Softly, softly, Sir Alec
The election manifesto of an incoming government seldom makes very happy reading for its supporters one year later.
The harsh pressure of events has a way of getting between the Ministers and the fulfilment of their visions in opposition.
Mr Heath and his colleagues are already being reminded of this reality. The tax cuts do not look quite as imminent as many Conservatives had been led to expect (and the sudden death of lain Macleod—re- ferred to elsewhere in this issue—is a tragic loss on this front). Mrs Thatcher's determination to fulfil one commitment— the reprieve for grammar schools—has run into a storm of criticism. Sir Alec Douglas- Home's well publicised intention to auth- orise in principle the sale of arms to South Africa has suffered a similar fate.
The Government had an impeccable case in logic. It takes a vivid imagination to discover scope for the utilisation of ground to air missiles in crowd and riot control. Refusal by Britain to supply these arms since 1964 has not deprived the South African government of them: the contracts for supply of submarines have gone to France, and the licence fees for the production of fighters to Italy. Brit- ish civilian trade with South Africa almost certainly has suffered from Labour's em- bargo: at least our share of the South African market has declined. The Navy does need access to the Simonstown base if it is to operate in the southern Atlantic and western Indian Ocean, and the terms of the Simonstown agreement do stipulate that Britain will assist South 'Africa with its external defences. Last but not least, the Conservative party was entitled to claim an electoral mandate to do just that.
By contrast Labour's position is utterly inconsistent. After coming to power in 1964 Mr Wilson's government banned all new contracts for arms sales to South Africa. But it continued to authorise the sale of Buccaneer aircraft under existing contracts—aircraft which, the party now argues, could easily be used for purposes of internal repression. Then, in the autumn of 1967, the South African govern- ment made overtures to. London about a possible renewal of arms sales. What transpired precisely thereafter has never emerged. But there were well-authentica- ted reports that Mr Wilson personally authorised Mr George Brown, then For- eign Secretary, to enter into discussions with the South African Ambassador about relaxation of the embargo. Then came devaluation and the dis- covery by Mr Wilson of one of those real or imagined plots to unseat him. It may be that he was genuinely taken aback by the scale of opposition within his party which reports of the impending arms sale had provoked. But there is no doubt that he personally requested his chief whip to organise signatures to a motion against the arms sale, and then seized the oppor- tunity of Mr Brown's temporary absence from the country to make a statement to the House of Commons openly implying that the Foreign Secretary (one of those he had apparently identified as plotting against him) was resisting a majority Cab- inet decision to maintain the embargo.
After this extraordinary performance it is sheer impertinence for the leader of the Opposition to open his mouth on the sub- ject.
There is no obvious logic to a policy which precludes the sale of arms for ex- ternal defence to South Africa, but permits the sale of arms for internal repression to Nigeria or. for that matter, Indonesia (where they might and very probably would be used to terrorise the stone age inhabitants of 'West Irian'). But logic is not the only consideration: and here we reach the nub of the real case against a decision to resume arms sales. The South African government is not, by abstract standards. the most wicked to be found in the world. It is. however, the most offen- sive to the fashionable morality. Govern- ments whose own domestic records do not -stand up to a moment's scrutiny are accus- tomed to acquire respectability by denun- ciation of South Africa in every available international gathering. This may be con- temptible. but it is a fact which the British government is unwise to ignore.
The Prime Minister has said that his government's guiding principle for foreign policy will be the defence of British inter- ests. So the question that must be asked is whether a resumption of arms sales as one of the first diplomatic decisions of the new government would indeed be in the British national interest. In order to be able to answer this question in the affirmative it would have to be shown that the value of potential export orders to South Africa put at risk by maintenance of the embargo would be likely to exceed the value of potential export orders to and British as- sets in third countries put at risk by a resumption of arms sales; and that access to the Simonstown naval base is essential for the protection of British sea communi- cations in time of war, and would prob- ably be lost by maintenance of the em- bargo. It cannot be said that the Govern- ment has so far demonstrated either pro- position very convincingly.
There remains one further motive for renewing the sale of arms, although un- admitted. This is that with suitable en- couragement Dr Vorster can be persuaded to lean on Mr Ian Smith to agree to a settlement of the Rhodesian situation 'in conformity with the live principles'. This is the most dubious calculation of all. Obviously Dr Vorstcr has the ability to place a stranglehold on Salisbury. But in practice his white electorate would never allow him to abandon Rhodesia. and Mr Smith is well aware of the fact. Hence he is under no necessity to make major con- cessions in response to South African pressure. And as we have frequently argued in these columns a negotiated settlement by which Britain assumed a continuing responsibility for the course of events in Rhodesia over which it has no conceivable control would be far worse than no settle- ment at all.
The course of wisdom for the Govern- ment to adopt towards southern Africa is one of circumspection and gradualness: not a negotiated settlement with Rhodesia. but a tacit abandonment of sanctions; not a trumpeted pledge of renewed arms sales to South Africa, but a discreet, piecemeal relaxation of Labour's embargo. That is MX what we have had from Sir Alec. Rather we have had the maximum pub- licity of intention followed by an unedify- ing display of panic at the entirely pre- dictable reaction. It may be that the South African government's 'request for clari- fication' of the Simonstown agreement caught the Cabinet on the hop; if so then Sir Alec would at least have spared him- self a deal of embarrassment if he had simply told the House of Commons on Monday that he was not after all yet ready to make a statement and left it at that. This would surely have been pre- ferable to the Foreign Secretary's extra- ordinary pronouncement that 'we have stated to the House our intention.' but that 'If . . . anybody can, by argument. break us away from that intention, then. well, we shall consider all the arguments.' Mr Heath and his colleagues used to pour justifiable scorn on Mr Wilson's nonsense about the 'smack of firm government', Was this what they had in mind?
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