COUNT NESSELRODES MEMORANDUM OF 1844.

[Translated from the French.]

Russia and England are mutually penetrated with the conviction that it is for their common interest that the Ottoman Porte should maintain itself in the state of independence and of territorial possession which at present constitutes that empire, as that political combination is the one which is most compatible with the general interest of the maintenance of peace.

Being agreed on this principle, Russia and England have an equal interest in unit- ing their efforts in order to keep up the existence of the Ottoman empire, and to avert all the dangers which can place in jeopardy its safety. With this object, the essential point is to suffer the Porte to live in repose, without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings, and without interfering without absolute necessity in its internal affairs.

In order to carry out skilfully this system of forbearance, with a view to the well- understood interest of the Porte, two things must not be lost sight of. They are these—

In the first place, the Porte has a constant tendency to extricate itself from the engagements imposed upon it by the treaties which it has concluded with other Powers. It hopes to do so with impunity, because it reckons on the mutual jealousy of the Cabinets. It thinks that if it fails in its engagements towards one of them, the rest will espouse its quarrel, and will screen it from all responsibility.

It is essential not to confirm the Porte in this delusion. Every time that it fails in its obligations towards one of the Great Powers, it is the interest of all the rest to make it sensible of its error, and seriously to exhort it to act rightly towards the Cabinet which demands just reparation.

As soon as the Porte shall perceive that it is not supported by the other Cabinets, it will give way, and the differences which have arisen will be arranged in a con- ciliatory manner, without any conflict resulting from them. There is a second cause of complication which is inherent in the situation of the Porte; it is the difficulty which exists in reconciling the respect due to the sove- reign authority of the Sultan, founded on the Mussulman law, with the forbearance required by the interests of the Christian population of that empire. This difficulty is real. In the present state of feeling in Europe, the Cabinets cannot see with indifference the Christian populations in Turkey exposed to flagrant acts of oppression and religious intolerance. It is necessary constantly to make the Ottoman Ministers sensible of this truth, and to persuade them that they can only reckon on the friendship and on the sup- port of the Great Powers on the condition that they treat the Christian subjects of the Porte with toleration and with mildness.

While insisting on this truth„ it will be the duty of the foreign representatives, on the other hand, to exert all their influence to maintain the Christian subjects of the Porte in submission to the sovereign authority.

It will be the duty of the foreign representatives, guided by these principles, to act among themselves in a perfect spirit of agreement. If they address remon- strances to the Porte, those remonstrances must bear a real character of unanimity, though divested of one of exclusive dictation. ,

By persevering in this system with calmness and moderation, the representatives of the Great Cabinets of Europe will have the best chance of succeeding in the steps which they may take, without giving occasion for complications which might affect the tranquillity of the Ottoman empire. If all the Great Powers frankly adopt this line of conduct, they will have a well-founded expectation of preserving the exist- ence of Turkey. However, they must not conceal from themselves how many elements of dissolu- tion that empire contains within itself. Unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall, without its being in the power of the friendly Cabinets to prevent it. As it is not given to human foresight to settle beforehand a plan of action for such or such unlooked-for case, it would be premature to discuss eventualities which may never be realized.

In the uncertainty which hovers over the future a single fundamental idea seems

to admit of a really practical application: it is, that danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey will be much diminished, if, in the event of its occurring, Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common.

That understanding will be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have the full assent of Austria. Between her and Russia there exists already an entire con- formity of principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey, in a common interest of con- servation and peace.

In order to render their union more efficacious, there would remain nothing to be desired but that England should be seen to associate herself thereto with the same view.

The reason which recommends the establishment of this agreement is very simple. On land, Russia exercises in regard to Turkey a preponderant action. On sea, England occupies the same position.

Isolated, the action of these two Powers might do much mischief. United, it can produce a real benefit. Thence the advantage of coming to a previous understanding before having recourse to action.

This notion was in principle agreed upon during the Emperor's last residence in London. The result was the eventual engagement, that if anything unforeseen oc- curred in Turkey, Russia and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in common.

The object for which Russia and England will have to come to an understanding may be expressed in the following manner. 1. To seek to maintain the existence of the Ottoman empire in its present state. so long as that political combination shall be possible. 2. If we foresee that it must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to everything relating to the eetablishment of a new order of things, intended to re- place that which now exists, and, in conjunction with each other' to see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation of that empire shall not injuriously affect either the security of their own states, and the rights which the treaties assure to them respectively, or the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. For the purpose thus stated, the policy of Russia and of Austria, as we have al- ready said, is closely united by the principle of perfect identity. If England, as the principal maritime power, acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburg, London, and Vienna. Conflict between the Great Powers being thus obviated, it is to be hoped that the peace of Europe will be maintained even in the midst of such serious circumstanees• It is to secure this object of common interest, if the case occurs, that, as the Em- peror agreed with her Britannic Majesty's Ministers during his residence in Eng- land, the previous understanding which Russia and England shall establish between themselves must be directed.