THE TRANSFER OF KASSALA. T HE transfer of Kassala from the
Italians to the English will be proceeding while these pages are in our readers' hands. Already the new Egyptian garrison has arrived, and some seven hundred of the Italian native levies have re-enlisted under the Egyptian flag. It is very natural that the public here should be asking why are we going to take over Kassala. What is 1 the use of getting so far away from the Nile water ?
Have we not enough African deserts already ? What is the use of putting ourselves so near the Abyssinians, and possibly incurring the jealousy and dislike of the most powerful ruler in Africa ? All these questions are worth asking, for they raise very important points in regard to our African policy, and to our general position in the Nile Valley and the Eastern Soudan. The best answer to the question, What takes us to Kassala ? is probably— "The force of circumstances." Neither Lord Salisbury nor Lord Cromer were, we expect, in the least eager to choose the present moment for an advance to Kassala, yet both have had to agree to its occupation as necessary and inevitable. Granted that we intend not only to stop in Egypt, but to hold the whole of the valley of the Nile up to the Great Lakes, the ultimate occupation of Kassala follows as a matter of course, for the holding of the valley of the Nile will be facilitated in no small degree by the possession of a station on the high and well-watered plateau on which Kassala. stands.
Kassala is nearly 2,000 ft. above the sea. That is, in short, the answer to the question, Why go to Kassala ? Po occupy a place of that altitude, which has plenty of good water and vegetation, and is only some 250 miles from the Nile, must be an immense advantage to a Power seated in the Nile Valley. Again, Kassala is, and always will be, a place of considerable trade. There is an easy and well-watered route from it to the sea at Massowah, and also a route which is supplied with water down to the Nile Valley a little above Berber. The Atbara River, the affluent of the Nile, on a tributary of which stands Kassala, joins the Nile near El Darner. No doubt the Atbara is only partially navigable, and that only during high Nile, while its tributaries are in the dry season only torrent-beds ; but in spite of that water can be obtained all along the route. Again, the country is not specially difficult. Hence it would be a comparatively easy task to run a railway from the Nile to Kassala, and so re-establish on a firmer basis what was once one of the great trade routes of Africa,—a trade route so much frequented that Kassala had some twenty thousand inhabitants. This railway might run from the mouth of the Atbara, or else—and this would probably be the better and shorter route— it might run direct from Khartoum. In any case, with Kassala in our hands, and the Mandi's power overthrown, we shall have control over, and so be able to protect and develop, a very impor- tant trade route. Thus by taking Kassala we gain not only a summer station and sanatorium for our troops and civil administrators which in the future may be most useful, but also an opportunity for developing the trade of the Soudan.
But, it may be argued, though Kassala may have a very great future before it, why should we hurry to take it just now,—why not wait till Khartoum has fallen, and we have plenty of time to look around and consider the best means of occupying it ? A sufficient answer to this argument of " Why not wait a little ? " often, we admit, a very good argument, is to be found in the fact that if we are to have Kassala. it must be now or never. The Italians have in a most friendly spirit waited eighteen months for us, and we cannot expect them to act as a warming-pan for us any longer. But if, when they evacuated Kassala, we had not taken it over, Kassala and most of the country between it and the Nile must have been lost to us and Egypt. Menelek allows the claim of Egypt to Kassala. as part of Egypt's former Empire in the Soudan, and makes, therefore, no objection to our succeeding the Italians. If, however, Kassala had remained derelict after the Italian evacuation the Abyssinians would certainly have seized it, and we should have found it impossible to get them to relinquish it a couple of years hence. Therefore it was, as we have said, a case of now or never and therefore it was a case of now, for no Power intent on holding the valley of the Nile from the Lakes to the Delta, as are we, could possibly neglect so useful a place. There is yet another reason for taking Kassala, and taking it at once, which must be mentioned. The occupation of Kassala, and the erection there of a well-fortified and well-supplied military base, will help us in the work of seizing Khartoum and destroying the Khalifa's power. When the final attack comes, the power to make a movement from Kassala, as well as from Berber and Korti, may be most useful. Look at a map and stick a pin into Kassala, into Berber, and into Korti, and then remember that if the advance be delayed for another year, it is possible we may also be able to send a force from Uganda down the Nile Valley. The Khalifa, threatened from all these points at once, would feel himself in a most perilous position, and might conceivably evacuate Khartoum without firing a shot. In all probability, no doubt, he would not do so ; nor do we suggest for a moment that it would be good strategy to advance from these three points simultaneously—i.e., from Korti, Berber, and Kassala—instead of concentrating our forces in one advance. Still, the fact remains that by taking Kassala we get another post within striking distance of Khartoum, and make something approaching to a half- encirclement of the Khalifa's stronghold.
But though there are so many good grounds for taking over Kassala from the Italians, and though we entirely agree with the wisdom of the course adopted, we are not by any means blind to the dangers and difficulties that are presented by our last step in the Soudan. To begin with, there is no doubt a good deal of truth in the objection that the possession of Kassala brings us into most un- pleasant proximity to the Abyssinians. It may be true that Menelek for the moment offers no objection, but who can feel sure that he or his successors will not change their minds? But a struggle with the Abyssinians would be the most formidable task we have ever undertaken in Africa. The Abyssinians are braver even than the Dervishes, and far better armed. They are also in touch with the sea-coast, and thus can be supplied with all the munitions of war very easily. Yet they have no ports which could be blockaded, and could get guns and powder, and even cannon, through French ports. By going to Kassala we undoubtedly run a certain risk of collision with the Abyssinians. Lastly, by taking Kassala we isolate a garrison in a place which it would be most difficult to relieve,—a place two hundred miles from anywhere, and therefore liable to be completely cut off, supposing for any reason we had to make a temporary retreat from our present outposts in the Soudan. We admit these arguments, but we do not think them by any means final. We do not see why we should quarrel with the Abyssinians any more than we quarrel with the Maharajah of Nepaul. Why, indeed, should we not treat Abyssinia exactly as we treat Nepaul, and offer good pay and good treatment to its inhabitants to enlist in regiments raised, like the Ghoorkas, from men not our own subjects, but willing to fight for us? If by paying a subsidy to Menelek for the privilege we could some day recruit ten thousand Christian Abyssinian troops we should possess the finest native army in Africa,—an army, too, which in case of internal trouble in India might be used with the greatest possible effect. Take it altogether then, we have, we think. done the wise thing in going to Kassala. To have neglected to do so might have prejudiced our whole policy in the valley of the Nile. As it is, we have got an excellent sana- torium and summer station, a trade centre, a place from which to threaten Khartoum, and a possible recruiting ground for a Christian African army. These are oppor tunities which no Government could have afforded tc throw away.
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