TOPICS OF THE DAY.
LORD SALISBURY AT BRADFORD. THE most weighty and effective speech which Lord Salisbury delivered at Bradford on Wednesday brought out with marvellous force the great political danger which now threatens us. And that danger we may best describe as the temptation to make one Parlia- ment into a recruiting field for the next. The present Parliament has been that, and nothing else. From the first the Gladstonians sew that they had not nearly majority enough to carry any measures without having either the tacit assent, or at worst, the most hesitating and reluctant dissent, of the Opposition, and the consequence has been that they have devoted their whole energies to manceuvring for more cordial support after the next dissolution. Unquestionably they are not likely to succeed. We hope, indeed, that they may fail so conspicuously as to discourage party managers from pursuing the same tactics in any future innings. That would at least be bringing good out of evil. But in the meantime we sincerely hope that our own statesmen will take the lesson to heart, and take warning against the policy of beginning, directly they assume power, to think not so much of what the needs of the people really are, but what the local leaders in different constituencies would be likely to approve or disapprove, as tending to brighten or to depress the prospects of the party in any future elec- tion. No policy can be worse than for a Minister to regard himself as a recruiting-sergeant for his own political party. That is what both Lord Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt have been making of themselves ever since Mr. Gladstone resigned, and it is fortunate for the nation, as we have already said, that the gigantic efforts made by each have met with so very little success. Perhaps the reason of this failure is partly to be found in the very unsatisfactory and wasteful mode of procedure which the group system has forced upon Sir William Harcourt. As Lord Salisbury explained, when you have to keep a. composite army together, one fraction of which cares exclusively for Home-rule, a second for Disestablishment in one part of the Kingdom, a third for Disestablishment in another part of the Kingdom, a fourth for a great attack on the publicans, and a fifth for an alteration of the suffrage, it becomes of the utmost importance to keep these various sections from flying at each others' throats, as a great General would have kept the bands of mer- cenaries in a medheval army from flying at each others' throats. And Lord Salisbury showed how very difficult this is when the mercenaries, who are far too disinterested to be paid by money, but for that very reason are all the more exacting because they are all the more virtuous, have to be paid by proportional allotments of the time of the House of Commons. "The Welsh Church Bill," says Lord Salisbury, "is advanced at the slow rate of two nights a week. If it were advanced at the rate of four nights a week, then the probability is that Ireland, Scotland, and the Local Veto men would object, because their claims were being neglected. Sir William Harcourt must keep them all front to front with each other, and give each of them a satisfaction in its turn. That may be very pretty strategy, and it may give a great opportunity for the exhibition of tactics," but it ends in much cry and little wool; indeed, in vanity and vexation of spirit equally apportioned between four or five different sets of faddists. That is not the way to recruit soldiers for the next great electoral campaign. And yet what , better way can be invented of satisfying four or five totally different cliques of partisans who have each their own object in view, and who care exceedingly little for the special objects of their comrades ? To our mind, the hope of the Unionists is that their main object is the single object (which, no doubt, includes many others) of preserv- ing the integrity and raising the spirit of the nation, and • that this object really covers and stimulates all alike in all the minor ends for which they contend. We are united, ,while our opponents are distracted, by the political objects for _which the war is waged. But none the less, even the Unionists may be in some danger of falling into the temptation to make their reign the opportunity for a. trengthemng their party in the constituencies and attempt- ing to gratify the various shades and sections of their supporters. Hence, we earnestly hope that the conspicuous failure of that policy during the present Parliament will be a warning to our own side against turning their period of rule into an attempt to enlist recruits for the Parliament which is to follow. In the United States the various Presidents have discovered that nothing has done more to injure the repute of any Administration than the attempt, to curry favour with the people for the grant of a second four years of office to the President in power. And in England we believe it is still more true that to make one- Parliament the recruiting-ground for the Parliament which is to follow, is fatal policy as well as bad form. As Lord Salisbury says, it is far more likely to win the people, if a. Government with a small majority sets to work to carry good non-contentious measures, and refuses to attempt what with a small majority it is quite useless to attempt,. than it is to require their recruits to "go through a long series of evolutions, and to undergo a great deal of muscular fatigue, without moving a single inch." That is what Sir William Harcourt's recruits have been about ever since this Parliament was elected, and the only result is that when they are dispersed, a very much smaller number will return to the standard which he upholds.
Again, a very powerful part of Lord Salisbury's speech. was that in which he showed that the policy of the Gladstonian party in relation to the House of Lords,. means simply this, that we ought to treat a House or Commons with a minute majority for one side, exactly as we should treat a House of Commons with a very large majority for that side, in other words, that we should treat a doubtful majority of the people as if it were a perfectly decisive or overwhelming majority of the people. As he showed, the Gladstonians do not wish to- reform the Rouse of Lords, They would object more to a reformed House of Lords with a larger popular element in it, than they do to the present Rouse of Lords, and they say so. Nor do they wish to aliolish the House of Lords and leave the House of Commons confessedly master of the situation ; that would frighten the people, and they do not want to. frighten the people. What they want is a paralysed House of Lords which shall mask without restraining the despotism of the House of Commons, even when the majority in the House of Commons is a very indecisive one, and cannot be said to represent any clear resolve a the people. Even the present House of Lords yields, as they are perfectly aware, to a decisive majority, the meaning of which it is impossible to misconstrue. They did so in the case of the Irish Church Bill, and the Irish Land Bill, and the Household Suffrage Bills, and the Ballot Bill, and many others. But they did not yield when it was obvious that the nation had not made up its mind, and that a great majority in England was opposed to the narrow majority in the United Kingdom. And for standing in the way of a precipitate and doubtful con- clusion, the House of Lords is now denounced by the Gladstonians, and threatened -with perpetual paralysis. Can this be really described as a democratic policy ? Is there any other powerful democracy in existence that does not take securities, and very effective securities, against its own momentary waves of feeling and its own vacillations of purpose ? The people know their own instability of opinion, and how composite and incalcul- able are the forces which go to bring about a minute Parliamentary majority. Lord Rosebery's appeal to them to push the House of Lords out of their path, not only fell dead, but turned the tide from a doubtful adherence to Mr. Gladstone's policy, into a very decisive protest against:Lord Rosebery's. It is of no use to try to persuade such a democracy as ours that a small popular majority is as good as a large popular majority. They know very well that it is not,—that a small popular majority should regard itself as intrusted with a very moderate amount of power, while a very large popular majority may safely regard itself as intrusted with dictatorial power. Wise Govern- ments will act accordingly. Governments supported by small majorities should be prudent, tentative, and anxious to carry their soberer opponents with them. Only very decisive popular majorities may play the part which Mr. Gladstone played in 1869 and 1880, but which he ought not to have attempted either in 1886 or in 189Z when he ought to have seen clearly that he had not received the popular authority for which he had boldly asked to cancel Mr. Pitt's policy and substitute for it a great and hazardous experiment of his own.
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