Defence Cuts in the Nuclear Age
By RICHARD GOOLD-ADAMS
rr HE certainty that Mr. Macmillan's Govern- ment ment will make substantial cuts in defence expenditure adds a special savour to this year's White Paper, now shortly due. The broad reasons for the cuts are well known and widely approved, from political reaction after the failure of the Suez expedition to fresh strains on the national economy. But there agreement ends, since the cuts can clearly be made only after a drastic reassessment of defence needs 'involving a.forbidding range of unknowns.
The main one is the type of war for which Britain must prepare. At a time when the future has never been more unpredictable, there are four general contingencies to be met : global H-bomb war, which would be short; and longer but unlikely old-style world war in which for political or military reasons at present unknowable the use of nuclear weapons might be temporarily deferred or artificially limited; local war on the Korean scale, with or without atomic weapons; and small-scale fighting on the Suez, Malaya or Kenya pattern. It is patently impossible for Britain to prepare adequately for all four, quite apart from any doubts about survival in H-bomb war. A variety of risks, therefore, has to be balanced against an estimate of the money that can be made available.
To take the supreme question first, the fact that global war of any kind is unlikely because of the thermo-nuclear stalemate seems bound to make Korea-type wars increasingly possible, since the former deterrent-7-that small wars might be turned into large ones—has been removed. And in a Korea-type war without atomic weapons Communist manpower has an immense advan- tage. For the West as a whole this means that ! a new gap has been opened in its defence policy, and for Britain in particular that some of the traditional Commonwealth and colonial commit- ments cannot be met either by continuing to develop the H-bomb or by retaining local garri- sons of conventional forces on the only scale that this country can afford.
This is the background to the idea which Britain and America both seem to be accepting in practice, though not in theory, that small atomic weapons will have to become usable in non-global war and that this must be made possible with- out automatically implying use of the H-bomb. But even the strictly military implications of the idea are still a long way from being worked out in terms either of cost, of the redesign of the armed services, or of relations between the Western allies. And the Government must cer- tainly be judged on its handling of this complex but critical problem when it comes to strike its new balance of risks against resources in this year's White Paper and the coming Budget.
In order to discuss the problems arising out of the use of low-yield atomic weapons in local war, an unofficial conference was held last week- end at Brighton, several dozen distinguished members being drawn from the Services, Parlia- ment, the professions, the press, the Church and the universities. It took as a starting point the pamphlet recently published by Chatham House, On Limiting Atomic War (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2s. 6d.), and a remarkable degree of agreement was reached on the urgent need to get both the public and the Government to give this question much more thought than has been given so far.
At first sight the logic of developing tactical atomic weapons for local war clashes with the accepted determination to spend less on defence. And it was a feature of the Brighton conference that this dilemma was not resolved. But what did emerge was that if these smaller atomic weapons are to be made a basis for strategy, as it seems they must, then a ruthless cutting down in other directions is unavoidable in terms of commit- ments as well as arms. Obviously this is something which only the Government is in a position to examine in any detail, since it alone has all the facts.
The discussions at Brighton did nevertheless reveal certain basic principles, although not every- one present agreed with them. Assuming that, having gone so far, Britain continues with its own H-bomb and V-bomber programme, the main brunt of economy must be borne by the conventional forces. In the next stage of the H-bomb programme, however, when the vehicle for delivering nuclear warheads will be the missile rather than the manned aircraft, econo- mies must certainly be made by depending more on purchases from America; and it is to be hoped that Mr. Sandys's forthcoming visit to Washing- ton will definitely establish this trend.
The reduction of conventional forces clearly cannot go below the minimum needed for carry- ing out responsibilities of the Malaya and Kenya type. At the same time bases such as those in Libya, at Mafraq and Akaba in Jordan, and even perhaps in the explosive political atmo- sphere of Singapore no longer fulfil the external functions for which they were designed. And it seems inevitable that if Britain is to make sense out of the lessons of the Suez operation these must be scrapped. Instead, it must be recognised that overseas action is unwise without local allies who can themselves offer the minimum base facilities on the spot.
Within the Services this should make possible a new approach to the twin problems of training and inter-Service responsibility. If the forces are to be smaller, they must be more professional and they cannot afford to cope with the endless flow of National Service men. In the genuinely atomic age conscription is out of date. Action can be taken, however, only if the professional is offered better conditions and his calling is made to appeal to a wider range of men.
The development of rockets and guided missiles is expected to reduce the distinctions between the traditional arms of the Service, navy, army and air force. But that is a long-term consideration. In the short term the immediate emphasis on economy, coupled with a concentration on tac- tical atomic weapons, seems bound to demand a rigorous review of the balance of expenditure between the various Services. And it is here that the long-drawn-out delay in determining the future role of the Royal Navy is damaging. If there really is to be preparation for global H-bomb war, then anti-submarine ships to guard the sea lanes are a waste of money, since the decision will be quick and not made at sea. On the other hand Russia has 400 submarines : why? Moreover, in a local war a few vessels would certainly be required to protect shipping else- where than round these islands.
Apart from the correct inter-Service balance, the army in particular must be reorganised to handle tactical atomic weapons. This has already begun. But the process needs to be speeded up if money is to be saved in the early future, since the initial change-over will demand new equip- ment and at first cost more. This streamlining must also be coupled with a clearer concept than hitherto of the size, role, mobility and composi- tion of a genuine strategic reserve. The lack of reserves for Suez did much to promote the feeling that the nation has not been getting value for money on defence. Any policy of tactical atomic local war will depend more than ever on the flexibility and efficient organisation of the central reserve, and thus also on the skilful use of transport aircraft.
Lastly, all this raises the question of defence policy in relation to Britain's alliances. The use of tactical atomic weapons seems almost incon- ceivable without American backing and probably supply. In this field there can be no question of going it alone. Equally, since the deployment of the British strategic reserve outside the NATO area would be of great concern to SHAPE, tactical atomic weapons imply both a new British appraisal of the detailed NATO commitment and a fresh NATO approach to problems beyond its own area. The use of tactical atomic weapons suggests in fact a tighter Western alliance and in the end a greater degree of international specialisation which should make some national economies possible. For the present, however, the Government's task is to fit a policy based on atomic weapons into the straitjacket of unilateral defence saving, and this is the year in which the most critical decisions about it ought to be taken.
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