The 'Testing of the Entente
WE have already devoted a leading article to this volume, but the more we study it the more instructive it appears, and there is more important matter in it than we could indicate in one article. Certainly Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was well advised when he decided in 1924 to publish the principal documents bearing on the origins of the War, and the editors, Dr. Gooch and Dr. Temperley, have done their work admirably and impartially. They said that if asked to use any bias they would resign, and it is certain that they would have been as good as their word. Most of the dispatches in this volume, the third of the series, were written by officials who never imagined that they would be published. They are, therefore, the best kind of evidence as to intention, temper, and honesty. The signing of the Entente between Great Britain and France was followed by years of anxiety, during which Germany tried to pierce the chinks of the protecting armour.
M. Delcassd was the originator of the pro-British cause in France, and Germany made it plain that she regarded him as a personal enemy. In June, 1905, France brought his Prime
Ministership to an end as a sign of good will to Germany, but the result was singularly disappointing ; Germany acted on the principle that the policy which had produced the resigna- tion of her enemy would produce more and better concessions if continued. It must be admitted that Germany had a grievance—or perhaps one should rather say a grief—though Great Britain and France were not the conscious or deliberate cause of it. She had come too late upon the scene as a colonizing Power. The world had already been for the most part divided up when she wanted to expand and to rule far outside her own borders. We remember that during the Morocco crisis, which began in 1905, the Spectator seriously examined the question whether it would be possible to satisfy the German Emperor's demand for " a place in the sun." The only suggestion we could make for a solution which would not do grave injustice somewhere was that Portugal should be asked to sell her colonies to Germany. It was out of the question that British colonies should be handed over. How
could Great Britain give away people who would furiously resent the transaction Y Why should they be the price of appeasement in Europe ? Why should they be forced to change an allegiance they liked for one which they would positively dislike ? True, Germany might have been, and we think should have been, consulted or at least kept informed of the arrangement between France and Great Britain in Morocco, but it cannot be pretended that a place in the sun of Morocco would have been of any value to her. Her grievance there was a matter of pride.
Practically all the documents in this third volume report suspicion and indignation in Germany and attempts to
separate Great Britain and France. Germany was convinced, or professed to be convinced, that Great Britain and France were contemplating an offensive and defensive alliance—
which was to be the strongest section of an ultimate " ring- fence " hemming Germany in. Of course, there was no such policy. The French complaint against Great Britain was precisely that she would not make definite promises of any sort. In the few days before the outbreak of war in 1914 the very absence of pledges explained the agony of doubt and fear
through which the French people passed. In 1905, when Sir F. Lascelles reported from Berlin that Prince Billow protested against, the hostility of Great Britain towards Germany, King Edward made the marginal note " flow badly informed he is 1" Similarly, when Germany tried to dictate to Spain as to who the Spanish representative should be at the Algeciras Conference, King Edward wrote on the
dispatch describing this manoeuvre ; " A case of bullying, as usual ! "
The fact was that there was a complete ,difference of method between Great Britain, and Germany.; Great Britain sincerely desired peace, though Germany would say that that was only because she had already got all she wanted, whereas Germany risked war in her efforts to alarm or threaten every- body into compliance with her wishes. When a threat was successful she invariably came to the conclusion that her method was sound, and proceeded again in the same manner. This is the sense of the long and very able memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe, from which we quoted a passage last week. He recommended. that the British attitude to Germany should be studiously courteous and correct, but points out that peace could never be served by such concessions as the forced retirement of M. Delcasse. It was only natural that France and Belgium should have been pressing in their requests for detailed statements of what help Great Britain would give if the independence of Belgium was violated. The utmost the British Government would do was to allow military conversations with the French and Belgian Staffs. But they insisted that nothing in the conversations could commit Great Britain. The details of the conversations in Belgium conducted by Colonel Barnardiston (January– April, 1908) are here published for the first time. Surprise has often been expressed that Lord Grey of Fallodon knew nothing of what passed in Belgium, although he authorized the conversations. The explanation is that he let highly technical matters pass out of his mind directly he had laid it down that the Government could not in any case be com- mitted. Lord Morley and Mr. John Burns resigned when war was declared, on the ground that they had been committed though the Cabinet had not been consulted. Nothing, how- ever, is clearer from the papers now before us than that Lord Grey warned both France and Belgium that it would be impossible for the British Government to engage to go to war in Europe. We find that Colonel Barnardiston was careful to emphasize the limitations under which he acted. Lord Sanderson went so fax as to tell M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, that if a British Government undertook to go to war without informing Parliament they would probably be impeached when the truth was discovered. The theory of the
ring-fence " was never more completely discredited than it is in this volume. What does appear is that Germany regarded her case as one of necessity. And " Necessity 'mows no law."
Sir F. Lascelles' careful portrait of the German Emperor is as interesting as it is valuable. It is not unsympathetic, but the best one can say is that if the Emperor is to be relieved of some blame more must rest upon his militaristic Govern- ment. Finally, we must mention Lord Haldane's diary of his visit to Berlin. He did his best for peace without ever com- promising his own country or those nations which rightly depended upon us for help. When the babble of ignorance has been forgotten Lord Haldane will stand out as the greatest Secretary of State for War in our own day.
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