MUNDELLA'S MOTION. T HE general effect produced upon us by the
debate on Mr. Mundella's motion is that the Government is, perhaps, doing about as well as a government without any really master-mind on the questions of the National Foreign Policy, and the Constitution of the Army, could be expected to do in a House of Commons so little able to understand its own mind on these subjects. If it be the most we can expect from a Government to strike an average between the various opinions entertained in the House, and accept that average as the sort of opinion it is most politic for the Cabinet to adopt as its own, then we must say that we think Mr. Gladstone's Government is doing this rather inferior sort of work very re- spectably indeed. They do not enlighten, they do not instruct, they do not guide the House of Commons on these subjects ; but they do manage to arrive at a very respectable medium between the opposite extremes, and to advocate the applica- tion of that medium view to the administration of the country with tolerable ability. Mr. Gladstone in his speech of Thursday night really bisected the difference of view be- tween Mr. Jacob Bright and Lord Echo with very fair arithmetical accuracy, and gave quite as good reasons for adopting that position, as ethical philosophy generally manages to assign for the position that virtue is the mean between two extremes. Beyond this we cannot say that the Government seems entitled to much credit. But for a Government almost ostentatiously uninterested in foreign affairs and in the strength of the country in relation to foreign affairs, we think it may claim credit for as much prudence in resisting the dangerous counsels of influential friends as we had any reason to expect.
And Mr. Mundella undoubtedly was a dangerous counsellor on Thursday night. Not that we doubt for a moment that his main position was correct when he asserted that we might get an army almost indefinitely stronger than we have at present, at an annual cost certainly not greater, and per- haps even considerably less than the cost of the first estimates of last year. That, however, is not the real point. What is really wanted is, no doubt, a gradual reorganization of the Army on sound economic principles, but also an immediate acces- sion of strength which will enable us to fulfil the guarantees which we never cease giving, if we should be called upon so to do. And that this last object cannot be effected without an immediate increase of expenditure everybody must admit ; indeed it can hardly be effected in any but a very micros- copic degree by that increase of expenditure which Mr. Gladstone's Government so very reluctantly proposes. Nothing could be more complete than Mr. Gladstone's answer to Mr. Mundella on this point. Mr. Mundella deprecated, be said, any real reduction of the strength of the Army, while he also deprecated the addition to the estimates for its cost, and pro- posed to increase its strength and efficiency without asking for a penny more than in the first months of 1870. Well, but what sources of economy did he suggest ? None except the abolition of the honorary Colonelcies, which could only be done gradually by not filling up the vacancies, the economy of the cost of Army agencies, various economies in military stores such as might from time to time seem feasible, and the weeding of the Army of the needless expense as well as the moral contamination of bad characters. Well, all these sources of economy put together would not come near the proposed reduction of the vote during the first year ; and if the vote were to be so reduced, it could only be effected by reducing the military strength of the country to what it was, or very near to what it was in March, 1870, before there had been any prospect of war. But as Mr. Gladstone very justly said, it needs no disposition to panic, —we ourselves should say it needs a wonderful amount of inaccessibility to reasonable fear,—to see that the practical demand for aid under the foreign guarantees given by England is far less unlikely to be made under the circumstances of Europe in 1871 than it was under the circumstances of Europe in 1870. In the first place, we have one such obligation more than we had then. But besides that,—which may be said to be rather a re-affirmation and definition of a former obligation than a really new one,—Europe ie now in the excitable con- dition caused by a complete revolution in the relative strength of its former constituent elements. On all sides there are new fears, new hopes, new dangers, new calculations. To every reasonable mind it will seem in the highest degree unlikely that many years can elapse without some new disturbance ; and Mr. Cardwell's plan of Army reform requires not a few years, but many, to effect any substantial increase of the strength of what we all care about most, our Army Reserves. At present he is adding to these reserves not at most more than at the rate of 9,000 well-drilled men in the year, and though the ratio will, of course, be an increasing one on the short-service system, Mr. Cardwell does not himself anticipate that we shall have in seven years' time above 81,000 men in our reserves,—a very small reserve compared with the military reserves of the Continental powers, and a very long time to wait for it. New troubles are nearly sure to occur long before seven years are out, and though, of course, we may not- be involved in them, we also may ; and if we are, the pro- gress towards creating an adequate reserve will by that time have been insignificant. Mr. Mundella must be perfectly aware that though it is quite possible under a wasteful system to retrench without any loss, or even with some slight gain to efficiency, it is never really possible to make a great stride in advance without an immediate increase of expendi- ture. What the country needs, in the present disturbed state of Europe, is a great stride in advance, and what the Govern- ment propose is a very inconsiderable step in advance ; though one opening the way, as we admit, to very radical improve- ments and economies in future. At all events, it is perfectly certain that to refuse all increase of the Estimates, to refuse all expenditure except for the abolition of purchase, is equi- valent to postponing all substantial increase of the military strength of England to a doubtful future, and this is what Mr. Mundane, as a practical man, well knows that his proposition really meant. We hold, therefore, that he was a dangerous coun- sellor, the rather that he counselled the Government in the direc- tion of their own predilections ; and we think that the Govern- ment acted with meritorious self-command in rejecting the counsel. Mr. Gladstone showed by his speech that he is quite anxious enough to construe our European pledges in a sense very liberal to ourselves, and not very liberal to those to whom these pledges have been given, without the additional incentive that we could not help them if we would. But it was this additional incentive which Mr. Mundella's speech tended,— for the next few years, at least,—to supply.
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