THE PARTITION OF ENGLAND.
-THERE is practically no doubt that some sort of scheme for a general combination to strip England of what foreigners consider her ill-gotten acquisitions was at least laid before the leading European diplomatists. It even seems probable that in the West African Franco- German Convention signed the other day Germany made actual sacrifices of her pretensions so as to pave the way for joint action ; at all events the German papers are crying out that they were tricked in the negotiations. Nor is there any shadow of doubt that, for the moment at least, all such projects are abandoned. But it is interesting, and it may be instructive, to consider what main lines the Continental diplomatists would work on if they sat down • round a table to draft an agreement for the partition of England.
Suppose, then, that the great battle had been fought. Suppose that the Sedan of our Navy had come upon us, that our ports were blockaded and all supplies cut off by a joint fleet of the Powers patrolling in sight of our coasts, and that while England is starving into submission the plenipotentiaries sit down at Paris, Berlin, or St. Petersburg to arrange the division. Just so they sat down at Vienna when Napoleon was in Elba. The work to be done then was mainly work of restitution,—restoring the conquests which Napoleon had made within ten or fifteen years to the original owners. Yet the dis- agreements proved so violent that the only thing which prevented the partitioning Powers from flying at each other's throats was Napoleon's landing in France. Would the task be easier when the countries to be divided had either known no Sovereign but the English Sovereign, or were at least long-standing possessions where any conflicting title had long since died out ? At first sight the lines of agreement would seem obvious enough. America, of course, must have been bought off with the assurance of a free hand in Canada,—for it is practically certain that no combination of European Powers could crush an Anglo-Saxon coalition into prostration. Posts in the Eastern Hemisphere would be no temptation to her. But if we are not greatly mistaken, America would see in this occasion a great chance of extending the Monroe doctrine to the West Indies. She might fairly say to Europe : Canada is ours by the logic of events, since, England's naval power being broken, Canada must join us sooner or later, and the Monroe doctrine for- bids your attempting its conquest. You must give us some- tin lig else. Give us the British West Indies, and allow Cuba to declare its independence of Spain and join us.' There is no doubt a large party in the States who would be opposed to such a policy, but the Sugar Trust and the z_.:obacco traders, who would see an enormous profit in the arrangement, might overbear them ; and the Great Powers would no doubt gladly consent to buy America at the expense of Spain.
All this might be arranged without too much squabbling. France would certainly claim Newfoundland, to settle once for all the long-standing quarrel over her fisheries there, and America would see a menace in French stations so near the French-speaking community of the Great Lakes. But setting the New World out of the question, and assuming—it is a large assumption—that Europe would acquiesce in an arrangement which made the United States practically para- mount from Baffins Bay to Cape Horn, Asia and Africa would afford matter enough for dispute. France would take West Africa over bodily, and the Nile into the bargain. Germany would take British East Africa and the Cape, so that the whole continent would be virtually divided between these Powers. Russia would take over India, extend her railway from Mery to Peshawur, and connect Bombay with St. Petersburg. As for Australia and New Zealand, those communities would no doubt be encouraged to declare their independence, since in the general exhaustion after a great struggle no European Power would care to take over the very awkward job of re- ducing them ; but, probably by a tacit agreement among diplomatists, they would be recognised as within Germany's sphere of influence. Such would probably be the main lines. But just imagine the quarrelling when it came to working the thing out. Naturally each Power would depreciate its own slice. France would say to Germany : We really congratulate you! You have all the riches of Kimberley and all the riches of Johannesburg, to say nothing of the gold that is to come out of Rhodesia. Look at us : from the Congo mouth to the Nile mouth is there a mine working ? Besides, we make over to you a highly civilised community full of admirable white subjects, not mere negroes, Arabs, and fellaheen.' To which Germany would answer : 'This civilised community consists of turbulent English and contumacious Dutch, who do not appreciate the blessing that has been conferred upon them, and who will need an army of one hundred thousand men to subdue them. Besides, once they are subdued, it is a far cry from the North Sea to Cape Town, and the only coaling-stations we have in the interval are Ascension and St. Helena. It is absolutely essential that we should have Sierra Leone for a port of call." What, and bring in German trade into the middle of our possessions ? ' the French would reply. Scarcely, we thank you.' There at once is a divergence of interests hardly to be got over. Take another quarter of the