HOUSE OF LORDS' REFORM.
WE record with the utmost satisfaction that Lord Lansdowne gave notice on Wednesday that he will, at an early date, bring forward a Bill for amending the constitution of the Upper House. The exact nature of Lord Lansdowne's proposals is not yet known, but the Bill, we may feel sure, will follow the general lines of the Rosebery-Lansdowne resolutions, both as to composition and powers. In the matter of details it is also probable that it will approximate to the scheme set forth by Lord Curzon, which we summarised last week. We find a certain number of Unionists who desire, above all things, an efficient check upon the autocracy of a Single Chamber showing a good deal of impatience with the way in which the hereditary element is given a place in the scheme set forth in the House of Lords. No doubt it is the here- ditary principle very much changed and limited, for it is not proposed that any person shall sit in the reformed House of Lords merely because he is the son of his father. He will in future have to possess other and very notable qualifications besides this. Still, the hereditary principle is so far recognised that among the essential qualifications for a. portion of the House will be the possession of a peerage. Why not, say these Unionist critics, get rid of the hereditary element altogether, the element upon which the authority of the Upper House to co-ordinate legisla- tive powers with the Lower House is always challenged, and have instead a wholly democratic House ? The answer to this plea is, of course, that the wiser advocates of House of Lords' reform have no desire to set up a body which shall he as strong as the House of Commons. Though, if they had a. blank sheet of paper on which to write and were drawing up a new and an ideal constitution, they might like to give the Upper House the great powers and authority wielded by the American Senate or by the Senate in France, they recognise that it is impossible to ignore the historical claims of the House of Commons. For good or ill, the House of Commons must remain the -predominant partner, and the Second Chamber take a lower place, though not a placeof almost complete impotence, as the Government now propose. But if the Second Chamber is to be subordinate to the House of Commons, there is practically only one way of doing it—that is, by giving some recognition to the hereditary principle. If the Second Chamber were to be popularly elected and have as demo- cratic a basis as the Commons, it would be practically impossible to prevent that Chamber in the future claiming co-ordinate powers—obtaining a position which the House of Commons will never tolerate. If deadlocks between the two Houses are difficult now, they would be ten times as difficult if the body substituted for the House of Lords could say to the Commons, and say without fear of contradiction, We are as democratic a body as you are." The object of the wiser and more statesmanlike reformers in the Lords in retaining the hereditary element will thus be seen to be based upon an effort not to secure privileges for their own order or to keep power for the existing peerage, but merely to avoid claiming equality of powers on the part of the Upper House. Their intentions can, in fact, best be declared by linking the new House to the old and making it, as it were, inherit the old Chamber's traditional possession of secondary powers.
It may be said, perhaps, that this linking of the new Chamber to the tradition of legislative inferiority will not provide a sufficient check on the House of Commons. But those who argue thus forget that this necessary check can be provided by the use of the Referendum or poll of the people to decide deadlocks between the two Houses. In America if the Senate disagrees with the House of Repre- sentatives, the House of Representatives can do nothing but grin and bear it. Reformers like Lord Lansdowne do not suggest our giving the new Upper House any such powers as these. In the case of deadlock they propose not that the House of Commons will have to abandon its Bills alto- gether. They propose, instead, that the people shall be consulted as to whether the House of Commons is or is not to have its way. The Upper House will claim no power of veto for itself, but only the right in the case of disagree- ment to let the people, as the wielders of ultimate sovereignty, both legislative and executive, decide the question. Their function, far humbler than that of the American or the French Senate, will be that of acting as the People's Remembrancer. That a House of Lords reformed on the lines suggested by Lord Curzon would be an ideal body for exercising the functions first of criticism and deliberation, and finally of seeing that the people are given the opportunity to express their opinion on matters of vital importance, cannot be doubted. Lord Curzon's scheme, it may be remembered, was for a House of three hundred members (1) a hundred elected by the peers from among themselves by a minority system of voting ; (2) fifty sitting by the fact of their having held great public offices ; (3) fifty nominated by the Prime Minister of the day ; and (4) a hundred elected on a popular basis by local bodies—i.e., by county councils and the great towns. Under Lord Curzon's scheme the peers chosen by the Prime Minister would ultimately only be chosen as vacancies arose. In our opinion the better plan would be to allow the Prime Minister of the day to nominate those peers at the beginning of each session of Parliament, thus securing that the Government of the day should always possess a large body of supporters. The plea that a body thus constituted would in effect be too Unionist in com- position is sure to be made. It will be argued that a House of Lords so manned would be always inclined to refer Liberal measures to the poll of the people, while it would pass Unionist measures without any such reference. We very much doubt whether this would be so in practice, lett assuming the objection, it is quite easy to meet it. The advo,. to of the Referendum desire that a minority of the .iouse of Commons should be given a right to invoke the Referendum as well as a majority in the Lords. As we have often pointed out in these columns, the people should be given the opportunity of refusing their assent to legislation, even if passed by both Houses of Parliament, provided there were reasonable grounds for thinking that the people might disapprove of it. We have suggested that if two hundred members of the House of Commons petition the Crown that a Bill passed by both Houses shall not receive the Royal Assent till it has been submitted to a poll of the people, such poll of the people shall take place. The result of such an enact, meat would be that when the Unionists were in ,power the Liberal Opposition, which is never likely to fall below two hundred members in the Commons, could, if it so desired, invoke a reference. This meets the objection that with a reformed House of Lords the Referendum would only be used to check Liberal, and never Unionist, legislation.
