SIR.—When the old lady saw the giraffe, she said, 'I
don't believe it.' That seems to be the Government's attitude towards the Ian Smith regime; but it is time to forsake wishful thinking and personal animus and face harsh facts In the true African tradition, Rhodesia is now a one-party state. The Smith regime controls the armed forces, the police and the administration; and has an overwhelming majority in Parliament. Anyone who tried to form an active opposition or put forward an alternative government would quickly find himself under house arrest or banished to the wilderness. Much as we may dislike it, the regime is the de facto government of Rhodesia. It is therefore the only body with which we can negotiate, since it alone has the power to implement any undertakings given.
Economic sanctions can inflict great suffering on the innocent; but their record of political failures is lamentable. The first sufferers in Rhodesia will be the African workers and the moderate businessmen. The last will be the wealthy supporters of the Smith regime. They are in the position of the absentee Irish landlord who warned his tenants that they could not frighten him by shooting his agent.
It is assumed that the Government's object now is to bring a prosperous Rhodesia back to constitutional rule—not to appc.ase the African states, for the two aims are incompatible. It envisages two possible re- sults of sanctions The first is that Mr. Smith will throw in his hand in a few weeks, though there is no ■ visible reason why he should. The regime can last a long time even if the country is impoverished; and it knows that sanctions cost us much more than them.
The other possibility is that prolonged sanctions may reduce the country's economy to such chaos that riots and civil commotions would lead to a request to Britain to send troops to restore law and order. This request can only come from the Governor to give an air of legality. To cross the Zambesi in the face of strong opposition would be a D-Day operation; and would probably need two divisions—which we have not got—apart from logistic difficulties. When they have crossed the river and captured the Kariba power house, the troops' task is still undefined. With two warring European armies and two hostile African parties, the country would be a super-Congo. Rhodesia would become a 'running sore' like Algeria or Napoleon's Peninsular War; for, once the troops are in, they can never be got out.
The art of compromise is the greatest British virtue; and most of the Rhodesians are British too. Legal rights and moral duties are the first casualties in any war; and each side has been guilty of infringements though each thinks it is in the right. If these points are not over-emphasised and threats of future punish- ments are dropped. negotiations could begin; and the negotiators could strive to attain the possible, even at the sacrifice of the desirable. Otherwise, a pros- perous and progressive state will revert to barbarism.
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