account of two main factors. Germany, faced with the necessity of attacking both Holland and Belgium, would probably direct the maximum force of her assault against the very' sector the threat to which involves Belgian intervention. Against the fortified line of the Meuse in Belgium there would be merely a holding action. Belgium, however, would not be in a position to assume this, and whatever force she sent to the assistance of Holland would be sent at great risk. It re- quired four years' warfare to effect full unity of command on the Western Front. Could we expect a similar decision on the part of Holland and Belgium at the mere threat of war? If we cannot the situation of the two countries is subject to a weakness that might prove fatal very quickly. Holland and Belgium must in the last resort react to their divergent interests, the Dutch army retreating towards the north-west, the Belgian towards the south-west. In March, 1918, a similar rift appeared between the British and French before Amiens. At a certain point, under a certain stress, the British Army would have been compelled to retire to the north-west, towards the Channel ports, while the French would have withdrawn towards Paris, to the south-west.
It is not necessary to think that a German offensive would break down the Dutch defence by an attaque brusque& But having a great irregular frontier with but a small part of it covered by natural defences, Holland could not hold up a German attack for long, and, even with the help of her modern defensive works, Belgium could not give her much assistance. An attack on Belgium alone would be a very different thing. A combined defensive scheme prepared in time of peace would have a better prospect. In the present circumstances, when the crisis came in the German attack, as well it might very soon, neither the Dutch nor the Belgian commander-in-chief dare do other than consult his own national interest. This would mean divergent lines of retreat and the beginning of the end for Holland.
The second factor upon which the value of Belgian inter- vention depends is the question of the Allies going to the assistance of Belgium. The position is not quite the same as it was in 1914. Then we were committed beforehand to the defence of Belgian neutrality. Nevertheless it is pretty certain that were Belgium involved the Allies would go to her assistance at once, and the result would presumably be the restoration of open warfare. In that case probably the first and decisive battle would be fought in defence of the Belgian coast. From the facts of the case the initiative must remain in the hands of the Germans ; and it is unreasonable to repine or regret the disadvantage we suffer from a com- pletely different scheme of human values. To the Germans, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and all the other small countries are mere pawns to be taken from the board as coldly and ruthlessly as if war were only a game of chess. We, on the other hand, can only regard it as a calamity when any small independent State is involved in the war. With such an outlook the Allies must frequently appear to lack decision and order. But when Germany looks undecided it is either due to cunning or to the faltering of the machine.
As a result of the Belgian action it now seems certain that the German staff must either abandon the Dutch plan alto- gether or face the hazards of attacking the Allies where the war began in 1914. Apparently that was no part of her plan for the winter season. But is she likely to leave the Low Countries as they are—a bulwark to Essen and the Ruhr industrial area, but also a break on her air offensive? Will she depend on the damage she can inflict by mines? At present she is bullying Holland and Belgium ; but countries which are prepared to fight are scarcely likely to yield to threats. Perhaps Germany will depend upon her mines and submarines and attack elsewhere. There continue to be movements about Basle ; but, now, the Belfort gap has been fortified and the Jura are under snow. The next few weeks must show where Germany will gather her needed victories.
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