Japan
The turn of the tide ,
Michael Meacher
'The Japanese people now save 21 per cent of their income. Perhaps we should raise it to 25 per cent." This remark was made earlier this month in a private interview by Prime Minister Tanaka, and when other peoples save half or less of their personal incomes, it is a symbol of the unparalled confidence and self-restraint in Japan that such a solution should be sought to challenges — overcoming inflation and raising domestic social investment — that have provoked far more desperate measures in the West.
Japan has reason for its confidence. It now leads the world in electronics production, shipbuilding and motorcycles, and their Finance Ministry have just revealed that their GNP for 1972-3 reached £142,000 million, nearly three times the size of Britain's, though population is only double that of Britain. Per capita Japanese income has already reached £1,300, compared to rather less than £1,000 for,Britain.
By any standards this is a very formidable achievement. Yet there are several reasons for believing that this pattern of apparently phenomenally high growth represents the end of an era. A concentration of novel problems touch on every aspect of national life — paralysis of domestic politics, inflation, pollution and environmental deprivation (public squalor without necessarily private affluence), materials, increasing trade resistance, insecurity in the new world role and the nuclear ambiguity. Inter-related though these problems are, this article focuses on domestic,political and economic issues.
Firstly, Japan is heading for a first-rate political crisis next year. The ruling Liberal Democrats (Conservatives) have based their unbroken hold on power since 1949 on the post-war economic recovery and the alliance with the US. But inflation, severe housing congestion, spiralling land prices and pollution have taken the edge off the former, while the latter has been undermined partly by the gathering sense of national self-assertiveness and partly by the ' Nixon Shock' economic measures against Japan in August 1971.
Consequently over the last decade the Liberal Democrat Party (LOP) vote has declined at each successive election till by 1072 it had fallen to 46.9 per cent. Next year tfie Upper House elections take place, where the LOP now holds 134 of the 252 seats, and it has been predicted that it will end up two short of an absolute majority. It' so, the Government could grind to a halt. For although the decision of the Lower House (equivalent to the British Commons) is binding on the Budget and on treaties, all other measures may be revised or rejected by the Upper House. Such blocking manoeuvres can only be overridden in the Lower House by a two-thirds majority, which the LDP lacks.
The ruling Party has sought to avoid the Approaching deadlock by an electoral reform designed to switch from the present multiple constituencies to a single-member system. which might be expected to favour the LDP. But such gerrymandering — dubbed ' Kakumandering ' after the Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka — backfired, and massive public demonstrations forced the Government to drop the plan last month. The only option remains some unpredictable coalition, almost certainly a Japanese Opening to the Left.
A second crucial issue lies in the economic implications of such a shift in the centre of political gravity. The LOP has sought to pre empt the Left-wing trend in the electorate by its own massive social investment programme. Popularised by Tanaka's own bestselling book The Remodelling of the Japanese Archipelago it aimed to move the emphasis from private consumption, private equipment investment and exports to welfare a bold plan which raises a thicket of difficulties Will the proposed new nationwide transport network relieve city congestion, or merely export their pollution elsewhere into the countryside? Is the pursuit of social and perhaps unprofitable goals compatible with current levels of the overall growth rate? If so, won't the maintenance of a very high growth rate merely worsen the environmental problems it is supposed to contribute towards preventing? If not, will not the key to Japanese economic success — narrow profit margins built on a rapid market expansion — be put at risk? This central dilemma for the first time drives a wedge between the ruling Party's political future and the maintenance of the country's unique economic record. Priority for one or the other must be sacrificed, but which?
Thirdly, it is clear that many of the factors producing Japan's phenomenal post-war economic success now no longer operate. Low wages, an abundant labour force, American economic paternalism, a one-way free trade framework to Japan's unilateral advantage, stiff exchange controls, ready access to raw materials, and availability of foreign technology are all gains that have faded. Worse still, inflation has obtained a solid grip on the economy. Wages rose by an average 11-i per cent in the 1960s, by 14 per cent in 1968, 16 per cent in 1969, 18 per cent in 1970, and by no less than 21 per cent negotiated in the 1973 ' Spring Offensive.'
Quite simply, the Japanese people are beginning to lay claim to the fruits of economic growth rather than merely promoting it endlessly. Housing remains dreadfully cramped, and urban sprawl represents a landmark to the lack of proper town planning. The dormitories we saw for unmarried male workers of the Toyota car company were composed of three small rooms and a bathroom, each room providing for two men and containing no furniture except sleeping mats on the floor and a colour TV set. Old age social welfare remains almost non-existent, despite the rapid decline of the extended family, and social security expenditure is
about a third only of the level in Britain. The state retirement pension is only £7 a week, though prices are in general nearly half as high again as in Britain. Health insurance too at present gives far from full cost protection. Social and leisure facilities are in many places lacking. Recently the third case of mercury poisoning was reported, arising from sea con. tamination, and opposition is mounting fast to the local siting of pollutant factories — a major obstacle to the future development of a large-scale atomic power programme.
New social demands, now being made represent a major turning point for post-war Japan. Closely paralleled by equally pivotal changes in the country's international role they can be expected to herald fundamental changes in both the economic and political structures. The future may be uncertain; but the time of relentless and all-consuming growth is past.
Michael Meacher is Labour MP for Oldhatn West.
Previous page
