Military withdrawal the policy and the logistics

A Senior Officer

Following Mr Merlyn Rees's statement last week, envisaging, at least, the eventual withdrawal of the army from Northern Ireland, the idea of such a withdrawal and a consideration of the circumstances in which it could be effected are much under discussion — although many who counsel or demand that course may have a highly simplistic, even a naive, view of the role of military power within the context of government authority.

Let us be certain as to what is actually meant by the cry, 'withdraw the army from Ulster.' If it means that the British Government withdraws those extra units which have been moved into Northern Ireland since 1969, then of course a sizeable military infrastructure would still remain in the province. This has a number of serious implications; not least of which is the security problem posed by the presence of only a small number of troops if terrorism were to continue or be re-activated. If, however, those who wish for military withdrawal mean that this withdrawal should be total — implying the closing down of the depots of the Irish Regiments, for instance, and presumably in the end, the demise of those units — it has to be appreciated that it is bound to have a significant effect not only upon the minds of the Irish, in both the North and the South, but upon the will of the British Government. Total military withdrawal by a power from a territory has always been followed (or preceded) by a change in the form of government of that territory — usually some form of independence.

If, then, the Government in the near future does consider some form of military withdrawal, what factors must be taken into account, and what lessons are there from past withdrawals from which we might profit? There are four examples, among many, from which we can learn — all post-1945: the withdrawals in the late 'forties from India and Palestine, and the pull-out from Aden and then from Cyprus in the 'sixties.

In the Indian case, the political decision to give independence was taken while the power and the means to control events were still in British hands. Wavell, the then Viceroy, and his advisers — all of whom knew India and its problems — produced a military plan which envisaged a gradual transfer of power, starting in the south then extending the area of India's responsibility northwards in an orderly fashion. It was obvious that the flashpoints were in the north where the inter-religious strife and passions were most dangerous. The men on the spot with their long experience of that sub-continent were well aware that as the day of Independence grew closer it was vital that power to keep the peace should remain in 'neutral' British hands. It was argued that if a transference of power was seen to be going well, when the time came for the transfer to take place in the northern areas there was a greater chance for this to happen peaceably. In the event the socialist government of the day rejected this advice, and the consequences were disastrous. Power, once transferred, was misused or deliberately withdrawn. Between one and two million people died in the subsequent inter-communal violence which attended the emergence of an independent India and Pakistan.

The lesson is simple and clear. When two communities have a long-standing enmity, even though a peace has been imposed on them by a third force, if this force is removed or, rather, if the agency controlling the source of power is removed, then, in conditions when the security of one or both of the communities is thought to be in jeopardy, the result will be violence.

The withdrawal from Palestine took place once the British government had lost the will to maintain the League of Nations mandate. By the time the decision to withdraw the army was taken, both sides, Arabs and Jews, were well armed and had been fighting each other and us for some time, and they were ready for war. The British got no thanks from either side for maintaining what peace there was, and probably the main lesson to be learnt there is that it is a most unprofitable exercise to overstay one's welcome. It is also useless for a government to make deals with both sides in a power dispute. This inevitably results in one's friends becoming one's enemies, whilst one's enemies remain such. The army conducted its own withdrawal from Palestine under most difficult circumstances with efficiency and were thankful that at long last it was conducting an operation with a sensible, well-defined and simple aim: to get out with minimum fuss and casualties.

The Cyprus solution, if solution it can be called, is an interesting one. Here the British withdrew, leaving an independent state, but retained 'sovereign bases.' Furthermore, the government undertook, with others, to guarantee the Constitution of independent Cyprus. The maintenance on Cyprus of military power, although retained, other than for training purposes, within the sovereign base areas, could be taken as a demonstration by the British government that it was indeed prepared to back up its guarantee. Whether or not there were formal or informal assurances about the role that the British army might or might not play in maintaining an independent Cyprus is beside the point. The presence of power carries with it the assumption that the government responsible for the deployment of that power is prepared to use it. (Why else are we pulling out east of Suez?) Unfortunately, in the event, the present Government failed to move effectively when the President of Cyprus was illegally deposed, thus insuring that the Turks, who for good strategic reasons were not prepared to seek enosis, moved in.

