RUSSIA STRIKES AGAIN
By STRATEG ICUS
THE new offensive in Russia has faced Hider with a fresh problem, and now it is possible to form some picture of the design behind the winter attacks. The strength of the German Army
is not what it was, and it has to meet the growing power of the Allies as its own declines. Moreover, although the position in North Africa cannot be exactly described as a second front, it has certainly created some of the main conditions of a war on two fronts. That these conditions should be made fully operative it is necessary that the front in Russia should not become quiescent
while the North African theatre is active, and vice versa. Already the African challenge is creating a diversion and, despite the advan-
tages of interio: lines, active operations which are separated by such distances and connected by far from perfect communications must produce a dispersion.
Russia is taking every advantage of that condition. The very success of Hitler's offensive has complicated his position. Failing the complete success he set out to achieve, it has all the handicaps of a great territorial expansion with none of its advantages. The long, circuitous front inevitably strains to the uttermost resources that would be very formidable indeed if laid out with better economy. Hitler's wiser winter strategy would be to husband his strength for the vital test that must come. Unfortunately, he cannot permit himself to adopt such a strategy, and the more he tries to adopt it, within the conditions he has set himself, the more infallibly they continue to betray him. He dare not abate his attempt to relieve the considerable force cut off between the Don and the Volga ; but to provide the weight his counter-attack needs he is driven to thin his concentration on other sectors.
Although the thrust up the Tikhoretsk-Stalingrad railway has gained little ground at much cost, it is now evident that it is being made by very strong forces ; and Hitler is determined to persist in it as long as his troops can be made to advance. It is here that the new offensive begins to enter the picture. Within the eastern part of the Don bend the Russians have cut off an area little less than a fifth that of England, and pockets of enemy troops are gripped between the columns which have struck across that territory. The great force encircled between the Don and the Volga lies east of this territory, and the German plan was to combine the thrust up the railway from Tikhoretsk with another operating from the west, along the line which traverses the country within the Don bend. This line is a branch of the Voronezh-Rostov line, and the new Russian attack has cut that line at Kantemirovka. The troops are indeed approaching it over a considerable extent. They have even reached tei within about 18 miles of Millerovo, which is only 5o miles from the point where the eastward line leaves the main track. There seems little prospect of any movement along that line now.
More than this, the advance has already placed hors de combat some 47,000 of the enemy and captured over 1,300 guns, and the penetration has at some points reached a depth of 90 miles. Can Hitler possibly neglect such a breach in his positions? Even if, in general, such a defeat could be ignored, it seems impossible that a breach that cuts so important a railway only about 140 miles from Rostov can be left unrepaired, unless it is completely irreparable. The Rostov railway is the chord upon which the great eastward loop of the Don rests, and hence it is the whole of the position east of this line that is threatened. The Russians are very carefully breaking through weak sectors and leaving the enemy to repair the breaches as best they can after the severance of the railway corn- munications which alone can adequately supply the force necessary for the repairs. It can be said with certainty that Hitler must restore the present breach ; but he must also relieve the garrison between the Don and the Volga and the units isolated on the central front.
In fine, the Russians are facing Hitler with the problem of an offensive upon several sectors, the cumulative effect of which must be to produce a breaking-strain somewhere. What is the alternative? Hitler can either shorten his front to an extent that will enable him to preserve an efficient strategic reserve and maintain a successful defensive while he delivers a blow on some other front, or he must resign himself to a mere active defensive on every' front. That seems to be the situation to which he has now been reduced ; at any rate, it is the situation to which the Russians are trying to reduce him. It is an unfortunate dilemma for a man of Hitler's temperament. " What we seize we hold," he says. " Stalingrad wiU be taken, you may be sure of that." No soldier would commit himself to such positiols. Haider, who saw the signs of the present painful position approaching and protested, was sent about his business ; but the first balance-sheet of his successor can scarcely reassure anyone.
The position has not been represented at its worst. Clearly if Hitler should set himself to repair the damage he has suffered about
Stalingrad, Rzhev, Velikie Luki and on the Middle Don the Russians will pose another conundrum for him. There are several other sectors on the Russian front that must be weakly held by the Germans, several which it would be to the advantage of the Russians to improve, several also which the Germans say are threatened with attack. Hitler's difficulty is not that he could not hold them if he were left free to apply his whole force to that single purpose. It is simply that the Allies will not leave him free now or ever again. That condition, now beginning to break in upon his imagination, is not his worst trouble. This is his inability to admit himself in the wrong. He has shouldered the responsibility for the conduct of the war, and Goering and other generals have ostentatiously placed the onus upon him. His position rests upon the fact that he has so far given the Germans a diet of victories. He dare not admit defeat. But it is clear that such a Hitler is much more useful to us than the professional soldiers, who would before now have cut some of their losses.
While Russia can continue to inflict such heavy blows, Hitler's problems must increase ; and if we speculate on such a continuance, it is with a complete recognition of the difficulties this implies for our Ally. Indeed, if it had not happened, who would have believed that Russia could have so turned the tables? Who would have believed that she could move great masses of men across vast stretches of territory in the terrible winter conditions? What are the Allies doing in North Africa to maintain the strain upon Germany? Montgomery's brilliant attempt to cut off the German rear failed in its main purpose, but there can be little doubt that the New Zealand troops who carried out the outflanking movement inflicted considerable damage upon the rearguard. When we are accustomed to the figures of the Russian successes, it is difficult to take very seriously the capture of some 20 tanks ; but in point of fact that probably represents an appreciable proportion of the remaining tank-force. Similarly 50o prisoners seized from the troops selected to protect Rommel's rear cannot be ignored. If the rest of the rearguard saved itself by dispersal over the desert, it must still have been badly damaged.
The most interesting feature of the incident is the versatility and organising power shown in arranging it. The reorganisation of the Eighth Army and its supply some seven or eight hundred miles from its point of departure are no mean feat, and they augur well for the future. Rommel will be the less disposed to try conclusions with the Eighth Army now that he has again experienced its fibre. And yet his purpose must be to prevent the junction with the First Army and to keep the two air forces separate. Already he has travelled so far that the Middle East fighter-bombers are beginning to come into play in Tunisia. Another of the most interesting recent developments is the speed with which the aircraft are making use of evacuated airfields in spite of all the enemy can do to ruin them. Rommel's purpose is to reinforce Nehring as soon as possible ; but in what shape will his army be after its battering by the Middle East aircraft?
It is stated that the bulk of the aircraft which have been brought to the Mediterranean front by the enemy has not yet appeared in battle over Tunisia, but what has appeared has come from Russia. The meaning of this withholding of force which, employed at the present juncture, might make a difficult Allied problem even more intractable, cannot be fathomed. The Allies are certainly strengthen- ing their concentration in Tunisia and perfecting their supply system for the attack in force which can hardly now be long delayed. The splendid exploit of the Hampshires shows the stuff of which the First Army is made, and the French have fought with much dis- tinction before they are fully equipped for battle in this area. Though there is little to show beyond patrol exchanges as yet, it is beyond question that there will not be a day longer spent upon preparation than is strictly necessary. The decisive clash will come very soon ; and although the enemy is steadily reinforcing his units within the bridgehead and on the east coast, there is abundant evidence that he is losing heavily in the process. In sum, the resultant condition is far from discouraging. The battle which is gathering will be stern and heavy, but of its ultimate result we need have no doubt.
Previous page
