THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY. T HE Government have refused to give their
assent to the proposals made to them in regard to the Baghdad Railway. To say that Mr. Balfour's announce- ment to this effect will be received with the utmost relief and satisfaction by the majority of Englishmen can lay us open to no charge of exaggeration. Except the case of the Alliance with Germany in regard to Venezuela, we can recall no instance in recent years in which the nation as a whole showed itself so full of anxiety lest the Government should adopt a particular line of policy. Had the Government, indeed, actually agreed to the Ger- man proposals, they would, we feel certain, have found themselves involved in a conflict with public senti- ment which must have had the most disastrous effect upon their position. The outburst of resentment which would unquestionably have followed any official endorse- ment of the Baghdad Railway would have been strong enough to sweep the Government away.
In view of the great peril from which we have escaped, it may be worth while to consider once more the story of the Baghdad Railway. It will be useful as a warning, and as showing the remarkable audacity, as well as ability, with which the Germans undertake and press forward schemes of a half commercial, half political and diplomatic character. The genesis of the Baghdad Rail- way scheme appears to be as follows. The German Emperor some years ago conceived the notion of opening up Asia Minor and Mesopotamia by means of German commercial enterprise. Now the best instruments for opening up a country are railways. Therefore his com- mercial projects as regards Asia Minor soon crystallised into a scheme for a German railway. On this object the German Emperor kept his eye fixed. But to his scheme there were many obstacles, and three of prime im- portance. The first was the objection of the Sultan to allowing his Asiatic dominions to be exploited and in- terfered with by Europeans. The next was the financial difficulty,—the difficulty presented by the making of a railway through mountains and deserts, and in a region where the local trade could only be small and the through trade would take many years to develop. The third obstacle was the jealousy of Russia in regard to any interference with Asia Minor and Mesopo- tamia. But obstacles only incite the German Emperor to still greater efforts. Instead of abandoning his scheme, he kept a resolute and patient mind, and cherished the hope that one by one the obstacles would disappear. And to a very large extent the Emperor's tenacity has been rewarded, or, rather, till a few weeks ago it looked as if it would be rewarded, by ultimate success. To begin with, the Sultan's objections were got over. The accident of the Greek War, and the rapid way in which the Turkish Reserves were conveyed by the railways already existing in his dominions, converted the Sultan to the belief that after all there was a good deal to be said for railways. They were, he dis- covered, a most useful engine of war, and greatly increased his security and his power. Hence when it was pointed out to him that a railway through Asia Minor and Meso- potamia connecting Baghdad with Constantinople would enable him to bring up Asiatic troops into Europe with celerity, and also enable him to send troops more easily to quell Arab insurrections, he became a supporter of the Baghdad Railway. Again, the Sultan has of late been made to realise that even when railways do not pay of them- selves, they enrich the owners of the land through which they pass. But the Sultan himself owns a great deal of the best land in the Euphrates Valley. Thus he would profit in a pecuniary as well as in a military sense by the making of the railway. In this manner one objection to the Emperor's project entirely disappeared. There remained the financial obstacle and the Russian obstacle. The way in which the German Emperor pro- posed to get over these was masterly, and must compel the admiration of all who watch his career. It was plain that the money could not possibly be obtained in the ordinary way or from the ordinary sources. No one would lend money to build the Baghdad Railway as an ordinary commercial speculation. To get the money the financiers must be shown a guaranteed income in some shape or form. How was such a guarantee to be obtained The simple-minded might suggest a German guarantee as the appropriate security for a German railway. The Emperor had a better plan. He or his advisers hit upon the ingenious idea of getting the Sultan and the British Government to provide the guarantee. In the first place, it was suggested that the Sultan should give a guarantee of so much per year per kilometre of railway. But this was not enough. Therefore it was further suggested that the money which the British Government spend every year in sending the mails to India should be laid under contribution. Why should so much money be given to the P. and 0. and the French and Italian railways? It would clearly be much better to pay the postal subsidy to the Baghdad Railway, which would charge no more for carrying the mails, and would take them more rapidly. If the Baghdad