Here, too, the lesson is obvious. Unless one is really prepared to use force it should not be deployed at all. In Ulster the presence of British power is a visible sign that the government is not prepared to see a part of the United Kingdom sliced off against the will of its majority, and that, when necessary, that force must be used. This lesson has not had to be relearned in Ireland — yet.

The fourth example of British military withdrawal is that of Aden in 1968. In this case once the decision to withdraw was taken, and we are not concerned with the rights or wrongs of that policy, a difficult situation was made impossible, not so much for the British as for the many people of Aden, by the further extraordinary decision to make public the date by which final withdrawal would be complete. The various terrorist organisations at once stepped up their campaigns, particularly against each other. Those Aden officials, police and civil, who had been loyal to the British found their positions hopelessly undermined. Law and order virtually disappeared in those areas from which the British army progressively withdrew.

The planning complications which faced the military in having to conduct a withdrawal while at the same time maintaining its own security, when the date by which the withdrawal had to be completed was known to all,

Spectator January 25, 1975

were considerable. The political argument that to publish the date of withdrawal would persuade the various factions to get together turned out to be wishful thinking. One suspects that much the same would apply in the case of Ulster where the majority party has amongst it a core of well-armed men who are not prepared to see themselves delivered into the hands of either the Republic of Ireland Government or of a Marxist-dominated People's Republic of Eire.

Let us suppose, though, that at some point in the near future the political decision is taken that the army will be pulled out of Ulster. What sort of advice might the Chiefs of Staff give to the Government?

First, they would want to know whether or not this withdrawal was to be total, or simply a withdrawal 'off the streets.' Once having settled this, a provisional timetable for a withdrawal is worked out. This basic timetable must depend a great deal on the ability of the police to replace the army, or at least on their potential for replacing the army should this be necessary. If it were judged that the police were not in a position to take on this role, then a period of recruitment and training would be required before military withdrawal. The actual method of withdrawal is of paramount importance. Unless for political reasons the gamble is taken totally to withdraw the army, the preferred military solution would almost certainly be for a sudden unannounced withdrawal into military enclaves. At the same time, reserves at a high state of readiness would be positioned at strategic areas with the means of rapid redeployment, by helicopter and vehicle, to hand. This withdrawal off the streets would be done probably without prior warning to the troops involved. This would mean the loss of some equipment and stores, particularly from the forward company areas. However, the chances of giving away the withdrawal are considerably increased if unexplained unusual activities are observed. Even such a mundane thing as a platoon packing its stores and handing in its bedding could, if the IRA intelligence was reasonable, be sufficient to give the clue that something was up. One would visualise this initial withdrawal being done at night, with troops moving to collecting areas and being driven off in to the enclave areas. However, in order to disguise the extra movement it would be likely that, in accordance with well-established militarY doctrine, a programme of night patrolling on a slightly increased scale to normal would be initiated some time before the actual withdrawal date so that the local people would become used to this extra night movement. The military, and the government would probablY agree, might then propose an unspecified period of military silence. That is to say, no public statements, no public prophecies and no military movement outside the enclave areas.

This period could last for a number of weeks. and these weeks would be crucial, because all would now depend upon the reaction of the various parties to the present troubles — the Loyalists, the Republicans, the UK Government and the Government of the Republic of Ireland. It would be during this phase that either the theories of the pessimists would be confirmed, in which case the army would return to impose a military solution, or peace would prevail and political agreement be sought, in which case the army could thank' fully retire to its major peace-time role of being a part of NATO's deterrent forces in Europe. The decision to withdraw the army can onlY be political and it must be taken responsiblY. The plain fact is that although it is easy t° assure everyone that violence will somehoW stop if only the army would leave Ulster, the responsibility inherent in a decision which could cost lives is a heavy one. The precedents for trusting to the honour of terrorist orga" nisations are not good, and the Government still has a responsibility for the whole of the United Kingdom, which includes Ulster. The decision to withdraw the army will not be all easy one.