world. Germany holds New Guinea, and may be supposed to cast an eye upon Australia. At least, she would say : 'Let us make clean work of it in Polynesia ; we take over all these little islands, and while we are about it British Borneo would naturally come to us too.' On the contrary. France would say: 'It belongs to the Straits Settlements, which will make our Far-Eastern colonies really worth having. We shall also take Hong-kong, for China must learn to respect us.' But at this point Russia would interpose. Hong-kong,' she would say, naturally belongs to the Power which is on such friendly relations with the Celestial Empire as to be privileged to run railways through its territory ; and the Straits Settlements are an essential link between that and India." Was it for this,' France would retort, that we abandoned our historic claim to the Empire of Dupleix, and made over to you the rich peninsula over- flowing with highly manageable races, with its railways counted not by thousands of miles but by tens of thousands? It is an estate in such perfect order that you have only to walk in and receive the keys and title-deeds at Calcutta ; a possession that gives you ports on two seas. The least you can do is to allow us to take the Straits Settlements, and also we claim Ceylon and Burmah, which are in no way integral parts of India." Have it your own way,' Russia might very possibly answer ; we are friends and we do not quarrel over trifles. We should have liked Hong-kong, but very probably we may make some equally convenient arrangement with China. But you will of course understand that the sovereign Power in India must necessarily control the Suez Canal. You will not mind if we take Aden and Cyprus ; and, in the interests of civilisation, you will allow us to annex Crete. Because, you see, the day cannot be far distant when we shall be at Constantinople, and we mean to be masters in the Levant. You will naturally be supreme in the Western Mediterranean, having Biserta and Toulon. It would, however, be indecent not to restore Gibraltar to Spain ; and, besides, she is not likely to hurt anybody. There is also Malta,—but Italy, you see, has got nothing, and it would be really very nice for her to have Malta; it would please her without making much difference to us.'
This is merely the briefest outline of the probable ambitions and the certain disagreements. France and Russia would contend for control of the Suez Canal. Whichever got it, Germany would be obliged to see her South African Empire separated from her ports by an interminable length of harbourless coast on West Africa, and on the East by the Canal, both lines of com- munications at the mercy of one or other of the Powers which she always has, and must have, for dangerous neigh- bours. Italy would certainly claim a gratification, and it does not seem clear where it is to come from ; and as for Austria, she certainly would have to be rewarded ; but what British dominion is there to give her ? She would clamour for an instant partition of Turkey and the right to get to the sea at Salonica. Russia would not be averse to the scheme ; and if France objected, France might be pacified with Syria. Germany, which would be making nothing over the transaction, would probably insist in that case upon leave to annex the Philippines, and constitute for herself a really paying establishment in the Malay Archipelago. So that the partition of England would be apt to lead to a partition of the world. But a very curious point is that, although England would certainly be no loser if Germany's position were weakened, Germany is, of the three leading Powers, the one which would gain least by a cutting up of her rival. Even with our almost inexpug- nable naval ascendency, and with all the bolts and rivets that keep together our widespread Empire, we only hold our dependencies at the Cape and in Australasia by allowing to them an independence wholly incompatible with German notions of government. If Germany had even the Cape, she would find it the most expensive white elephant that ever belonged to any stud. All the gold that ever came out of the Rand and all the diamonds of Kimberley joined to all the money that speculators have dropped over them, would not pay the bill of maintaining her hold upon such a possession. Very probably the German Emperor's scheme did not extend to a definite plan of partition ; he may have merely projected the knocking out of some of our bolts and rivets, and trusting that the Empire would fall to pieces. But practically we should fight to the bitter end for any single coaling-station, and by the time that fight was over, Europe, panting and bleeding from its victory—if it gained the victory—would think of Alsace and Lorraine, and France's amazing recovery, and would determine to make a clean end of the Power that they had with such labour shattered to pieces. They would make England, if they could, as Holland or as Spain. But if it ever came to that, and the spoil were in division, we do not believe that the diplomatist is yet born who could keep the victors from coming to blows over the quarry. Out of the war in which England was defeated another and not less terrible war would arise, and we firmly believe that the indomitable spirit of our race would find itself allies where it had before met enemies, and renew the battle in a twelvemonth.
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