TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUSSIA'S NEW STARTING-POINT.
RUSSIA occupies the Principalities, and proposes to negooiate,— makes an aggressive step in advance, and will then talk about it. It is an old trick with Russia ; but it remains to be seen whether the arts of that power, which have fallen into a mannerism, are still to be suffered to attain their end even after they are seen through. The question is important, and it appears to us that it might be put in a form still more startling. In the present aspect of Europe, the elements for calculating eventualities are in themselves too uncertain, too much the sub- ject of hypothesis, to be relied upon for the results. Those things of which we are at all certain are only contingent and negative possibilities. Should Europe unite,—we cannot yet say-remain united against Russia,—undoubtedly that power does not possess the strength to early her will against the rest. Should England and France remain united, they might withstand any serious ag- gression on the part of Russia, even though she had formidable allies. Should France withdraw herself, and England be left the sole champion of order, there might still be resources which would enable us to make good our stand and to restore something like public law. The mere enumeration of these contingencies is enough to remind us how little we can make our calculations with security : we cannot even rely upon ourselves—we cannot be sure that England would have the virtue to make a stand alone for public law in Europe ; still less could any strict logician assume, what we all at present hope and are inclined to believe, that France would remain firm against all the temptations that might beset her to depart from the English alliance. For the other greater powers of Europe we can as yet only speak alternatively. Much of course would depend upon the strength which this country can exhibit, in resources, in influence, and in moral resolution. If England had been restored to such a pitch of national health as to be able to say, "We will take our stand upon a certain principle, and nothing shall drive us from it," the greatest results might be anticipated without fear. As it is, our preparations for the event, our readiness to adapt our policy to practical alliances, our openness to receive friendly advances from any possible auxiliaries, are all circum- stances greatly in our favour, and cannot fail to strengthen us in our position whatever that may be. The chances that we have to face can be best estimated by viewing alternatively the course we might take, supposing it pos- sible that we are left with comparatively small support. Should we in that case back out, or should we go on ? Should we prefer the negative dangers of retreat, or the positive dangers of ad- vance? We have had some experience of the retiring policy. The last time that Europe rose in conflict, England showed herself just enough to remind the nations of her existence, and then she drew back, leaving the settlement of Europe at that period without any positive action or influence from her; and therefore none of the results bore her mark. The results that bore any traces of her interference have been the consequences of her sufferance ; and, however they may be retrieved in the sequel, they were not very creditable to her at the time. There is no doubt that the conduct of England caused her to be hated by those against whom she protested, mistrusted by those whom she left in the lurch, disliked if not despised by the bystanders. On the other side, her influ- ence was shaken; and her position we have always regarded as enfeebled by the results of that contest. She left the two extreme principles of Despotism and Revolution to fight it out between themselves; and that principle of government upon which our poli- tical existence depends lost ground in Europe, and England has left herself to suffer by the diminished strength of the outposts. With few and very small exceptions, Constitutionalism, which had previously gained an apparent footing on the Continent, has been swept from the whole field ; a result which we do not think could have occurred if England had exercised a more active share of in- fluence. Should Europe once more rise in contest—should Eng- land repeat that experiment—it is quite certain that she must sustain a further loss, probably in a geometrical ratio ; and if she were to undergo an additional abatement of her influence, the next European movement would probably bring our independence, pos- sibly the existence of our commerce, into question. These appear to be the consequences of a retiring policy, so obvious that it is almost tiresome to review them.
On the other hand, to go forward seems to be impossible except under conditions which at present are not assured. We ought to have in power, men, or at least a man, capable of dealing with the junc- ture in a spirit not of aggressive but of independent statesmanship, and not a follower of routine. If our councils were administered by such a man, the course would not, we believe, be really so difficult as it looks. 'While we survey it with only our known resources, it must be taken for granted that if England were to pursue a for- ward policy, our course must be different from that which it has been for the last forty years. No nation has made greater sacri- fices to sustain the system which may be designated by the date of its settlement, 1815: she has been lavish in the devotion of money and of influence in sustaining recognized governments and authoritative law ; and at the same time England has profited less by that settlement than any other country. Our conquests in Europe have been entirely of the commercial kind, while other powers have enjoyed territorial aggrandizement and titular pro- motion. Down to the very latest date England has appeared as the disinterested upholder of that system, its authorities
and law. If Russia chooses to break away froin the ;conpact and the code, the crime and its consequences misst,
be laid at her door. If other states join with Russia, England must be considered to be emancipated from the compact, and free to choose her own course. We have called ourselves a practical nation, and if we were to launch in such a course it is to be presumed that we should take a practical view, not only of the difficulties to be encountered and to be overcome, but of the means and appliances ready to our hands. Respect for the compacts of 1815, so far as they bore upon our antagonists, would be incom- patible with the position in which they would have placed us. It is probable that, except Russia, there is no power that does net perceive the expediency of not driving England to extreme eburses. There is not a single government on the Continent that would not suffer in its authority, internal as well as international, if the sanction of England were given to its antagonists whoever they might be.
On the other hand, if there is to be a resettlement,—and if there is to be war in Turkey there must be an European war, of course to be followed by an European resettlement,—it is evident that any power which hopes to reappear after that interregnum with any distinctive integrity, must perceive how necessary it is to her in- terest to have the good-will and support of England. One of the most important states which would enter upon that scene of con- flict with a position the most recent and precarious, might derive almost "a Parliamentary title" for her tenure under a new com- pact more consonant with existing facts than that of 1815 ; a com- pact, for example, which might recognize nations as well as land- lies—which might establish, instead of exile, a Napoleon. The importance of the English sanction would be apprehended by other states in proportion to the boldness and resolution of het attitude. At such a time, menaced by antagonists so formidable, driven to a course so novel, responsible for results so momentous, it would be incumbent upon us not to refuse to accept any auxiliaries that might offer—to avail ourselves of any forces on our side that might exist in the dynamics of Europe.
To take our illustration from the immediate scene whence the whole question arises. It may be true that the Ottoman empire, as it has existed, is crumbling down by natural decay ; but it is still more certainly true, that the Ottoman empire has been able to develop a national growth, a commercial activity, and a social freedom, which would have been impossible under the more iron grasp of a Russian government. To let the European dominions of Turkey pass from the rule of the Porte to that of Russia, would amount to relinquishing a commerce which is valuable to England, to giving up a political territory, and to abandoning a promising family of mankind to a thraldom whose rescue is without date. But if we were set free from the compacts of 1815—free for the necessity of shaping our action by ex- isting rules—it would not be difficult to recognize in that very region the means of evoking a power on our own side sufficient to dispose of any enemy that could meet us ' on the ground. If the Ottoman empire is a fadine. dream—if
Russia is a prowling foe not yet too near to be kept fading is on both sides of the Danube a family endowed with energy, born to the soil, inspired with young ambition, ready to accept a politi- cal tutelage, and capable of becoming, as Switzerland is, a barrier against the encroachments of the greater states around it. The same principle applies to many other grounds in Europe. If the Russian, like the Greek of old, sows the dragon's teeth of war, he may find armed men spring up ; but, unlike the incident of that older time' there would now be a guide to teach those men a better task than that of destroying each other.
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