Israel loses support
Edward Mortimer
Here we go again. Israel has occupied another piece of territory belonging to ecnIrse, no territorial ambitions in the area another of her Arab neighbours. She has, of concerned. Her action is taken in selfdefence, a long-delayed response to repeated and intolerable Arab provocation. It is absolutely necessary to ensure the security of her frontiers and the safety of her civilian PoPulation. Her troops are ready to withdraw as soon ' as there is an acceptable iagreement ensuring that the area can no mnger be used as a base for terrorism. The Arabs denounce the move, however, as fr.esh evidence of Israel's inherently expansionist nature. The UN passes resolutions lling for withdrawal. Mr Begin flies to washington to face strong American pressure. Inevitably attention centres on the terrns, timing and extent of Israeli withd,rawal from southern Lebanon. The pre scheduled questions —settlements in Sinai and the West Bank, Palestinian selfdetermination — are pushed into the background.
With luck, events will this time follow the pattern of 1957 rather than 1967: with 'Jews, under American pressure, dem ilitar.1s,ation of the area concerned and inst'Intent of a UN emergency force, rather than permanent occupation and colrisation justified first by Arab unwil„gness to negotiate, later by a jumble of 'erecences to defensible borders and to ancient and modern history. Israel's accepgince of Sunday's Security Council resolution is encouraging in this respect. Less e, neouraging are the statements about a security belt', Israeli troops remaining n i so, uthern Lebanon so long as necessary to M.alntain order', and the possible delegat!" of this task to the local Christian ilitia, who would have the 'right' to appeal lor renewed Israeli aid if they found themjives in difficulties. Already Dr Geula ehen, admittedly a right-wing extremist even in the context of Mr Begin's party, has been calling for the establishment of Jewish ,,s6ttlements in the newly occupied area. erY soon, no doubt, someone will be reminding us that in 1919 Lloyd George wanted the river Litani as the northern frontier of Palestine under British mandate, and 1Y reluctantly conceded the area to the I'rnch-mandated 'Etat du Grand Liban'. With every day that Israeli troops remain there the danger grows that southern Lebanon will come to be regarded as an inalienble part of the Land of Israel, to whose Inhabitants Mr Begin will be happy to offer Protection and 'self-rule' but in which 'foreign rule' cannot be tolerated.
What is unusual about this episode, as
compared to those of 1956 and 1967, is the bad press that Israel is getting in the West. The effects of the Israeli blitzkrieg on the civilian population (both Palestinian and Lebanese) are being reported in a way that they were not in the Gaza Strip in 1956, or even in the West Bank in 1967; and there seems to be a general feeling that this time Israel has 'gone too far'. There must be two sets of reasons for this. One is essentially technical: the accessibility of the Arab side to Western media coverage. Of course there were reporters on the Arab side in 197. I well remember the description by Nicholas Herbert, then The Times's Middle East Correspondent, of hcAir he lay on the floor of his Jerusalem hotel room while the Israeli tanks roared past outside. The problem was not one of physical access so much as of reporter's orientation. The 'story' was Israel's spectacular military achievement. The plight of the civilian population was not an obvious subject, and the Arab governments themselves, caught completely off balance, did not think until much later of directing media attention to it. The deliberate destruction (after the ceasefire) of three villages in the Latrun salient, was reported only by Michael Adams in the Guardian and the Sunday Times — and he for his pains was labelled a pro-Arab apologist and driven out of mainstream journalism.
The Arabs have learnt a certain amount about public relations since then, and Lebanon anyway has always been the most open Arab country for the Western media. Lebanon is a country where no one will stop you going near the fighting, if that is where you are foolish enough to want to go and you are prepared to pay over the odds for a taxi or a hired car.
The other set of reasons, not entirely unconnected with the first, comes under the heading of the law of diminishing returns.
Israel's military prowess is no longer really news. The myth of 'plucky little Israel' triumphing over overwhelming odds is wearing rather thin. Indeed the dis proportion is now clearly the other way about: Israel the superpower against the ragbag Palestinian army, normally capable only of kamikaze actions against women and children but now heroically if vainly resisting the advancing steamroller. Israel invading Lebanon, a small country incapable of controlling its own territory, let alone threatening anyone else's.
Yet one should see that the Israeli dilemma is genuine. The Palestinians did use southern Lebanon as a base for attacks on Israel which frequently claimed Israeli lives, even though they were not remotely a threat to the existence of the state. The Lebanese government was incapable of policing the area. The Syrians could have done the job, but Israeli strategists presumably considered that if there had to be a point of contact between Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon it was safer to have it on the Litani than along the old frontier. As long as one views the question in purely military terms, Israel's case is strong.
Morally, of course, it is much harder to justify the exaction of such a high price in Arab lives for each Israeli life lost; and politically too the price is liable to be very high in loss of international (especially American) and moderate Arab (especially Egyptian) goodwill. Yet the alternative — to attempt to deal with the political roots of Palestinian terrorism — is virtually unthinkable for Israel. The Palestinians in Lebanon are refugees, or the children of refugees, of 1948 vintage. They belong to the fait accompli before last. The world has long forgotten the UN resolutions asserting their right to return home and live in peace with their neighbours. It is hard enough trying to undo some of the results of the 1967 war — perhaps already not worth it now there is the 1978 war to worry about — without going back to right the wrongs of 1948. To a political question so acutely embarrassing it is much easier to give a military response.
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