- It will be seen, by what we have said above, that the poll of the people is essential to any system of House of Lords' reform which is of a moderate character and preserves the traditional relations between the two Houses—that is, the relations under which the House of Commons is the predominant partner. This being so, we welcome the fact that a peer of the weight, experience, and statesmanlike ability of Lord Balfour of Burleigh has given notice that he will introduce a Bill providing machinery for taking a poll of the people, and setting forth the occasions on which it is to be taken. Let us say once again that no system for taking a poll of the people will be satisfactory which does not primarily provide that it shall be used as a solution for deadlocks between the two Houses. We must recognise the predominant position of the House of Commons in the Legislature, but we must at the same time see that that predominance is corrected by a right of veto over legislation lodged in the hands of the people themselves. We must also provide that this right of referring legislation on vital matters to the people can be put into operation by a minority of the Commons, even though the House of Lords is willing to assent to such legislation. By these means the predominant character of the House of Commons is fully secured.
The objection that is sure to be raised against any system for taking a poll of the people is that the nation will be constantly worried with demands that its opinion shall be expressed. We do not believe that this is at all likely. Neither political party in the State will be anxious to be beaten at the Referendum, and therefore they will be chary of calling it into operation, unless there is a good prospect of success. Certainly considera- tions for a moderate use of the institution are sure to weigh greatly with such a body as that suggested by Lord Curzon. But, it may be said, even if the Upper House is careful to avoid frivolous references, that will not apply to the scheme for allowing two hundred members of the House of Commons to ob- tain a reference on petition. The Opposition will always be demanding a poll of the people. We doubt it, especially if the obvious precaution is taken of enacting that a Bill once accepted by a poll of the people cannot be repealed without a poll of the people. That will act as a very strong check on frivolous appeals. Take a concrete example. Suppose a Unionist Government when in power passes a Bill through both Houses which for some reason or other is very much disliked by the Liberal Opposition, though it is by no means certain that the country dislikes it. The problem then will be—to ask or not to ask for a reference. No doubt extremeoppone nts of the Bill will clamour for a reference. The matter, however, will not be decided by them, but by the responsible leaders of the Opposition, since only they will be able to command two hundred votes. They will not be slow to recognise and point out to their followers the danger of a reference. If the Bill is not referred to the people, they will say, " We shall always be able to repeal it or modify it as soon as we come into power. If, however, it is sent to the people and they accept it, we may never be able to get it modified." The risk, they will conclude, will be too great, and they will therefore prefer that the Bill should operate for two or three years, and then be amended, rather than run the danger of it becoming a permanent enactment. The details of Lord Balfour's Bill will soon be before the country, and therefore it is undesirable to speculate upon them here. We will only say that we have little doubt that the object of those who advocate this reasonable check on certain evils connected with modern developments of the representative institutions under a closely organised party system will be greatly helped forward. The country will be able to realise exactly what is meant by the poll of the people, how it will work, and what it will do. They will also see by the concrete provisions of a Bill that it is absurd to call it in any sense a plan for the destruction of representative government. On the contrary, it will be seen that the poll of the people will in reality strengthen representative institutions and restore them to health and -vigour. Our rigid party system has to a great extent taken the heart out of representative institutions in the matter of legislation. It has substituted the will of the caucus for the will of the people. By a system of legisla- tive log-rolling measures are passed when there ia not really a majority in Parliament, much less a majority in the country, in their favour. The Referendum will deal a crushing blow to legislation by log-rolling. It is for this reason that it is so much detested by people who know that their proposals would never be accepted by the people voting on the isolated issue, and must, to succeed, rest upon the agreement " I will roll your log if you will promise to roll mine." The Referendum will not destroy representative institutions, nor, again, will it destroy the party system. It will merely provide for both a much-needed corrective.
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