HOW TRAFALGAR WAS FOUGHT.
THERE is plenty of excuse for the adoption of a loose and purely conventional theory as to how a battle was fought, when the battle took place long ago and was a confused battle, and when reputable evidence is scarce ; but there was much less excuse for the general acceptance of a wrong theory as to how Trafalgar was fought. That the common belief that Nelson changed all his plans on the day of the battle was a mistake is con- clusively proved by the Report which the Admiralty has just issued. We suspect that the plans of most ancient battles are simply " traditional," which is a polite way of saying that they are extremely unlikely to be accurate, but perhaps it does not greatly matter. The plan is good enough to justify the master in rapping over the knuckles the boy who places, let us say, Prince Rupert's cavalry a few hundred yards out of position, although Prince Rupert himself probably could not have said after the battle exactly where he had been at any given moment. But the history of Trafalgar is another matter, and the documentary evidence is good enough for accurate conclusions. It is really strange that it should have been so unscientifically treated. So far as we know, recent writers who have studied all the docu- ments bearing on the battle—writers like the late Admiral Colomb, Admiral Mark Kerr, Mr. Henry Newbolt, and Mr. Thursfield—have nearly all come to the conclu- sion that Nelson fought Trafalgar in essential accordance
with the plan which he and Collingwood had previously agreed upon. There is more in this matter than a mere academic point of interest. If the young Naval officer is encouraged to believe that in the most famous naval battle in history the carefully planned tactics of Nelson were thrown overboard at the last moment, and that the enemy was engaged " anyhow," he must necessarily conclude that the study of tactics need not weigh very heavily on a bumble person like himself. This would be a disastrous conclusion, and in our opinion the Admiralty wasted neither public money nor the brains of the able men it appointed as a committee of inquiry in arriving at the truth about Trafalgar. Sir Cyprian Bridge, Sir Reginald Custance, Dr. C. H. Firth, and the Admiralty Librarian formed the committee. They found a wrong theory in such successful possession of the field that it is expressed in all the well- known models of the battle—those exhibited in Greenwich College, in the Royal United Service Institution, and in the Victory.' With their Report the committee publish plans, prepared by Captain Tizard, which are the first plans of Trafalgar ever drawn to scale. Moreover, they give the positions of the ships relatively to one another in precise accordance with the information derived from the logs and journals.
Nelson arrived off Cadiz in the Victory' on September 28th, 1805, and took command of the fleet blockading the combined French and Spanish fleets under Villeneuve. He soon received his officers and explained to them what he called the "Nelson Touch "—the Touch which he told Lady Hamilton was " warranted never to fail." This in other words was his plan, already thought out in England, for engaging the enemy. To Lady Hamilton he described the effect of his exposition on his hearers. " It was like an electric shock. Some shed tears, all approved. It was new—it was singular—it was simple ' " Nelson afterwards discussed the plan in ever greater detail day by day with Collingwood. On October 9th the plan was put in writing. The original of this in Nelson's own writing is in the British Museum. " The Nelson Touch " was briefly as follows. The order of sailing was to be also the order of battle, so that no time would be wasted in preliminary manoeuvring. Two lines of sixteen ships each were to be formed, and there was to be in addition an advanced squadron of eight fast ships to be used as circumstances might require. As a matter of fact, on the day of battle, October 21st, Nelson had only twenty-seven ships all told. The advance squad- ron had to be abandoned, but the essential plan as to the employment of the two lines held good. Twelve ships were in the weather column under Nelson's own command, and fifteen ships were in the lee column under Collingwood. Collingwood was to have the entire direction of his own division in attaching the enemy. Nelson reserved to him- self complete liberty of action with his own division, but he expressly undertook to do his best to secure that Collingwood should not be interrupted or unduly harassed in pressing his attack home. The first and chief attack was to be delivered by Collingwood with superior numbers on the French rear. Nelson was to deliver his attack later, and his early movements were designed indirectly to help Collingwood by puzzling the enemy, as we shall see. There was not to be a simultaneous attack.
Why has it ever been supposed that this plan was not acted upon 11 Soon after the battle widely divergent accounts of how the battle was fought became current at Gibraltar, where the fleet went to refit, and prominent among them was that expressed in a letter from Captain Moorsom, of the Revenge.' He wrote : " A regular plan was laid down by Lord Nelson some time before the action, but was not acted upon." It is true that Captain Harvey contended that Nelson's original plan was carried out, but for some reason or other Captain Moorsom's view prevailed. All this time the evidence of Collingwood himself might easily have disposed of the opinion which the Service thus casually accepted and which gradually became stereotyped. Collingwood's account of the battle, written on the follow- ing day, clearly conveys the information—unless words are not to be allowed their proper meaning—that " the Nelson Touch " was by no means ignored. " As the mode of our attack," wrote Collingwood, " had been previously deter- mined on, and communicated to the flag officers and captains, few signals were necessary, and none were made except to direct close order as the ships bore down." Collingwood, indeed, knowing that no signals were to be
expected from the Victory ' as regards the handling of his own line, was astonished and vexed when he saw a signal being hoisted on board the Victory.' " I wish Nelson would stop signalling," he exclaimed. " We all know what we have to do." A moment later he saw that the signal did not merit his impatience. It was the famous one : " England expects that every man will do his duty." The traditional, and wrong, view of the battle has been that Nelson, having suddenly changed his plan of letting Collingwood attack the enemy's rear with superior numbers —fifteen ships against twelve—while Nelson himself first watchfully protected Collingwood and afterwards used his own division for the completion of the victory, substituted for it a simultaneous attack. In the model at the United Service Institution the British ships are shown advancing simultaneously in two columns in line ahead at right angles to the enemy's line. "Form the order of sailing in two columns," which was Nelson's first signal on October 21st, may be used to support the traditional view, but, of course, it does not necessarily do so. One more proof of how thoroughly the traditional view was accepted may be given. In the Signal Book of 1816 a new signal was introduced for the following move- ment: "Cut through the enemy's line in the order of sailing in two columns." That is to say the signal was meant to order the tactics which were supposed to have triumphed at Trafalgar, but which as a matter of fact were not employed. The brevity and rarity of Nelson's signals surely in themselves suggest the operation of a plan that was going on, as it were, automatically. At 6.10 a.m. Nelson signalled, as we have already said, " Form the order of sailing in two columns." Three minutes later came the signal, " Bear up and sail large on E.N.E. course." At 6.46 he signalled "Bear up and sail large on E. course." There were no other general signals ; all the other signals were to particular ships. Villeneuve, thinking that Nelson was about to attack his rear in force, wore all his ships together and formed a close-hauled line of battle on the port tack. Even when that operation was effected, Nelson made no change in his tactics. The wind was light and rather variable, but the Report of the Committee shows to demonstration that Collingwood delivered the attack, so far as was humanly possible, exactly as it was prescribed for him in the Memorandum. Nelson, too, played the part he had set himself. He secured that the attack of Collingwood should be interrupted as little as possible. He prevented the van of the enemy from coming to the support of the centre or the rear, and while he threatened the van he concealed his real intention of attacking the centre. Nelson went on with his feint on the van till it could neither tack nor wear to any advantage. He then turned to his subsequent task of attacking the centre (to which it was now too late for the van to render any help), and he made good the destruction which Collingwood had already fairly begun in the rear. That, in brief, is how the battle was won. The " Nelson Touch " was acted upon and vindicated. It is not likely to be asserted again that it was abandoned.
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