THE MILITIA: ITS PLACE IN OUR MILITARY SYSTEM.
[To THE Eniros or THE "SPROTATOR.1 Sts, It has become abundantly clear that except on paper the British Army can never be reorganised or reformed until the British public knows what it wants and insists upon having it. At present the Army, like Ireland, is the football of political parties, and upon the rare occasions when either party has attempted anything worth doing the other party has on principle opposed it. Captain the Earl of Malmesbury, 3rd Batn. Hants Regiment, has contributed a most useful article under the above heading to the current number of the Primrose League Gazette, which the editor of that paper requested me to notice in the United Service Magazine. Un- fortunately I did not receive the advance proof supplied to me in time for the April number, and a notice next month would be of little use. Therefore I wrote a letter to the Army and Navy Gazette, which was published last Saturday week, and as I should like to bring the matter also before civilian readers, I trust that you will kindly allow me space in your columns. Lord Malmesbury asks : (1) Do we want the Militia at all ? and if so, (2) What are we going to do to prevent its further decay ? Now, Sir, in my opinion we have only to consider the amount of the Army Estimates in order to arrive very speedily at the conclusion that we need the Militia very much indeed, and that not only must it be preserved from further decay, but raised to such numbers and efficiency that it shall be able to do what the Regular Army cannot do,—namely, provide for us an ample security against the dangers of a great war. The Regular Army has a paper (not an effective) strength far exceeding what is required of it as the " police of the Empire," but is hopelessly inadequate for the greater task involved by the struggle for Imperial existence that would be encountered in case of war with a Great Power. The cost of the Regular Army is already ex- cessive ; and rich as we are, and even if there were no "recruiting difficulty," no substantial increase of the Regular Army is possible, because of its prohibitive cost. Our Navy is our first, and practically our only, line of defence, because upon it everything depends. No Army, however strong or efficient, would avail us anything if our Navy were to suffer decisive defeat. But the Navy can only fight at sea, it can- not fight on land; and in order to wring satisfactory terms of peace from an enemy we must have an Army large enough to carry out offensive operations against him by land. The mere fact of possessing such an Army would not improbably suffice, without actual need for its employment. The Militia, the old Constitutional force of this country, represents what we require,—a Citizen Army enlisted for defensive purposes. The Militia needs only numbers and training, and to be rendered available for active service abroad in case of national emergency, in order to meet our necessities. If numbers can- not be obtained by voluntary methods, then we must resort to the ballot. But I believe that if the issue were honestly put before the country, the men would be forthcoming without need for any compulsion ; and in no case should the ballot be applied in any district which succeeded in providing its proper quota by voluntary enlistment. The annual training for twenty.seven days is the chief obstacle to Militia service, and should therefore be abolished. The Militia recruit should be
trained very thoroughly for six months on enlistment, and lazy or stupid men for as much longer as might be necessary. Subsequently, the training should be by companies, upon the lines of the present Volunteer system, and upon one day annually the battalion should be collected for a tactical exer- cise of such a nature as to demonstrate the values of the various companies. There should be a week in camp annually, at which a proportion of all ranks would be present, and every member of the force be compelled to make one attendance in every three years during his service in what we may call the active Militia, and then pass to the Reserve. It is impossible in this letter• to give details of a scheme, and any scheme that one man could propose would certainly be full of faults. I have therefore made only general suggestions. At all events, it is perfectly clear that our present Army system is a failure. We have hitherto endeavoured to meet two entirely distinct eventualities by a single means,—a comparatively small Regular Army. We must alter this, and regard the Regular Army in future as what General Hutton has called the " police of the Empire," and form a Citizen Army for the purpose of meeting the real emergency,—a great war. We may, more- over, be certain that the greater our power to defend our- selves by the offensive-defensive, the less likely we shall be to have need to employ it.—I am, Sir, &c.,
A. W. A. PoLLocir, Lieut.-Colonel, Editor Ignited Service Magazine. P.S.—I have not forgotten the Volunteers ; but their• busi- ness is home defence, not offensive warfare upon the terri- tories of the enemy.
[We have always advocated an improved a force increased in numbers as well as efficiency. We think the suggestion of the six months' training, plus a week in camp each year, a good one, but should like to see it more fully dis- cussed. We recommend to our correspondent's attention a proposal repeatedly made in these columns,—namely, that in the case of town Militia regiments we should go back to the system once in vogue in many regiments, under which the Militia recruits lived at home during their training, were, that is, day-boy soldiers, not boarders. The results were exceed- ingly satisfactory as regards discipline and recruiting. The last regiment trained in this way was, we believe, the Tower Hamlets Militia. The system lasted in their case till only six or seven years ago, and kept the regiment full of a good class of soldier.—En. Spectator.]
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