Railway could beat the sea route by, say, three days, the British Government would surely promise the mail contract. Here, then, were the elements out of which a sound guarantee might be provided for a German railway without the German Government having to spend a penny. But there was a further difficulty. Turkey might agree to the kilometric guarantee, but she could not pay it as she has no money. Not daunted even by Turkish bankruptcy, the German Emperor next determined to find Turkey the money. And here again the help of Britain— who, he imagined, could be counted on never to refuse a good offer (good, that is, for Germany)—might be invoked. If Britain would agree, probably the rest of the Powers would also agree to the Turkish Custom dues being increased. And this increase would not go into the general Turkish Treasury, or into the hypothecated revenue fund, but would be ear-marked as a railway subsidy. But British goods would be the chief payers of the increased Turkish Custom dues. Thus Britain, privately through her traders and officially through the Indian mail subsidy, would obligingly provide the project with just the financial security it needed. Even this was not the end of the benefits to be obtained from Britain. Why should not the British Government be also asked to give a general official sanction to the scheme, for by doing so they would greatly facilitate the placing of the loans ? If Britain were told firmly but kindly that not to do so would be an unfriendly act towards a great and friendly nation ruled by the King's nearest relative, she could not have the bad manners to re- fuse. Finally there was the Russian obstacle. This last fence the German Emperor proposed to get over by an ingenious combination of devices. In the first place, a group of French financiers would be brought into the scheme. Next, Britain's participation in the scheme could be used as a double defence against Russian protests. The Russians would hardly venture to protest openly against Britain and Germany in combination, and summarily forbid the making of the line. If, on the other hand, she protested privately to Germany, she could be told that Germany had no political interests in the scheme, that her aims were merely commercial, and that any political interest in the matter belonged to Britain. The fact that Britain would in future regard the Baghdad Railway as part of her route to India was no affair of Germany's, but Russia might rest assured that if the railway ever appeared to be a menace to her, Germany would transfer her rights to Russia. Thus Britain would play " general utility." She would not merely provide guarantees, and so the money required to build the railway, but she would actually pro- vide also shelter and security against Russian hostility. In fact, Germany's modest proposal put in homely terms was like that of a man who might say to a friend : ' Unless you are determined to show yourself grossly rude, hostile, and unfriendly to me, you will not only lend me a five-pound note at once and back a bill for me, but also stand outside my house and act as a lightning- conductor.'
It seems almost incredible that proposals of this kind should actually have been made to the British Government, or that any one should ever have thought it possible that they could have been entertained, if only for an instant ; yet, strangely enough, that has been the case. And, after all, those who showed such astonishing audacity may fairly say that they were justified in that audacity by the fact that they very nearly succeeded. It is no less strange to think that the British Prime Minister last November, when the Spectator pointed out the kind of proposals —accurate, as it turned out, in every particular—which were going to be made in regard to the Baghdad Railway, described our statement in a public speech as containing " the wildest and the most fantastic inventions which even an inventive Press has ever discovered." We make no accusation of verbal insincerity in respect of this statement. On the contrary, we are certain that Mr. Balfour here, as in all matters, was absolutely sincere. We do think, however, that a British Prime Minister should take care to know his facts before he makes a contradiction of that sort. We cannot pretend to say that the Spectator's reputation for veracity and good sense suffered at all from the Prime Minister's words about us at the Mansion House, or that we lost even the temporary confidence or respect of a single reader, and subsequent events have, of course, more than justified us, and have entirely rebutted the official strictures we incurred last November in regard to the Baghdad Railway. In the case, however, of a paper less well known the results of such a denunciation by a Prime Minister might have been very different. In any case, the fact remains that those who charge newspapers with the manufacture of wild inventions should be specially careful of their facts. Let us by all means exact a high standard of prudence and restraint from our newspapers, but our statesmen must not feel less bound to care and circum- spection in their public utterances.
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