SOCIALIST LEADERSHIP
THIS is not the best of times for exercises in party politics. Whatever the full repercussions of the Korean war may be, it is generally recognised that the situation is already sufficiently serious to underline the need for national unity in Britain. Indeed, this feeling runs so deep that the assumption seems to be accepted without argument that the General Election which was at one time expected to take place before the end of 1950 should now be postponed indefinitely. This may be taking matters too far. The international position is not yet so desperate as to put the question of the date of the next election beyond the realm of reasonable discussion and cool decision. But at least the party struggle is not uppermost in the minds of the people, and that makes it surprising that the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party should have chosen to publish at this moment its statement of policy entitled Labour and the New Society. The timing as well as the content of party political statements is in the control of their sponsors, and there have been several post-war reminders—the notorious brown book on European Unity was the most recent—that mistakes in timing can have very unfortunate results. Mr. Morrison does not make many mistakes in this field, and it can therefore be assumed that the glimpse of the mind of our Socialist leaders which is afforded by the publication of this document at this time was deliberately given. It is not an encouraging sight.
There is no need to jump to the conclusion that the Labour Party wants to stir up a party dog-fight. In fact the opposite conclusion is more plausible. The Socialists can secure a number of party gains—of which the putting into effect of iron and steel nationalisation is the most important—from the prolongation of the life of the preSent Parliament. The National Executive Committee of the Labour Party state explicitly that Labour and the New Society is not an election programme. They are obviously anxious to make that clear. But they make it even clearer, without any effort at all, that they are unwilling to reduce or significantly to retard their programme of Government spending at home in order to facilitate an effective defence programme abroad. Such modifications of the policy of socialisation as are now implied—in effect they are the abandon- ment of the threat of nationalising sugar and cement and " mutualising " insurance—are mere indications of the victory of the moderate or consolidating school within the Labour Party. They are, in fact, political expedients. They have nothing to do with clearing the decks for action in the Far East.
This statement was probably drawn up before the storm broke in Korea. But it is published now, when the battle is in its most crucial stage. This key fact reveals in the plainest light the grave defects of Socialist leadership at this time. The struggle in the Socialist mind between socialism and defence has not been settled. The further to the Left the light is switched the more clearly are revealed the doubters, the appeasers, the deliberate confusers of the issue, until the borderline of Communism is reached. In Mr. Attlee and the other official leaders of the Labour Party the taint of doubt is not strong, and their patriotism is not in question. The danger lies rather in -a confusion of mind which goes right to the root of Socialist thinking and expresses itself in the present situation in a pathetic half-belief that " business as usual " is just around the corner, whereas it should be overwhelmingly clear that it has already receded into the far future. Whatever happens in the immediate struggle in Korea, the need for a new world-wide system of defence against further Communist aggression will remain, and iit is bound to be very expensive. If Labour and the New Society were simply 'a straightforward, sober and objective statement of party policy it might still be possible to excuse its publication at this time. But that is probably too much to expect of any statement of policy by any party, and these conditions have certainly not been met in this instance. The type of confusion which springs from the familiar Socialist assumption that they know what they are doing in economic matters (when in fact they are fumbling with they know not what) runs right through the whole document. It is a form of arrogance which becomes acutely provocative when it pretends that a number of perfectly sensible ideas, to which any party could subscribe, are a Socialist monopoly. Such behaviour does not promote the cause of national unity. Nor does the statement of general objectives. Mr. Morrison may play his chosen part of the moderate man, but every item on the list of general powers of control—control over investment and foreign exchange, bulk buying by the Government, powers to " take over concerns which fail the nation " and so on—is phrased in such a way as to permit of a rapid and ruthless extension of Socialism. Under Mr. Morrison's hand it may be a toy pistol. Under Mr. Bevan's it would be a battery of heavy artillery. If the National Executive believes its own statement that " No more power should ever be '6"oncentrated at the centre than is reasonably necessary for efficient government " then it ought at once to divest itself of the formidable permissive powers which it already has and refrain from adding to the list.
It is very unfortunate that time should have to be spent on these matters during an international crisis, but it is impossible to let them pass. The plain fact is that the vast extension of State control which Socialists claim as one of their post-war achievements was to a great extent carried out by a Coalition Government in the course of fighting the war. Emergency powers which were intended to be temporary have been made permanent. The considerable limitation of personal freedom which was unavoidable during the war has been retained not because the people wanted it—it is inconceivable that the millions who voted Labour in 1945 were deliberately voting, for example, for the permanent retention of the Ministry of Food—but because Socialist Governments found it convenient to retain it. Much of our present Socialism has been acquired by accident, not by deliberate decision, and it is essential to have assurance that there will be no more such accidents. In particular it would be a damaging blow to internal harmony if the present Government in effect took advantage of an extension of its term of office through the Korean emergency to complete the nationalisation of steel. Such a trick would hardly be forgivable. Yet the possibility of it cannot be ruled out. Even if the National Executive did not have these circumstances in mind when it decided to retain steel nationali- sation the statement of policy reveals the, kind of mentality which is liable to restrict freedom from force of habit. But such restrictions as the war in Korea and the subsequent defence policy may make necessary should be plainly marked as such and abandoned as soon as it is safe to do it.
The expression of a string of doubts about the capacity of the Labour Government for leadership in the coming difficult days is an ungrateful duty. It could easily lead to the counter- accusation that the opponents of Socialism are taking advantage of the international situation to attack the Labour Party's policy. But no bout of party polemics could alter the fact that it was the National Executive of the Labour Party which, by issuing its statement of policy at this time, itself sowed the seeds of doubt as to the Government's capacity to deal with the emer- gency effectively and with an undivided mind. And the ground had been well prepared, by the Government themselves, in which those seeds could take quick root. The new defence programme of £3,400,000,000, involving a net increase of 000,000,000 over three years, a large proportion of which was to be met by further dollar aid, was not very impressive. The delay over sending land forces to Korea and announcing an increase in the period of compulsory military service cannot be entirely excused by the need for the experts to work out the details, since if they were plainly and promptly ordered to work them out a public announcement could do no harm and might do much good. The Prime Minister's refusal to recall Parliament before Septem- ber 12th had a damping effect on the public which he either deliberately sought or failed altogether to notice. Such failures must not continue. There is still time for the Government to make a determined effort to regain national confidence. Four weeks ago, in an admirable broadcast, the Prime Minister did what the nation expected of him. He must now do it again, without delay.
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