Mr. Smalley, in his long telegram to Wednesday's Times, has
certainly intended to alarm us afresh, and to some extent perhaps has alarmed us afresh, as to the danger of war with the United States. He points out that we have come to no agreement with Venezuela, that we have rejected the proposal for arbitration on the subject as between the United States and this country, that Con- gress will adjourn at the end of May, that no treaty can be ratified with the United States without the assent of the Senate, and that as soon as Congress adjourns the canvass for the next Presidential election will begin in earnest, and that with it all the party manoeuvres, which are more or less inevitable in a Presidential contest, will be in full swing, and that we may find the war scare leaping into full prominence as one of the most effective of these manoeuvres. Moreover, he points out that the United States Commission is hard at work drawing up its decision as to what the true boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana ought to be, and that if it reports unfavourably to Great Britain,—which is likely enough,—there is sure to be a great cry that the Government of the United States is bound to stand by that report and enforce it against us, and enforce it with all the more peremptoriness because England has declined to recognise the right of the United States to interfere in a particular quarrel between Venezuela and herself. Of course the Irish party in the United States will jump at the chance of rekindling the feud with England, and so the Presidential campaign may easily become a most dangerous element in the question, unless we can succeed in settling the quarrel before the last heat of that campaign fairly begins. Of course, therefore, Mr. Smalley's general conclusion is that we are still in great peril of war, and that unless we "agree with our adversary quickly while we are in the way with him," we may find ourselves suddenly plunged into a foolish and fratricidal contest, without mean- ing, without limit, and without any probable prospect of final adjustment.
Previous page
